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Key messages
l	 This research examines how local authority enforcement and regulation in the UK private rented sector (PRS) 
could be improved. The findings are based on 70 in-depth interviews with key stakeholders and professionals 
from 13 UK local authorities. 
l	 Much thinking about regulation and research on enforcement in the PRS focuses on deterrence – using formal 
processes to control bad behaviour. It fails to account for the wide range of other tools and approaches that can 
be effective in achieving compliance.   
l	 Local authority strategies and approaches to regulating the sector are shaped on a local level. There are at least 
four types of approaches operating in the sector: 
m	 Light-touch approaches: focusing mainly on reactive informal activity with limited use of formal powers. 
Proactive compliance-focused activities such as advice or training are generally not provided. 
m	 Hard-line approaches: focusing on formal activity and punishing non-compliant landlords. These councils 
have high rates of prosecution and other formal action. There is officially no informal approach and limited 
compliance-focused activities are provided. 
m	 Compliance-focused approaches: that focus primarily on collaboration but are willing to escalate the 
response to formal activity if necessary. A range of compliance-focused activities are provided as part of the 
strategic approach. 
m	 Creative approaches: that focus not only on enforcement but on alternative regulatory techniques which aim 
to also address tenant vulnerability, poverty and homelessness. Such holistic approaches are based on strong 
partnership working and integrated service delivery. 
l	 Local authority strategies are shaped by resource availability, the level of political support locally, leadership, 
how the problem is understood and defined, geographical factors, the way in which teams are organised and 
configured and how the local authority views itself in relation to the PRS.  
l	 Our findings indicate there are significant limitations and challenges associated with relying either on light-touch 
or hard-line strategies. Regulation in the sector is more likely to be effective when local authorities aim to find a 
balance between the two approaches. 
l	 Some local authorities are adopting the principles of responsive regulation as a means of combining deterrence 
and compliance-focused approaches. However, this is only occasionally adopted at a strategic level which can 
lead to inconsistency in the application of the law. 
l	 The sector needs to re-think the way in which outcomes and impacts are understood. The number of 
prosecutions or other formal activity are not appropriate measures of success. The aim of regulation within this 
context is to improve standards by achieving compliance. 
l	 A positive way forward is not only to consider the application of formal penalties but to take into account broader 
regulatory techniques. This includes aims and purpose (does the adopted understanding of the problem capture 
all relevant dimensions?), holistic thinking and multi-agency working (what is the role of other organisations 
within this process?), internal design (how are PRS teams are configured? Do they work collaboratively?), and how 
outcomes are defined and measured. 
8l	 Across the UK, there is a need for an effective and responsive database that evolves in real time and consequently 
allows local authorities to understand the sector and the way in which it is changing. In England, a national system 
of registration should be introduced. 
l	 Our findings illustrate an exclusive focus on formal enforcement overlooks some of the most important work of 
local authorities. Certain characteristics of the UK PRS indicate that less interventionist measures will often be 
preferable. 
l	 The following key principles and approaches may facilitate the effective use of compliance-focused activities.
m	 Aiming for a balance between deterrence and compliance-focused approaches. 
m	 Designing and delivering compliance-focused activities at a sector wide and strategic level.
m	 Making decisions on the specific blend of enforcement approaches which are appropriate to the local context 
based on data and evidence. 
m	 Adopting more nuance in the language of non-compliance. Policy discussions which suggest a binary 
between the majority of responsible landlords and those that are “criminal” or “rogue” are unhelpful. 
m	 Providing adequate funding to ensure councils can adopt appropriate and effective responses to the changing 
nature and context of the PRS.
m	 Consider prevention and the role of local authorities in encouraging adherence to standards.
l	 The regulatory efforts of local authorities in the PRS are seriously undermined by the low fines and other sentences 
issued by the courts. Clear sentencing guidance is required. 
l	 Local authorities should adopt a tenant-focused approach which focuses on addressing the advice and support 
needs of vulnerable renters, for example, through effective signposting or referral processes. 
housingevidence.ac.uk
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Executive summary 
Introduction
Poor property conditions and variable standards of housing management in the private rented sector (PRS) are 
among the most important housing issues facing the UK today. In response to these challenges, regulation of the UK 
PRS has been significantly restructured over the last fifteen years.1 Regulatory policy is changing at different speeds 
in each of the four jurisdictions, and across the UK local authorities now have a broader range of powers to improve 
standards and affect landlord behaviour. 
Local authorities however currently face the challenge of meeting increased demand for their services with 
diminishing resources. Across the UK there are widespread criticisms regarding the inadequacy of current 
enforcement activities. There is currently a lack of research exploring how various PRS strategies and approaches are 
shaped on a local level. 
In this context, our research aim was:
l	 To investigate how UK local authorities are developing strategies to improve their PRS, and to provide suggestions 
for how regulation and enforcement in the sector could be improved.
The more specific research questions we addressed were: 
l	 How are local authorities enforcing the law aimed at tackling low standards in the UK PRS?
l	 What PRS strategies are local authorities adopting and how do they combine formal and informal approaches? 
l	 What can other local authorities learn from the system and approaches adopted that can be used to help shape 
decisions on regulating the PRS?
These research questions were addressed in two stages. Stage 1 involved seven semi-structured telephone interviews 
with key stakeholder professional participants from national tenant groups and landlord groups and and two 
interviews with participants working within Rent Smart Wales. Stage two of the research involved in-depth interviews 
with 61 professionals from across 13 UK local authorities. The sample included a wide range of individuals working at a 
managerial and strategical level and those responsible for enforcing the legislation “on the ground”. Analysis included 
consideration of written enforcement strategies and related documentation (where available).
Setting the context: different approaches to regulation 
Understanding what drives landlords to comply with rules is fundamental to developing effective regulation. Similarly, 
the motivations and behaviours of tenants, local authorities – housing and trading standards officials - will shape 
compliance. In the UK PRS there is currently little systematic research on issues of motivations in which to ground 
policy assumptions and responses. Why do landlords comply, or not, with the law? How and why do enforcement 
agencies select their approach to enforcement? 
There is a literature on regulation and compliance which offers a more comprehensive approach to thinking about 
how to improve compliance and therefore standards in the PRS. 
1 For an overview of these regulatory changes see A. Marsh,  K. Gibb (2019) The private rented sector in the UK: An overview of the policy and regulatory landscape 
(Accessed: 15/4/20).
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The different approaches to regulation are: 
1. Command-and-control or deterrence-focused: Much regulatory activity adopts a deterrence-focused approach 
which involves setting rules, monitoring adherence to those rules and applying sanctions where appropriate. This 
approach has been subject to sustained criticism, partly because it does not capture the varied activities of officers 
on the frontline. 
2. Responsive regulation: This offers an alternative approach. It is based upon the idea of a ‘pyramid of enforcement’ 
(Figure 1). The presumption is that most regulatory responses start at the base of the pyramid (involving more 
informal actions) and will rise up the pyramid (to more formal activities) if compliance is not forthcoming. Much 
regulatory activity in the PRS can be seen as adding new and higher tiers to the regulatory pyramid.
3. De-centred regulation: This embraces processes of self-regulation and the activities of actors (other than the 
state) who may play a role in regulating the sector. Critics complain that self-regulation is not as effective as 
regulation by public authorities. This approach however enables us to consider a broader range of mechanisms 
through which behaviour change in the sector might be achieved.  
4. Risk-based regulation: This includes focusing resources on particular areas of concern.  Focusing entirely on 
“high risk” can lead to an increase of risk in “low risk” parts of the sector. Mixed strategies – such as accompanying 
targeting of high risks with unpredictable random inspections on low risk subsectors – may be necessary to keep 
risks low.
Figure 1: Pyramid of Enforcement
housingevidence.ac.uk
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The UK picture: law and policy
There have been significant shifts in the regulation of the PRS across the devolved governments. There has been 
some convergence over issues such as licensing of houses in multiple occupation, and local government being the 
sector regulator. But there has been considerable divergence over issues such as licensing of landlords and properties, 
and registration of landlords.2
Housing law and the regulation of standards 
England: After a long period of deregulation, in recent years there has been considerable re-regulation of the landlord 
and tenant relationship. New statutory provisions regulate various documents and certificates that must now be 
provided to a tenant. There is a new condition that the property is fit for human habitation. The Tenant Fees Act 2019 
restricts the fees and amount of tenancy deposit that can be levied. New enforcement powers have been granted 
to local authorities under the Housing and Planning Act 2016 (including the ability to apply civil penalties for certain 
offences). The Energy Efficiency (Private Rented Property) (England and Wales) Regulations 2015 requires all residential 
tenancies to have a rating of at least “E”.
Wales: Although the provisions of the Housing Act 2004 in England apply equally to Wales, the enforcement regimes 
are different. For example, the civil penalty regime does not apply as this was introduced by the Housing and 
Planning Act 2016. The Energy Efficiency Regulations also apply in Wales because they relate to matters not devolved 
to the Welsh Government. The major intervention by the Welsh Government has been the requirement for all 
landlords in Wales to be registered, and landlords and lettings agents must be licensed for that purpose. Rent Smart 
Wales is responsible for processing registrations, issuing licenses and enforcement. The other major intervention has 
been the Renting Homes (Wales) Act 2016. However, that Act is not yet in force in Wales. 
Scotland: The Private Housing (Tenancies)(Scotland) Act 2016 introduced the private residential tenancy, which is an 
open-ended tenancy. Since 2004, all landlords must be registered which requires that they be a fit and proper person. 
Local authorities are responsible for the administration and enforcement of the scheme. After 1st April 2020, the E+ 
rating has been required on all newly rented properties.3
Northern-Ireland: There is a mandatory registration scheme for landlords in Northern Ireland, the purpose of which 
is to be “light touch” to enable communication and better regulation of the sector.4 Accordingly, there is no fit and 
proper person requirement. Private Tenancies (NI) Order 2006 enabled protection of tenancy deposits; enacted when 
regulations introduced in 2012 required protection of deposits within approved Tenancy Deposit Schemes from 2013. 
Before the Northern Ireland Assembly was dissolved, a range of further interventions in the PRS were being discussed, 
with comparisons being made between developments made by the other devolved governments and Northern 
Ireland.  
Policy Issues 
Registration and licensing: 
l	 Landlord registration can be used as a device to monitor growth and decline in the sector and provide 
information to landlords. However, there are data gaps across the devolved governments between the number of 
landlords operating in the sector and those held on the database.
l	 The amount and level of information distributed to landlords varies across schemes and between different local 
authorities. 
2 T. Moore (2017), “The convergence, divergence and changing geography of regulation in the UK’s private rented sector”, International Journal of Housing Policy, 17(3): 444-
56.
3 This requirement has been suspended until the Covid-19 crisis has come to an end. 
4 Department for Social Development (2010), Building Solid Foundations, Belfast: DSD.
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l	 There are issues around data sharing. In Northern Ireland these restrictions significantly impact on local authorities’ 
ability to use the data to understand the sector, communicate with landlords and target enforcement action.
l	 Data sharing restrictions have been addressed in Wales by a memorandum of understanding between local 
authorities and Rent Smart Wales.
Civil wrongs: 
l	 There has been a move away from traditional forms of prosecution towards financial penalties, levied by way of a 
civil penalty (England), rent penalty notices (Scotland), or fixed penalty notice (Wales and Northern Ireland).
l	 This move has created new issues around the variability in the use of the penalties and around its collection. 
Participants expressed diverse views regarding their role and effectiveness.
l	 Our findings suggest that the effectiveness of rent penalty notices in Scotland may be undermined by the 
introduction of Universal Credit and the inability of local authorities to request termination of the benefit at source. 
Two-tier authorities (England):
l	 The existence of two-tier authorities in England, and the awkward distribution of responsibilities between them, 
means that there is a need for a more streamlined approach in organising those responsibilities. This can be 
resolved locally, but national guidance would be welcomed.
Legislative development 
l	 Reflecting longstanding concerns,5 participants in Scotland and England criticised the law governing the PRS as 
fragmented, opaque and lacking strategic focus. Calls were made for consolidation and simplification of the law as 
a means of facilitating more effective enforcement practices.
Short-term funding:
l	 Short-term funding streams have proved problematic for local authorities and do not assist the development of 
strategic approaches.
Enforcement strategies and styles 
UK local authorities are responsible for developing regulatory and enforcement strategies to address poor standards 
and management practices in their PRS. On a strategic level this includes decisions on the tools and activities that are 
prioritised. 
l	 Informal enforcement action directed at the individual landlord or letting agent includes education, advice or 
guidance, persuasion, and negotiation. 
l	 Formal enforcement activity includes legal action, for example, serving statutory notices, civil penalties or 
prosecuting landlords. 
l	 Compliance-focused activities targeted at the wider sector can include dedicated advisory services, landlord 
training, accreditation schemes, newsletters or landlord forums.
5  Marsh and Gibb, The Evolving Private Rented Sector
housingevidence.ac.uk
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Findings suggest that at least four types of strategy currently operate in the sector: i) light-touch approaches, ii) hard-
line approaches, iii) compliance-focused approaches, and iv) creative approaches.
Some local authorities in the UK favour non-coercive activities and a “light-touch approach”. Adequate resource 
investment, political support, robust enforcement policies and a strong strategic approach are key factors that 
contribute to effective enforcement. These factors are however largely absent from local authorities adopting a light-
touch approach.
Because of the perceived weaknesses of light-touch approaches, some UK local authorities are moving towards more 
“hard-line” or “deterrence-focused’ strategies” that place the use of criminal sanctions to the fore. However, there are 
limitations and challenges associated with relying this style of enforcement as the primary means of regulating the 
sector (see below).
14
Some local authorities and Rent Smart Wales are seeking ‘a synergy between punishment and persuasion’6 whilst 
prioritising a “compliance-focused” approach. These enforcement agencies are open to using formal tools where 
necessary, but the primary response is to help landlords comply (rather than impose penalties). These agencies appear 
to occupy a middle ground between light-touch and hard-line enforcement approaches.
Some authorities appeared to be adopting “creative approaches”. These local authorities are distinctive in their 
understanding of the problem and possible resolutions, and their adoption of alternative regulatory techniques. Poor 
housing standards are seen as part of a more complex reality, with issues related to poverty, deprivation and tenant 
vulnerability comprising a key part.
6 R. Baldwin, M. Cave and M. Lodge, (2011) Understanding Regulation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
housingevidence.ac.uk
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Enforcement styles
Decisions on pursing hard or soft enforcement strategies in authorities do not always reflect the opinions and 
activities of officers. In some cases, officers adopt a flexible and collaborative approach believing it to be more 
successful in changing behaviours or attitudes in the long run, even though the official position of their local 
authority was to be hard-line. 
Obstacles to effective enforcement 
The findings indicate there are significant limitations and challenges associated with light-touch strategies that 
rely totally on persuasion or informal activities and those that are hard-line and based mostly on deterrence and 
punishment. 
Informal approaches: 
l	 The effectiveness of informal activity depends on the motivations and behaviours of those being regulated. Lack 
of awareness of the rules and inadvertent non-compliance among small landlords was highlighted by several 
authorities as the paramount challenge. 
l	 Many local authorities reported that it was rare that their response would need to be escalated to more formal 
action illustrating the effectiveness of informal activities in achieving compliance. Where non-compliance is due to 
a lack of understanding or awareness, information and support is required rather than the big stick.
l	 The main risk of informal activity is that in areas without a real threat of formal action, landlords may simply 
disregard the local authority. Evidence from light-touch authorities demonstrates that relying heavily on an 
informal approach without possible escalation is exploited by a small minority of landlords.
l	 Informal activities can take longer than enforcement and there appears to be inconsistency regarding when the 
response will be escalated. 
Deterrence-focused approaches: 
l	 Highly coercive instruments such as prosecutions are expensive and require substantial administrative resources in 
order to be effective. A lack of resources made it impossible for officers to adhere to a hard-line approach. 
l	 Under-reporting on standards by tenants, gaining access to properties and finding tenants willing to testify were 
additional key challenges. Migrant communities were reported to be particularly reluctant to approach the local 
authority due to a lack of awareness of council services, low expectations of property conditions, and a fear of 
public services or authority figures. 
l	 The effectiveness of formal enforcement measures depends on court sanctions being sufficiently severe, which is, 
however, rarely the case. 
l	 To prioritise punishment, particularly where insufficient advice or assistance is provided, risks undermining the 
good will of those who are willing to comply. 
16
Demonstrating outcomes and impacts: 
The impact of different enforcement strategies and approaches is rarely monitored or assessed, so exploring the 
causal impact of informal or deterrence-focused activities is difficult.
l	 Both local authorities and the wider sector tend to confuse the output of local authority activity (e.g. number 
of prosecutions) with its outcome or impact (e.g. number of properties improved). Formal activity is not an 
appropriate measure of success since the goal of regulation is not to secure prosecutions, but to improve 
standards by achieving compliance.
l	 Although informal activity is often recorded in the form of case notes, this data was only analysed by a few 
participating enforcement agencies.
l	 Not all local authorities regularly communicate their successes and activities to the wider sector. Keeping landlords 
up to date on the outcomes and activities is a crucial aspect of building effective landlord engagement and 
achieving compliance. 
New regulatory approaches
The limitations associated with relying on either a deterrence-focused or informal approach raises questions regarding 
the extent to which local authorities are adopting alternative regulatory approaches. 
Self-monitoring and co-regulation
l	 Feedback from participants suggests episodic compliance is common in the UK PRS. This is where a regulatee will 
obey the rules in the runup to an inspection or following another local authority intervention such as a phone call. 
Obedience to the rules therefore appears to depend on local authorities being active in monitoring adherence. 
l	 Two participating local authorities tried to operate co-regulatory schemes but had encountered several challenges. 
If inadequate training, assessment, or development is provided to landlords to help them meet standards before 
accreditation, the scheme essentially becomes a self-certification exercise and is open to exploitation. 
l	 In several case studies accreditation schemes formed part of the package of compliance-focused activities offered 
to landlords. There was a feeling however that generally these schemes only capture landlords who were already 
willing and able to comply.  Particularly if used in isolation, the role of accreditation schemes may be relatively 
limited.
Responsive Regulation: 
l	 Some local authorities in England are successfully applying civil penalties as part of a responsive regulatory 
approach. There is also evidence of the principles of responsive regulation being adopted in some areas in 
Scotland and by Rent Smart Wales. 
l	 Civil penalties and rent penalty notices are seen as less effective for the most serious criminal offences and officers 
would sometimes immediately escalate the response to a higher tier on the regulatory pyramid. Prosecution 
remains an important tool at the local authority’s disposal. 
l	 Responsive regulation is however only occasionally consciously adopted as part of the overarching strategic 
approach and there is a lack of relevant organisational policies and procedures in place. We identified only one 
example of a graded response to enforcement being outlined in a written local authority enforcement strategy. 
This can lead to inconsistency in the application of the law. 
housingevidence.ac.uk
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Discussion and recommendations 
The importance of a strategic approach: England, Scotland, Wales7
l	 A significant culture change may be needed. Local authorities need to accept that the PRS is a significant player in 
their local housing markets which requires strategic thought and organisation.
l	 In developing a successful strategic approach, local authorities should not only consider the application of formal 
penalties, but also broader regulatory techniques. This includes: 
1) Aims and purpose: An overarching goal, related organisational aims, and a clear definition of the problems at 
hand is key to regulating the sector in a more strategic and responsive way. Local authorities should consider if 
their understanding of the problem captures all relevant dimensions. 
2) Holistic thinking: The development of a holistic strategy takes account of vulnerable populations and tenant 
needs in the PRS. It provides an opportunity to think creatively and draw in other organisations where needed. 
3) Multi-agency working: Partnership-working is essential both to identify non-compliant landlords or letting 
agents and to identify and provide support for vulnerable claimants.
4) Internal organisation: Giving strategic thought to the sector will require local authorities to consider the 
role of enforcement officers and the way in which the PRS teams are configured. Organising PRS licensing or 
landlord registration alongside other licensing activities can lead to inefficiency, lack of communication and 
confusion regarding the delegation of roles and responsibilities.
5) Adopting an outcomes focused approach can help local authorities move away from a more traditional 
output-focused approach. Once the ultimate aim or goal has been agreed, local authorities will need to make 
an evidence-informed decision on the desired outcomes; the changes or benefits that they hope will result 
from their enforcement activity. 
Improving the availability of data 
l	 Low level geographical information is key if local authorities are to successfully develop strategies that exert effective 
leverage on different landlord types and local housing market conditions. 
l	 Unless significant changes are introduced in the institutional architecture of landlord organisations, we are a long 
way from co-regulation as a plausible solution. 
l	 In England, we believe a national system of registration will be the only means of providing local authorities with 
the data they need to regulate the sector effectively. 
l	 The following three key factors will need to be taken into consideration in introducing and improving national 
registration schemes:
1)  Identifying non-compliance: The sector is characterised by fluidity and a lack of landlord knowledge about 
relevant requirements. Proactive enforcement, data sharing protocols and joint working are key in addressing 
the disparity between the number of landlords operating in the sector and the numbers registered.
7 In Northern Ireland, the housing functions with local authorities is limited. The development of housing strategy rests with the Department for Communities and 
statutory responsibility for homelessness with Northern Ireland Housing Executive.
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2) Scheme objectives: National systems of registration or licensing require purpose. In Scotland and Northern 
Ireland participants described a deficit in purpose. Many local authorities in Scotland are still focusing on the 
administration of the scheme rather than on making it more policy purposeful.
3) Information sharing agreements: If the information is used in a passive manner or cannot be accessed by 
local authorities, there may be little point in having it. In Northern Ireland current data sharing restrictions 
significantly limit the national registration scheme’s usefulness as a means of targeting enforcement and 
communicating with the sector at a local level. Local authorities in Northern Ireland also lack incentives to 
enforce it. 
Maximising the effectiveness of compliance-focused activity
l	 An exclusive focus on formal enforcement overlooks some of the most important aspects of the work of local 
authorities. The data illustrates, in some cases, an increased emphasis on providing advice and information 
through dedicated advisors, helplines, training sessions, and other support mechanisms. 
l	 Inadequate knowledge of the rules and capacity to comply appears to be particularly salient factors that affect 
compliance in the UK PRS. This suggests that compliance-focused activity will often be appropriate. 
l	 Our research adds new insights into certain principles and approaches that may support the effective use of compliance-
focused activities.
1) A balanced approach: Lessons from the case studies indicate that in isolation neither compliance nor 
deterrence-focused strategies are likely to be effective in a PRS context and that local authorities should aim 
to combine both approaches. Local authorities adopting compliance-focused or creative approaches clearly 
demonstrate the benefits of a blended range of tools or approaches. 
2) A strategic approach: Compliance-focused approaches appear to be most effective when a range of activities 
are provided systematically and regularly and targeting the sector at large. Ad hoc communication with 
individual landlords will only have a limited impact.
3) Evidence informed: As vulnerable tenants are significantly less likely to approach their local authority, an 
approach based solely on complaints received is not fully capturing the extent of non-compliance.
4) Greater nuance in the language of non-compliance: Policy discussions on the PRS suggest a binary division 
between the majority of responsible landlords and the minority who are deviant in some way; the “criminals” 
or “rogues”.  This term is unhelpful in the context of the sector and unlikely to resonate with the many 
landlords who may not wilfully neglect the law nor with those local authorities that expend significant effort in 
responding to this type of behaviour.
The availability of resources 
l	 A blend of different enforcement strategies is costly, and local authorities already struggle with the impact of 
austerity measures. Services require adequate funding to develop appropriate and effective responses to the 
changing nature and context of the PRS.
l	 Although we recognise that some funding has become available in England, this is usually made available under 
an extremely tight bidding process and is generally only available for short-term projects. Our research suggests 
that such staccato projects make little sense if longer term strategies are to be developed.
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Prevention 
l	 Most case studies seemed to adopt a traditional approach to regulation, e.g., a monitoring of obedience to the 
rules and a response to a breach of those rules (via formal or informal activity).
l	 The development of new compliance-focused activities – such as the dedicated advisory function of some Scottish 
councils and the landlord helpline introduced in Northern Ireland – suggests a growing concern about the 
prevention of harm in the first place. 
l	 These initiatives could potentially reduce the level of non-compliance from inadvertence and thereby prevent 
more costly enforcement action.
Responsive regulation 
l	 A clearly articulated enforcement pyramid can lead to less inconsistency and greater procedural fairness in the 
approaches adopted by officers. Rather than escalation (or de-escalation) being applied at the discretion of 
individual enforcement officers, this should be part of the enforcement strategy.
l	 A range of tools is needed to respond to different types of landlord behaviour, and the threat of criminal 
prosecution adds to the effectiveness of civil penalties.
l	 Our research however suggests that both the regulatory efforts of local authorities and responsive regulation in the PRS 
are seriously undermined by the low fines and other sentences issued by the courts.
A tenant-focused approach
l	 There is (rightly) much discussion about the ways in which local authorities can engage with landlords and letting 
agents. There is less discussion about ways of engaging with tenants.
l	 Creative authorities demonstrate the benefits of building strategic collaborations with a wide array of services in 
order to meet the advice and support needs of renters by, for example, effective signposting or referral processes.
Recommendations for local authorities 
All local authorities in the UK should develop more detailed PRS strategies. 
l	 When formulating their strategy, local authorities should adopt an overarching goal, clear aims and objectives, and 
an explicit definition of the problem they are aiming to address.
l	 Local authorities should integrate and, wherever possible, co-locate landlord registration alongside other housing 
services.  
l	 Local strategies need to reflect the needs of private renters and consider the specific issues experienced by 
vulnerable tenants. 
l	 Local authority enforcement teams should aim to build strategic collaborations with a range of internal and 
external partners to assist in the identification of poor property conditions and in signposting tenants to the 
needed support. 
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Local authorities should aim to improve the ways in which positive outcomes are defined, recorded and communicated to the 
wider sector. 
l	 Local authorities should move away from an output-focused approach and communicate success in terms of 
outcomes achieved.  
l	 Local authorities should report on cases resolved both by informal and by formal action.
l	 Wherever possible, the impact of compliance-focused activities should be evaluated. 
l	 Outcomes of enforcement activity should be regularly communicated to landlords and letting agents as part of 
building a positive relationship with the sector. 
Strategies that are entirely based on either compliance or deterrence-focused activities are unlikely to be effective in a PRS 
context. UK local authorities should aim to combine both approaches.
l	 Local authorities should provide a range of compliance-focused activities as part of their overarching strategic 
approach. This could include, for example, training sessions, a dedicated advice service, landlord forums, online 
information and regular newsletters. 
l	 In Scotland local authorities should use the national registration scheme to communicate with and upskill the 
sector. 
l	 Rural local authorities should learn from the experience of COVID-19 to explore how digital technologies can be 
used to share advice and information with the sector. 
l	 Compliance-focused activities must operate in the shadow of the law, with formal enforcement offered as a viable 
alternative.
l	 Pyramidic or responsive approaches to enforcement (where adopted) should be part of the enforcement strategy 
and clearly communicated to the sector. 
Recommendation for governments 
UK and devolved governments should improve the advice and guidance available to UK local authorities on regulating the 
PRS. This should include advice on:
l	 Multi-agency working and building effective partnerships with public services and external partners. The focus 
of these activities should be to identify poor conditions, target enforcement activity, and provide tenants with 
needed support. 
l	 Processes to integrate services or coordinate operations where co-location or the creation of new organisational 
forms is not a realistic objective.
l	 In England, consideration should be given to the issues faced by two-tier local authorities with responsibilities 
across those authorities. 
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UK and devolved governments should improve the data available to local authorities on the PRS.
l	 In England, a national registration system of all landlords as well as letting agents should be introduced.
l	 National schemes of registration or licensing should have clear aims and purpose.
l	 The Northern Ireland Assembly should consider whether the national registration scheme as currently configured 
is fit for purpose. Current data sharing restrictions are significantly limiting its usefulness as a means of targeting 
enforcement and communicating with the sector at a local level.
Given the significance of the regulatory role played, and of the private rented sector itself, UK and devolved governments 
should re-consider their approaches to resource allocation to local authorities. 
l	 Local authorities should receive, and allocate, adequate funding to develop appropriate and effective responses to 
the changing nature and context of the PRS.
l	 Funding programmes need to build in sustainable longer-term goals, as opposed to short-term sticking plasters. 
UK and devolved governments should consider technical amendments to the existing suite of legislation, as well as 
codification of the diverse legislative provisions which currently exist.
l	 The various provisions regarding the regulation of the PRS are found in diverse locations of primary and secondary 
legislation, with statutory guidance.  Codification is good practice, particularly bearing in mind the needs of the 
landlord community.
l	 Clearer sentencing guidelines need to be provided to criminal courts to ensure that punishment is proportionate 
to the nature of the offence.
l	 Trading standards should be entitled to serve civil penalties against the company directors who are the controlling 
figures behind the company form.
l	 Data sharing between local authorities and other agencies such as Universal Credit, that hold data that would 
facilitate more effective enforcement should be enabled.
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1. Introduction 
Poor property conditions and variable standards of housing management in the private rented sector (PRS) are 
among the most intractable housing issues facing the UK today. Despite a decline in the proportion of non-
decent homes within the sector, one quarter (25% or 1.2 million) of PRS properties in England still fail to meet the 
Government’s Decent Homes Standards.8 When compared with owner-occupied and social rented homes, PRS 
homes in England are more likely to have problems with damp or disrepair and to pose a higher threat to health from 
excessive cold.9
The 2017 Scottish House Conditions Survey also showed that, despite improvements, 49% of all PRS dwellings in 
Scotland have some disrepair to critical elements.10 In Northern Ireland, the Housing Conditions Survey shows that 
only 2% of PRS homes failed to meet the Fitness Standard.11 However, advice providers argue that the Fitness Standard 
is outdated and applies low thresholds that fail to represent the actual living conditions of PRS tenants in Northern 
Ireland.12 The Welsh Housing Conditions Survey 2017-18 shows that compared to other tenures the PRS has the oldest 
housing stock and a higher proportion of poor quality properties.13
A series of social policies have fundamentally re-shaped the housing market and the PRS is now intricately connected 
to broader patterns of inequality.14 An increasing number of vulnerable households now live in the sector. This 
includes people with a disability or long-term illness, households in receipt of means-tested benefits and recent 
migrants to the UK. Whilst poor standards may be encountered throughout the sector, it is at the lower end of the 
market that housing can be of especially poor quality. Vulnerable households are particularly susceptible to the harms 
associated with private renting, facing issues such as overcrowding, badly maintained properties, insecurity of tenure 
and lack of affordability.15
In addition, consumer protection and tenants’ ability to assert their rights compares poorly to that which exists in 
other consumer markets.16
In response to these challenges, regulation of the UK PRS has been significantly restructured over the last fifteen years. 
Regulatory policy is changing at different speeds in each of the four jurisdictions, but across the UK local authorities 
now have a broader range of powers to improve standards and affect landlord behaviour.17
Local authorities however currently face the challenge of meeting increased demand with diminishing resources. In 
the past decade, councils across England and Wales have had their core funding from the UK Government reduced by 
nearly £16 billion.18 In 2019/20, they faced an overall funding gap of £3.1 billion, which is estimated to rise to £8 billion 
by 2024/25.19 In Scotland, councils have also experienced several years of reduced funding. Between 2013/14 and 
2019/20 their total revenue funding decreased by 6%, whilst the core revenue funding reduction in some councils has 
been as high as 15% percent.20
8 MHCLG (2017) English Housing Survey, Private rented sector, 2017-18 (Accessed: 17/7/19)
9 MHCLG, English Housing Survey 
10 These are often the traditional tenement apartment blocks in cities. Scottish Government (2018) Scottish house condition survey: 2017 key findings (Accessed: 
22/7/19) 
11 Office for National Statistics (2019) UK private rented sector: 2018 
12 Housing Rights (2016) Review of the statutory minimum housing fitness standard for all tenures of dwelling 
13 Welsh Government, Welsh Housing Conditions Survey 2017-18 (Accessed: 23/4/20)  
14 A. Marsh, and K. Gibb (2019) The private rented sector in the UK: An overview of the policy and regulatory landscape (Accessed: 15/4/20)
15 D. Rhodes,  and J. Rugg (2018) Vulnerability in the UK Private Rented Sector (Accessed: 10/6/20)
16 L.S. Smith (2020) Consumer rights in the Private Rented Sector (Accessed: 27/7/20). 
17 A. Marsh, and K. Gibb (2019) The private rented sector in the UK: An overview of the policy and regulatory landscape (Accessed: 15/4/20) 
18 Local Government Association (LGA) (2019) Local Government Association briefing. Debate on local government funding (Accessed: 23/4/20)
19 LGA, Local Government Association Briefing 
20 Audit Scotland (2019) Challenges and performance 2019 (Accessed: 23/4/20) 
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Local authorities in England, Wales and Scotland are also facing rising demand for the range of their services. 
Increasing numbers of households who are homeless or living in poverty, an aging population and rising demand 
for adult care service are some of the key factors which are putting additional pressure on council services.21 
Consequently, local authorities not only have to address problems in a PRS that has grown substantially over the last 
15 years, but compliance and enforcement activities targeting the sector must compete for resources against a series 
of higher profile issues, especially the provision of statutory services that are often seen as having a more pressing call 
on scarce resources.
The fact that 1.2 million households in England alone are living in substandard housing, despite the apparent increase 
in the regulation of the sector, raises pressing questions regarding the nature and effectiveness of current approaches 
in securing compliance with the law. Many commentators, landlord groups, and tenant groups have all voiced 
concerns about current enforcement activity being entirely inadequate.22 
Raising standards and improving compliance
The focus of our overall research programme is raising standards in the UK PRS. In this study we are concerned with 
raising standards such that landlords across the sector are consistently fulfilling their existing legal obligations. It is not 
our objective here to argue for or examine how property and management standards might be raised above those 
specified in current legislation.
The concept of regulatory compliance is more complex than it might first appear. We do not review these debates 
here.23 For the purposes of this study, “compliance” refers both to outcomes, some of which may be measurable 
and quantifiable, and to a complex process which covers attitudes, behavioural intentions, and acceptance of the 
regulation. “Improving compliance” refers to a process whereby regulatory bodies such as local authorities can seek 
to influence the flow of events.24 Whether or not local authority activities are successful in achieving compliance will 
depend on array of other processes and events.25
The aim of this study 
Over the last decade and a half, the UK and devolved governments have introduced a range of mechanisms which 
aim to address low standards of housing and improve management practices in the PRS. There is evidence which 
suggests that local authorities face multiple challenges in exercising their powers effectively in practice, and that 
strategies and approaches to managing the sector vary significantly between different local authorities. There 
is currently, however, a lack of research exploring how various approaches to the PRS are shaped on a local level; 
how local approaches draw on and interact with regulatory innovations at national level; and the principles and 
approaches which may contribute to effective regulation and enforcement.
21 In Northern Ireland local authorities are not responsible for delivery of the statutory functions in relation to homelessness (rests with NI Housing Executive) or adult 
care (relevant Health & Social Care Board)
22 Citizens Advice (2017) It’s Broke, lets fix it (Accessed: 23/4/20); Generation Rent (2017) FOI local government enforcement 2017-18 (Accessed: 23/4/20); T.J. Simcock and N. 
Mykkanen (2018) The Postcode Lottery of Local Authority Enforcement in the PRS, Manchester, UK, Residential Landlords Association, (Accessed: 7/4/20)
23 See for example, C. Parker and V.L. Neilsen (2011) Explaining Compliance: business responses to regulation. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
24 C. Parker and J. Braithwaite (2005) ‘Regulation’, Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies, Oxford: OUP. 
25 P. Drahos and M. Krygier (2017) ‘Regulation, institutions and networks’, in P. Drahos (ed.) Regulatory theory: foundations and applications, Acton: ANU Press. pp.1-22. 
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In this context, our research aim was:
l	 To investigate how UK local authorities are developing strategies to improve their PRS, and aims to provide 
suggestions for how regulation and enforcement in the sector could be improved.
The more specific research questions we addressed were: 
l	 How are local authorities enforcing the law aimed at tackling low standards in the UK PRS?
l	 What PRS strategies are local authorities adopting and how do they combine formal and informal approaches? 
l	 What can other local authorities learn from the system and approaches adopted that can be used to help shape 
decisions on regulating the PRS?
Research methods
We addressed these research questions in two stages.
Stage one of the research involved seven semi-structured telephone interviews with key stakeholder professional 
participants from national tenant groups and landlord groups to gain their views on enforcement and regulation in 
the sector. Participants were distributed from across England (n:3), Scotland (n:2) and Northern-Ireland (n:2). In addition, 
we interviewed two participants working for Rent Smart Wales. The interviews were carried out between October – 
December 2019 and each lasted approximately one hour. 
Stage two of the research involved interviews with 61 professionals from across 13 UK local authorities. Participating 
authorities were distributed from across England (n:7), Scotland (n:4), Northern-Ireland (n:1) and Wales (n:1). In most 
cases this involved a researcher visiting the local authority and carrying out a series of one-to-one interviews with 
individuals involved in designing and implementing PRS strategies. Analysis included consideration of written 
enforcement strategies and related documentation (where available). Interviews were carried out between December 
2019 – March 2020 and lasted between 45 minutes and 1.5 hours. 
Sampling 
The 13 case study local authorities were selected based on region and information assembled from existing sources 
on the enforcement strategy adopted. Because existing evidence indicates significant diversity in local authority 
approaches to enforcement, case studies were purposefully sampled in order to explore this variation and to capture 
authorities that appeared to be active in this policy area. These sources included both an initial review of online 
information available on local authority websites and written housing and enforcement strategies. It was not easy to 
identify appropriate data from existing online sources and not all authorities appeared to be active in regulating the 
sector. Stage 1 interviews and consultation with advisory group members therefore also helped to identify authorities 
who appeared to be doing interesting work in this area. This sampling approach was not applied in order to produce 
generalisable findings for similar authorities, but rather to provide insight into the various enforcement activities that 
can influence compliance and therefore property standards. 
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Data Collection 
Primary data collection included a case study approach and semi-structured face to face interviews with 
approximately six participants working within each local authority. Preliminary discussions were carried out with 
each authority to identify the best people to speak to. In order to capture a diverse range of perspectives, the sample 
included individuals working at managerial and strategical level and those responsible for enforcing the legislation 
“on the ground”. Participants included environmental health officers, housing renewal officers, enforcement officers, 
housing leads and directors, research and development officers, landlord registration officers, licensing officers and 
managers, local landlord groups, trading standards officers, and local councillors. Most interviews were carried out on 
a one to one basis, although in some cases small focus groups with two or three participants were conducted. 
This project was approved by the University of Bristol, School for Policy Studies, Research Ethics Committee, outlining 
procedures relating to confidentiality, risk assessment, and data storage and processing.
Analysis 
This study adopted a thematic approach to analysis, using both inductive and deductive approaches. The coding 
process has been carried out using both a priori codes derived from theoretical and applied concerns discussed at 
the start of this project, and a posteriori analytical categories and themes developed from the initial coding process. 
Data was coded using NVivo using a widely recognised five-step approach.26
Report structure 
Chapter 2 explores the academic literature on compliance and regulatory theory. It discusses how this literature can 
offer a more comprehensive approach to thinking about how to improve compliance and therefore standards in the 
PRS. This chapter also reviews what we already know about regulatory practice in the UK PRS. 
Chapter 3 first sets out the differences in the regulatory framework for the PRS across the devolved governments. The 
second half of the chapter draws on findings from the stakeholder interviews to identify key policy issues and lessons 
which can be learned from the different approaches taken.
Chapter 4 draws on findings from our case studies to explore the variations in local authority enforcement strategies 
in their day-to-day interactions with landlords and letting agents. Four distinct approaches to regulating the PRS are 
identified and the key drivers which underpin these decisions and activities are also discussed. 
Chapter 5 explores the nature of obstacles that local authorities are facing and certain key issues associated with 
the enforcement strategies identified in chapter 4. The second half of the chapter explores the extent to which local 
authorities are using regulatory approaches that go beyond relying on public sector-driven formal enforcement 
activity.
Chapter 6 draws together the findings on the enforcement of standards in the private rented sector derived from this 
study. The chapter is structured around five key themes and concludes with a series of recommendations for local 
authorities and national governments. 
26  V. Braun and V. Clarke (2013) ‘Using thematic analysis in psychology’, Qualitative Research in Psychology, 3(2):77-101. and P. Bazeley, Qualitative Data Analysis: Practical 
Strategies. London: SAGE.
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2. Setting the context: different 
approaches to regulation
This chapter reviews four issues that are central to a discussion of compliance and enforcement in the PRS. First, we 
consider the drivers of compliance. Understanding the factors that shape compliance with regulatory standards is 
fundamental to formulating effective policy responses. The motivations of the social actors involved in a policy sector 
– the primary and secondary targets of regulation (landlords and tenants) as well as regulatory agencies (primarily 
local authorities and trading standards bodies) – are integral to the analysis of (non)compliance. But motivations need 
to be understood alongside a range of contextual and institutional factors that shape - facilitate and constrain - the 
capacities and discretion exercised by those actors. We review these issues in the first section of this chapter. 
In section two we review recent evidence on the traditional regulatory instrument most often associated with driving 
compliance – enforcement within a command-and-control or deterrence-focused regulatory structure. 
In section three, we locate enforcement in relation to the broader regulatory literature. Thinking about effective 
regulatory strategies continues to develop: this section reviews several distinctive regulatory approaches that have 
been advocated, debated and synthesized. These are issues that have been extensively explored in the broader 
literature on regulation - across economics, political science and socio-legal studies - but they are not issues that have 
been discussed extensively in relation to the regulation of the PRS.27
We conclude the chapter by briefly considering the relevance of systems thinking to our topic. Again, systems 
thinking has not featured prominently in regulatory analysis or housing studies.28 However, ideas embedded in 
systems approaches complement important existing strands of regulatory thinking, particularly once the focus moves 
from regulation to compliance. We believe that drawing these ideas into the conversation can facilitate the richer 
and broader analysis that is required to develop more effective responses to non-compliance. While these ideas have 
informed our thinking in this report, we do not explore these points in depth here: we develop them more fully in a 
companion report.29
The drivers of compliance
All strategies to raise standards in the private rented sector – to ensure that legal minimum standards are adhered 
to – are based on assumptions about the behaviours and motivations of landlords, regulatory agencies, and tenants. 
Why do they comply, or not, with the law? Why do they seek to assert – or otherwise - their rights? How and why do 
regulatory agencies select their approach to enforcement, both at the level of strategy and in day-to-day frontline 
decision-making? Assumptions about the motivations and behaviours of landlords and tenants – and their responses 
to the various regulatory instruments available - undoubtedly influence the actions of enforcement agencies. This 
includes assumptions about the degree of diversity within the landlord and tenant populations: if landlords all exhibit 
similar motivations and behaviours then a standardised enforcement approach may be justified, whereas greater 
diversity will call for strategies that are tailored or targeted.
Assumptions about motivations and behaviours are a starting point. They typically intersect with further assumptions 
about the contextual or capacity constraints that landlords and tenants face that mean that, while they may have 
appropriate motivations or wish to engage in desired behaviours, they are prevented from doing so.
27 There are notable exceptions. The Law Commission’s work on private renting was explicitly informed by regulatory theory: Law Commission (2007) Encouraging 
responsible letting: a consultation paper, CP181, London: The Law Commission; More recently the work of MHCLG’s Regulation of Property Agents Working Group, 
chaired by Lord Best, has been informed by regulatory scholarship, and in particular the work of Professor Hodges, a member of the working group: see, for example, 
C. Hodges and R. Steinholtz (2017) Ethical business practice and regulation: A behavioural and values-based approach to compliance and enforcement, Hart.
28 See K. Gibb and A. Marsh (2019) Housing and systems thinking, CaCHE Working Paper, Glasgow: UK Collaborative Centre for Housing Evidence. 
29 A, Marsh, J, Harris, and D, Cowan (2020) Private rented sector compliance: a systems approach, CaCHE Working Paper, Glasgow:  UK Collaborative Centre for Housing 
Research.
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Where these various assumptions underpinning compliance and enforcement action originate is an important 
question. In the context of the private rented sector, there is limited systematic research on these issues of motivation 
in which to ground policy assumptions. One alternative to systematic research is that these assumptions might be 
based upon accumulated local experience within the field. A third possibility is that they are entirely theoretical: for 
example, assumptions of self-interested behaviour that underpin rational choice models. Finally, they could be rooted 
in political ideology (‘private landlords are a bad thing’), prejudice, or normative principle (‘crime should always be 
punished to the full extent of the law’).
These assumptions are profoundly important to the understanding of non-compliance and the policy prescriptions 
to address it. For example, economic theories that see compliance with regulations as being a rational calculation 
of costs and benefits – are the benefits of breaking the rule greater than the costs of doing so? – lead to deterrence 
theories that focus on increasing the size of punishment or the likelihood of detection in order to shift the cost-benefit 
calculation in favour of compliance. But if non-compliance has nothing to do with this type of cost-benefit calculation 
then the high probability of severe punishment might have little influence upon behaviours in practice, while, at the 
same time, they may be seen as an unduly harsh response to offences produced by unfortunate oversight rather than 
criminal intent.
In the context of the private rented sector, at its most simplistic this issue can devolve to debates about: 
l	 the extent to which substandard landlord behaviour is a result of ignorance and inadvertence rather than 
conscious criminality; 
l	 the extent to which tenants are unwilling to assert their rights because of their lack of security of tenure and 
worries about retaliatory eviction, rather than ignorance of what those rights are; and 
l	 the extent to local authorities lack the resources, rather than the powers or the political will, to pursue effective 
enforcement strategies. 
In each case, the issue being raised is whether social structures and institutional constraints, rather than motivation, lie 
at the root of the problem.
Clearly, the debate is considerably more nuanced than this: a host of further factors have been identified as shaping 
compliance behaviours. However, the private rented sector discussion largely occurs in isolation from the broader 
literature on compliance, which offers more comprehensive approaches to thinking about the factors shaping 
compliance. Here we focus briefly upon providers’ – landlords’ - motivations because this is the primary target of 
regulation and fundamental to driving standards within the sector.
The concept of ‘motivational postures’, which is based upon empirical studies of regulated populations, captures a 
range of responses to regulatory oversight.30 Five such postures have been identified:
l	 Commitment: agreement with the aims of regulation and support for complying with its requirements;
l	 Capitulation: willingness to comply with regulatory requirements because they are seen as legitimate, but without 
necessarily supporting the aims of the regulation;
l	 Resistance: dissatisfaction with how the regulatory authorities operate and “a plea to authority to be fair and 
respectful”;
30 See V. Braithwaite (2017) Closing the gap between regulation and the community, in P. Drahos (ed) Regulatory theory: foundations and applications, ANU Press, pp.33-34; 
a key empirical study is J. Braithwaite, T. Makkai, and V. Braithwaite (2007) Regulating aged care: Ritualism and the new pyramid, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
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l	 Disengagement: ignoring regulatory requirements and carrying on business-as-usual; 
l	 Game-playing: attending to regulatory requirements but searching for loopholes and ways of circumventing 
regulatory authority in order to continue operating in a preferred manner.
While it is possible to distinguish these five motivations in theory, empirical research suggests that in practice some 
members of regulated populations display a mix of motivations, particularly in respect of the defiant postures: for 
example, both resistance and game-playing. Equally importantly, the motivational posture of a specific individual or 
organisation can change over time, in part in response to an evolving regulatory context.
In his seminal ethnographic study of the regulation of water pollution, Hawkins identified that inspectors tended to 
classify regulated firms into one of four categories, which shaped their regulatory response to the firm: 
l	 socially responsible companies: key personnel would feel bad if they discover the company is causing pollution; 
l	 unfortunate companies: lack the technical or financial resources to address the pollution they are causing;
l	 reckless companies: openly defy the regulations and refuse to comply;
l	 calculating companies: contravene the regulations in secret and think they can get away with it.31
This classification acknowledges not simply motivations but also constraints and behaviours. It suggests a mix of 
regulatory responses involving both persuasion and punishment. This is only one of several attempts to capture 
diversity within a regulated population. 
A key question for any regulated sector, including the private rented sector, is the distribution of the regulated 
population across these categories: are most providers socially responsible, unfortunate, reckless or calculating? 
And how do we know? It is a question that most of our case study local authorities had, at best, a qualitative feel for, 
rather than having undertaken a well-calibrated systematic assessment. A typical characterisation of the compliance 
orientations among the local private landlord population was:
… like a lot of enforcement, there’s those that will comply because they want to comply, there’s those that just are, 
shall we say, a bit lazy about complying and when it’s flagged up they’ll get on with it. There’s those that take a bit 
more of a shove to say, “well if you don’t, this is what we could do”, and that’s a few more that then comply, and 
then there’s those at the very top of that triangle that just say, right, on you go, take me to court, do your worst and 
then we’ll see whether we’ll bother or not, which are arguably the very worst ones.  
(Head of landlord registration, Scotland) 
31 K. Hawkins (1984) Environment and enforcement: regulation and the social definition of pollution, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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One of the most comprehensive statements of the drivers of compliance is offered by Parker and Neilsen, who have 
proposed what they term a “holistic compliance model”.32 They structure their discussion around fourteen factors, 
divided between those relating to spontaneous compliance and to enforced compliance:
Table 2.1: Parker and Neilsen’s fourteen compliance factors33
Spontaneous compliance factors
Economic, social and normative motives
1. Social and economic costs and benefits
2. Degree of acceptance of the regulation
3. Respect for the law in general
4. Existence of non-official influence over the target group’s compliance
Characteristics and capacities of members of the target population
5. Business model
6. Knowledge of the rules
7. Capacity to comply
Enforced compliance factors
8. Respect for the regulator
Deterrence factors
9. Risk that any rule violation will be reported to the authorities
10. Risk of inspection
11. Risk of detection
12. Selectivity of inspection and detection by regulator
13. Risk of sanction
14. Severity of sanction 
 A strength of this approach is its breadth. It resists narrowing the focus too rapidly to the characteristics of the formal 
regulatory structure operating in a specific policy context; rather it sees compliance as shaped by a broader range of 
factors. This is evident in the prominence given to economic, social and normative factors in shaping spontaneous 
compliance. 
32 C. Parker, and V.L. Nielsen (2017) ‘Compliance: 14 questions’, in C. Parker and V. Nielsen and P. Drahos (2017) Regulatory Theory: Foundations and Applications, ANU Press; 
For an alternative approach see R.K. Weaver (2014) Compliance regimes and barriers to behaviour change, Governance, 27(2):243-265.
33 Source: Parker and Neilson, 2017, Compliance: 14 Questions, in P.  Drahos (ed), Table 13.1
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A culture that places considerable weight upon compliance with the law in general (Factor 3) will be reflected in a 
stronger likelihood of compliance with the law in a specific sector. Economic, social and normative factors (Factor 1) 
can be related to the concept of a “social license” to operate: this means that firms are conscious that they do not have 
carte blanche and must be seen to be operating within socially-sanctioned parameters – to go beyond these limits is 
to risk delegitimising their activities.34 This can be related to acceptance of the regulation (item 2), which focuses more 
directly upon the question of whether the target population for a regulation (for example, landlords) consider the 
regulation to which they are subject to be acceptable, both in terms of its rationale and the burden associated with 
compliance. In the PRS, debates about the need for existing – let alone additional – regulation are long-standing, with 
interest groups aligned to landlords typically being less enthusiastic about extensive, and extending, regulation than 
those aligned to tenants.35
Thirdly, the idea of non-official influence over compliance (factor 4) can be viewed in terms of organised regulatory 
mechanisms such as the role of trade associations in promoting and enforcing codes of practice. Alternatively, it can 
be thought of as referring to the effects that social network membership and peer group effects can have upon 
normative standards and therefore compliance behaviour.
Several of these compliance factors - particularly those associated with deterrence - can usefully be prefaced by the 
word ‘perceived’ because it is the perceived risk, severity, benefit that is the more likely basis for decision, and these 
perceptions could be based upon a range of information that might or might not be accurate.36
Thus, this model invites us to consider regulation in a broader sense than formal enforcement. It invites consideration 
of the relative power of different regulatory levers and the identity of influential regulatory actors. Much of the 
regulatory literature focuses upon the effectiveness of various instruments of, in Parker and Neilsen’s terms, enforced 
compliance: that is, primarily command-and-control or deterrence-focused approaches. However, there are limits 
to the leverage offered by such enforced compliance mechanisms. Our ability to increase compliance and raise 
standards within a sector would be enhanced by also considering more closely the spontaneous factors identified by 
Parker and Neilsen. 
This point is at the core of arguments for adopting decentred and pluralist approaches to regulation, on the one hand, 
and behaviourally-informed public policy, on the other. More fundamentally, it speaks to:
… a profound recognition that self-control is a necessary element of any social ordering since rules cannot be 
created for every imaginable harm nor can inspectors watch over everyone all the time. For this reason, all types of 
regulation must, in the final analysis, promote self-regulation.37
We consider some of these arguments a little further below. A key point here, though, is that we would want to put 
a question mark next to the term “spontaneous” to describe these broader compliance factors. This term might be 
taken to indicate that these factors are beyond the reach of policy. However, that invites us to consider the extent 
to which they are variables that are amenable to influence: not only do they change over time, but there is scope to 
explore how they can be changed. To what extent is it possible to, for example, deliberately reshape the degree of 
acceptance of a particular regulatory regime by shifting social norms or facilitate the strengthening of non-official 
influences on compliance? 
34 See, for example, G. Lynch-Wood and D. Williamson (2007) The social licence as a form of regulation for small and medium enterprises, Journal of Law and Society, 34(3), 
321-341.
35 J. Rugg and D. Rhodes (2003) ‘Between a rock and a hard place’: the failure to agree on regulation for the private rented sector in England, Housing Studies, 18: 6, 937-946.
36 The importance of perceptions in shaping decision making, and how such perceptions can be reshaped to account of known decision making biases, is a core 
issue in the literature on behavioural public policy. For an overview see, for example, E. Shafir (ed) (2012) The behavioral foundations of public policy, Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton.
37 C. Coglianese and E. Mandelson (2010) Meta-regulation and self-regulation, in R.Baldwin et al (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Regulation, Oxford: OUP 2010 p164.
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One characteristic of the private rented sector that makes the application of insights from the compliance literature 
a considerably more subtle task is that the literature examines firms in a range of industries and policy sectors 
operating at a range of scales but where there is typically little doubt that they are part of the industry. They might 
raise questions of capacity, competence or motivation but there is little dispute that they are commercial enterprises 
selling products or services. For a significant proportion of the PRS, that basic condition is not met. Various accidental, 
temporary, “sideline” and amateur landlords might wish to argue that they are not primarily in the business of 
providing housing. This means that the normative landscape of the small landlord sector can become more confused: 
landlords hold beliefs, and make assertions, about what they are within their rights to do with “their” property which 
do not align with their legal obligations as landlords. Yet their arguments can resonate with underlying cultural 
assumptions about property ownership and the discretions that accompany it. There can be a clash of competing 
logics which makes the regulatory challenge more complicated.
Evidence on enforcement activity in the UK PRS
While regulating for compliance can encompass a broad range of activities, much of the evidence available focuses 
on formal enforcement. Recent studies of enforcement activities have sought to establish how often formal powers 
are applied in practice. This formal activity covers serving statutory notices, civil penalties or prosecuting landlords 
and, depending on the regulatory breach, can result in various legal outcomes such as administrative penalties, 
removal of licenses, or custodial sentences. Information obtained via Freedom of Information requests to local 
authorities in England and Wales highlighted the paucity of formal enforcement activities.38 In 2017/18:
l	 67% of local authorities in England and Wales did not commence any prosecutions against a private landlord
l	 89% of local authorities in England and Wales had not used the new Civil Penalty Notices; 53% did not have a 
policy to use them
l	 18% reported having not served an improvement notice 
In addition, between April 2018 and April 2019 no landlord had received a banning order. 
Evaluations of the early stages of licensing and registration schemes in Scotland and Wales also indicated a limited 
amount of formal enforcement activity, which may have been undermining their success. For example, a 2011 
evaluation of Scotland’s landlord registration system reported difficulties in monitoring activity and ensuring 
compliance which had limited its impact on property standards.39 In Northern Ireland, Housing Rights reports that 
many of their clients are frustrated by the lack of legal protection offered by the Housing (NI) Order 1981 (fitness 
standard), and the lack of enforcement by local councils.40
Whilst a lack of formal enforcement activity among UK local authorities appears to be the dominant stance, the 
evidence suggests significant geographical diversity. A small number of local authorities appear to have prioritised 
formal enforcement, and their activities account for the majority of activity reported. For example, whilst data for 
England and Wales shows a 459% increase in the number of prosecutions commenced against private landlords 
between 2012/13 and 2017/18, this is largely attributable to Liverpool City Council, which introduced a borough-wide 
selective licensing and co-regulation scheme in 2015. When the Liverpool data is removed it leaves a 69% increase in 
the number of prosecutions elsewhere in England over this period. 
Other research has suggested that local authority enforcement can be characterised as a ‘postcode lottery’.41 For 
example, some local authorities in London inspect one in 10 properties for hazards, while others inspect only one in 
38 Generation Rent, FOI local government enforcement 2017-18
39 F. Lees and J. Boyle (2011) Evaluation of the impact and operation of landlord registration in Scotland, Edinburgh, Scottish Government Social Research
40 Housing Rights (2016) Review of the statutory minimum housing fitness standard for all tenures of dwelling (Accessed: 23/4/20). 
41 T.J. Simcock and N. Mykkanen (2018) The Postcode Lottery of Local Authority Enforcement in the PRS
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600 properties.42 Charities and pressure groups have argued that this significant variation in levels of regulatory activity 
demonstrates that, with rare exceptions, landlords are not being held to account when failing to meet their legal 
obligations.43
Local authorities are widely reported to lack sufficient resources to enforce legislation and, where necessary, to 
prosecute landlords. Measures to reduce local government spending have had a significant impact upon enforcement 
activities. In 2010-2012, the average budget allocated to environmental health services per head of the population fell 
by 8%, whilst 1,272 environmental health officer jobs were lost.44 The Chartered Institute of Housing and Chartered 
Institute of Environmental Health reported that between 2009/10 and 2015/16 local authorities reduced spending 
on enforcement activity by one fifth.45 In England, these resource constraints have in some cases led to enforcement 
teams being reduced to a mere handful of officers, and difficulties in attracting and retaining trained Environmental 
Health Officers (EHOs).46 For example, Birmingham City Council has only five EHOs to cover a city of 1.1 million 
people.47 The lack of ring-fenced local funding for enforcement leaves this area of activity exposed to budgetary 
pressures as it competes with other council services for resources. 
Whilst limited resources clearly impose significant constraints on local authority enforcement activities, this does not 
in itself explain why some local authorities report much higher levels of formal enforcement activity than others. This 
in turn leads to questions about the range of contextual factors that can affect the development and operation of a 
local authority’s enforcement strategy. 
Theorising regulatory approaches
Our aim here is to provide a brief outline of some key themes in the regulatory literature to provide points of 
connection with the discussion of the regulatory approaches we encountered in our empirical work.48 We do 
not at this stage discuss the risks associated with regulatory interventions producing a variety of unintended and 
undesirable consequences.49
Legislative standard setting followed by enforcement action – whether criminal, civil or administrative - against those 
detected as being in breach of the standard, of the type discussed in the previous section, is the starting point of the 
debate over regulation. This is the so-called “deterrence-focused” or “command and control” approach to regulation. 
This approach has the advantage of relative clarity and simplicity. Much regulation still takes this form. 
However, deterrence-focused regulation has been subject to sustained criticism on both empirical and theoretical 
grounds. From the empirical perspective, researchers studying how regulators go about their work in practice 
have identified more nuanced approaches to the use of rules. Even when legislation is highly prescriptive about 
the punishment(s) that should follow a breach, frontline regulators can adopt a less formal approach and, through 
regulatory conversation and dialogue, seek to persuade an offender to change behaviour and bring their activities 
into alignment with the regulation. The concept of “parameters of acceptable deviance” has been proposed to 
capture transgressions that do not immediately trigger formal enforcement.50 Indeed, empirical studies indicate that 
in some cases regulators will try as many other tools as possible before taking formal action: law is viewed as the “last 
resort”.
42 Pidgeon, C. (2016) Rogue Landlords in London: A survey of local authority enforcement in the private rented sector, (Accessed: 8/7/19)
43 Citizens Advice (2019) Getting the House in Order: How to improve standards in the private rented sector (Accessed: 22/7/19)
44 Shelter (2014) ‘Safe and Decent Homes: Solutions for a better private rented sector’
45 CIH and CIEH (2019) A licence to rent
46 Housing, Communities and Local Government Committee (MHCLG) (2018) Private rented sector: Fourth Report of Session 2017-19 
 47 MHCLG, Private rented sector
48 For extended and comprehensive discussions see: R. Baldwin, M. Cave and M. Lodge (eds) (2010) The Oxford Handbook of Regulation, Oxford: OUP; D. Levi-Faur (ed) 
(2011) Handbook on the politics of regulation, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar; P. Drahos (ed) (2017) Regulatory theory: foundations and applications, Acton: Australian National 
University Press. There are important strands of the regulatory debate – such as the merits of principles-based regulation – that we do not address here: on which, 
see J. Black (2008) Forms and paradoxes of principles-based regulation, Capital Markets Law Journal, 3(4), 425-457.
49 On which, see P.N. Grabosky (1995) Counterproductive regulation, International Journal of the Sociology of Law, 23, 347-369.
50 M. Edwards (2006) Law and the parameters of acceptable deviance, Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 97(1), pp.49-100.
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We can differentiate at least two interpretations of the move away from formal enforcement. On the one hand, a 
reliance on persuasion, and a range of other activities short of formal enforcement, can flow from a belief that 
such informal activities are a more effective route to achieving the ultimate objective of greater compliance with 
the regulations. On the other hand, they can be a warning sign either of a failure to take the issues seriously or 
of “regulatory capture”: that is, the regulatory agency is making policy and taking action in a way that is unduly 
influenced by the interests of the regulated population, which ultimately undermines the purpose of the regulation.51 
Distinguishing between the two interpretations by observing a regulatory agency’s actions alone can be difficult. One 
key issue is how much of a “last resort” formal enforcement action appears: there is an important difference between 
formal enforcement rarely being used and it never being used. 
From a theoretical perspective, academics – partially influenced by the empirical research - have argued that the 
formal deterrence-focused approach has a range of weaknesses that lead to the conclusion that it is an insufficiently 
subtle regulatory approach.52 A range of alternatives have been proposed.  
Responsive and smart regulation 
Responsive regulation is perhaps the most well-known alternative approach in the academic literature.53 It is based 
on the idea of a pyramid of regulatory strategy and a pyramid of regulatory enforcement, as well as the idea of cross-
sectoral co-regulation. The pyramids are illustrated in Figure 2.1. The base of the enforcement pyramid comprises 
soft, informal actions by regulators; ascending the pyramid increases the intrusiveness, formality and severity of the 
interventions. Most regulatory activity should take place around the base of the pyramid. Only if regulated actors 
don’t respond to dialogue and persuasion is the principle of escalation applied. Formal actions such as license 
revocation are rare and can indicate a failure of softer strategies. Sufficiently serious violations of the regulations can 
result in immediate escalation. De-escalation - a move down the pyramid - can, in theory, follow a demonstration 
of increased compliance on the part of the regulated actor, although when a move to formal action destroys trust 
between regulator and regulatee then research suggests it can be difficult in practice to de-escalate and move back 
to primarily soft measures.54
51 Regulatory capture may involve direct influence by the regulated population: members of the regulated population are able to make representations into, or 
participate in, the policymaking process in such a way as to influence the outputs of policy so they are favourable to, or at least relatively benign for, their interests. 
However, capture can be more indirect. The broad socio-economic and political context can be such that the regulatory agencies give so much weight to the 
interests of the regulated population that it ultimately neutralises their regulatory activities, even without the members of the regulated population trying to exert 
influence directly. One of the most egregious examples of this is discussed in Gunningham, N. (1987) Negotiated non-compliance: A case study of regulatory failure, Law 
& Policy, 9, 1, 69-95.
52 There has been a parallel developments in policy debates, often framed under the banner of ”better regulation”. However, there is an important difference 
between the two discussions. The academic debate has been preoccupied with effective regulation, rather than necessarily with reducing regulatory activity. In 
contrast, in practice the focus of the better regulation policy agenda has been deregulation. See, for example, R. Baldwin (2005) Is better regulation smarter regulation?, 
Public Law, 485-511.
53 The argument originates with I. Ayres and J. Braithwaite (1992) Responsive regulation: Transcending the deregulation debate, Oxford: OUP.
54 Responsive regulation has itself been subject to significant critical response. It raises a range of important issues such as the risk of inequities – similar offences 
being treated differentially due to regulators’ assessment of the compliance orientation of the regulatee. There are also concerns that while the pyramid idea has 
been extremely influential, the arguably more important concept of tripartite co-regulation has been relatively neglected: P. Mascini (2013) Why was the enforcement 
pyramid so influential? And what price was paid?, Regulation & Governance, 7, 48-60.
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Much of the development in regulatory policy towards the PRS over the last fifteen years could be interpreted as 
adding or filling in tiers of the regulatory pyramid, opening up the scope for more flexible, clearly articulated and 
better calibrated strategies of escalation and de-escalation.
While responsive regulation is seen as promoting this principle of movement up and down the pyramid, smart 
regulation places more emphasis upon strategies that combine regulatory instruments in ways that capitalises 
upon complementary strengths and neutralises weaknesses.55 As with responsive regulation, smart regulation 
acknowledges the possibility of looking beyond the state to other social actors to provide regulatory input. Indeed, it 
goes further and suggests that there can be situations in which the state may not be as well-placed as actors in the 
private sector or civil society to deliver effective regulation.
Decentred regulation 
Taking this idea further is the concept of “decentred regulation”. Much regulatory thinking starts from the state – in the 
case of the PRS: local authorities, licensing agencies, trading standards and the police – as the core of the regulatory 
regime. Decentring regulation is an invitation to look more widely at the organisational landscape of a policy sector to 
understand what else is going on and which other organisations and social actors are acting in a regulatory capacity.56 
Approaching regulation as “decentred” frequently signals a concern with processes of self-regulation.57
The possibilities for, and desirability of, industry self-regulation as a key part of a regulatory regime are the subject of 
a substantial academic literature.58 Self-regulatory processes can overcome knowledge and access problems, they 
can be relatively agile and provide regulation with different sources of legitimacy to public sector-focused regulation. 
But there are longstanding questions about the effectiveness of such mechanisms in dealing with problematic 
behaviours robustly enough to address the public interest and policy concerns that justify regulation in the first 
place.59 
Figure 2.1 The regulatory pyramids of responsive regulation
55 N. Gunningham and P. Grabosky (1998) Smart regulation: designing environmental policy, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
56 P. Grabosky (2013) Beyond Responsive Regulation: The expanding role of non-state actors in the regulatory process, Regulation & Governance, 7, 114-123.
57 See J. Black (2001) Decentring regulation: understanding the role of regulation and self-regulation in a ’post-regulatory’ world, Current Legal Problems.
58 See for example N. Gunningham and J. Rees (1997) Industry self-regulation: an institutional perspective, Law & Policy, 19(4), 363-414.
59 F. Bowen (2019) Marking their own homework: The pragmatic and moral legitimacy of industry self-regulation, Journal of Business Ethics, 156, 257-272.
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These non-public sector actors may be acting entirely independently of the state. Recent developments facilitated by 
emerging technological opportunities - the platform MarksOutOfTenancy, for example, is one of the more prominent 
of several new apps - represent mechanisms seeking to regulate quality in the private rented sector (via tenant 
feedback and rating) that have been established independently of the state.60 It is equally common to conceive 
of self-regulation – by organisations such as trade associations or professional bodies – as acting in a regulatory 
capacity not independently but “in the shadow of hierarchy”: the threat of a more interventionist public sector-driven 
regulatory regime acts as a spur to self-organise and self-regulate. This is sometimes referred to as the “gorilla in the 
closet” argument.61
Alternatively, these social actors might be seeking to co-ordinate with the public sector or to contribute to state-
centred regulatory strategies. Indeed, they might be engaged in co-regulation – drawing on the different sources of 
legitimacy of the public sector, private sector and civil society to deliver regulatory instruments with greater credibility 
with the target population. In these circumstances, it can be appropriate to think in terms of “networked regulation”.
When we move beyond thinking about regulatory action and regulatory actors in terms of enforcement by public 
bodies, it opens up a wide range of possibilities for the architecture of a regulatory regime. It allows us to explore 
the possibilities for influencing the ‘spontaneous compliance factors’ identified by Parker and Neilsen.62 The literature 
on behavioural public policy – which includes, but is not confined to, ideas around ‘nudge’ – raises the possibility of 
considering a broader range of behaviour change mechanisms than targeted punishment or persuasion. Policy has, 
for example, sought to encourage healthy eating or a more active population by attempting to shift social norms 
and use peer group effects. These policies use the idea that reference levels and peer group behaviours can be more 
powerful influences upon individual behaviour than government edicts or legislative stipulations. 
Weaver observes that “Grudging - even compelled - compliance is still compliance, although it is likely to incur higher 
monitoring and enforcement costs”: regulatory strategies that focus on enforcement may deliver compliance even 
if it is unwilling, but if regulatees have not internalised the desirability of adhering to the relevant standards then 
compliance may only be temporary.63 The attraction of behaviourally-informed regulatory mechanisms lies both 
in their potential to reach parts of the regulated population that are difficult to reach through more conventional 
enforcement approaches and, if effective, their relatively low cost. They are ways of disseminating relevant information 
about normative standards and desirable practices to those who are not on the regulator’s radar. These type of 
behavioural policy concerns give a further perspective on the purposes and possibilities of industry self-regulation 
but can also encourage examination of the role that other less apparent social actors and processes might play.64 
While these ideas are not entirely absent from thinking about regulating the PRS, they have not been explored in 
depth.
60 marksoutoftenancy.com; The website has subsequently been incorporated, to a degree, into state regulatory strategies through the reference made to it in the 
Westminster government’s How to Rent guide. On the challenges presented by platforms as regulatory instruments see S. Ranchordás (2018) Online reputation and 
the regulation of information asymmetries in the platform economy, Critical Analysis of Law, 5(1), 127-147.
61 See for example P. Verbruggen (2013) Gorillas in the closet? Public and private actors in the enforcement of transnational private regulation, Regulation & Governance, 
7(4), 512-532.
62 Parker and Neilsen (2017) Compliance: 14 questions.
 63 Weaver (2014), p.245.
64 F. Mols, S.A. Haslam, J. Jetten, and N.K. Steffens (2015) Why a nudge is not enough: a social identity critique of governance by stealth, European Journal of Political 
Research, 54, 81-98; D. Centola (2018) How behavior spreads: the science of complex contagions, Princeton, NJ: Princeton; R. Frank (2020) Under the influence: putting peer 
pressure to work, Princeton, NJ: Princeton.
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Towards the end of the 2000s there was a move to a focus upon risk in shaping regulatory strategies. Risk-based 
regulation is a data-driven strategy that seeks to target regulatory resources on those parts of a sector of particular 
concern. Targeting may be entirely upon “high risk” providers or subsectors. But if this leads actors in other parts of 
the sector to conclude that they are beyond the regulators’ gaze then this can lead to the accumulation of risk in 
“low risk” parts of the sector. This can suggest that mixed strategies – such as accompanying targeting of high risks 
with unpredictable random inspections on low risk subsectors - is necessary to keep low risks low. While risk-based 
strategies can be styled as primarily objective and data-driven it is important to acknowledge that what constitutes a 
‘high’ or ‘low’ risk has an irreducible political component – high or low from whose perspective? In relation to whose 
wellbeing?65
With its reliance upon data to guide the targeting of regulatory resources, risk-based regulation is part of the 
conversation about data, big data, and algorithmic regulation.66 The use of algorithmic decision-making in the private 
rented sector – in the form of “proptech” - is currently better developed among subsectors of the landlord population 
than it is among regulators. This is a fast-developing area. Technology can be used not only to streamline processes 
of property management but also to sift and sort tenants based on their risk profile. From the regulatory perspective, 
there is potential to build a multidimensional, and thus comprehensive, understanding of risks and problems affecting 
the sector. Algorithmic regulation is seen by advocates as offering the potential for more ’objective’ approaches to 
targeting regulatory action and allocating scarce resources. 
One of the consequences of these developments in automation is to remind us, by implication, of the influence and 
importance of micro-social processes and interactions. It is not simply regulatory strategies at the organisational 
level that we need to understand, but also the way in which individual street-level bureaucrats approach their 
role.67 Frontline regulatory decision-making is infused with political considerations, in the broadest sense, as well as 
emotion.68 This can mean that regulatory policy as delivered on the ground and experienced by regulatees - landlords 
and tenants - can differ considerably from regulatory policy as embodied in strategy documents.
Types of regulatory activity 
Recent research on PRS enforcement by local authorities has focused primarily on formal action taken (e.g., the 
number of prosecutions or formal notices served).69 It does not consider the nature, range, and impact of compliance-
focused activities undertaken by local authorities. These are actions that fall short of prosecution or other formal 
activity, and can include providing advice or guidance, holding training sessions or other events, or issuing warning 
letters. 
This informal work may in practice form the bulk of local authority regulatory activity. In the early evaluation of the 
Scottish registration scheme, local authorities were asked to state the main focus of their enforcement activities; the 
most common response received was the provision of advice and assistance to landlords.70 
65  See J. Black and R. Baldwin (2012) When risk-based regulation aims low: approaches and challenges, Regulation & Governance, 6, 2-22; R. Baldwin and J. Black (2016) 
Driving priorities in risk-based regulation: what’s the problem?, Journal of Law and Society, 43(4), 565-595.
66 For example, K. Yeung and M. Lodge (eds) (2019) Algorithmic regulation, Oxford: OUP.
67 See Hupe, P., Hill, M. and Buffat, A. (Eds) (2015) Understanding street level bureaucracy, Bristol: Policy Press.
68 J.L. Short (2019) The politics of regulatory enforcement and compliance: Theorizing and operationalizing political influence, Regulation & Governance, earlyview.; S. 
Fineman and A. Sturdy (1999) The emotions of control: exploration of environmental regulation, Human Relations, 52(5), 631-663.
69 Citizens Advice (2017) It’s Broke, lets fix it (Accessed: 23/4/20); Generation Rent (2017) FOI local government enforcement 2017-18 (Accessed: 23/4/20); Simcock, T.J. and 
Mykkanen, N. (2018) The Postcode Lottery of Local Authority Enforcement in the PRS, Manchester, UK, Residential Landlords Association, (Accessed: 7/4/20)
70 Lees and Boyle, Evaluation of the impact and operation
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Research in England also shows informal approaches to be widely used in the management of selective licensing 
areas.71 Participating local authorities reported that upon identifying breaches of the scheme’s conditions, landlords 
would often be given work schedules to complete and would then schedule another inspection. Landlords with 
unlicensed properties would often be given a second chance to license before prosecution was commenced. Formal 
enforcement action was found to be employed as a ‘backstop’, with improvement notices, prosecution, and financial 
penalties only being applied when landlords repeatedly contravened the scheme requirements. 
This raises questions regarding the ways in which the various enforcement regulatory strategies are developed 
and operated; this is particularly the case for those that go beyond formal enforcement approaches. Strategies 
and approaches will likely vary significantly between different local authorities. However, there is currently a lack of 
research addressing the ways in which approaches are shaped at a local level. 
The PRS is not homogenous. Nor does it always stand in the same relationship to other parts of a local housing 
system. In assessing alternative approaches to regulation, this study starts from the assumption that the operation 
and effectiveness of enforcement strategies will be influenced by contextual factors. These factors could be types of 
landlord and their motivations; the size of the sector relevant to other tenures; the composition of demand; rent levels; 
and the overall level of housing demand. 
It is highly problematic to view landlords as a cohesive group with uniform aims and objectives.72 Some landlords may 
be motivated by short-term profit above all else, while some focus on longer term capital growth; others may have 
more altruistic motives for letting property. The heterogeneity in motive, intent and indeed geographical location 
poses challenges for policymakers and regulators.73
Hence, if regulatory activities are to be effective in affecting behaviour then they must be sensitive to the context in 
which they occur. Newham’s enforcement activities are widely cited as an example of best practice and an illustration 
of what can be achieved if the political will and resources are made available to tackle low standards. However, the 
factors that operate to bring about an outcome in a specific situation are very unlikely to be universal: the context 
differs both from place to place and over time.74 In seeking to explore regulatory effectiveness it is crucial to embed 
this sensitivity to context at the heart of the analysis.
Systems thinking and regulation
The label “systems thinking” can be applied to a range of different types of analysis used for diverse purposes.75 
Central to most systems approaches is an emphasis upon the interconnections between the elements of a system 
and the recognition that the behaviour of a system as a whole cannot be predicted from the study of each of 
its elements in isolation. Systems thinkers are interested in complex causation and how a system’s behaviour is 
generated by the interaction of positive and negative feedback loops between the elements of the system. Systems 
thinking is also concerned with boundaries: what is inside the system we are interested in; what is ‘outside’ the system 
and part of its environment; and how do the system and its environment interact. 
When we are trying to understand enforcement action in the PRS, does it make sense to study it as an activity in 
isolation? Or is it better to recognise that enforcement is embedded in the broader activities of the local authority 
and may be in tension with other priorities, such as ensuring housing supply or managing the number of homeless 
households,76 and then explicitly analyse the relevance of these tensions and interconnections for the behaviour of 
the system? This is a question of where we draw the system boundary for the purposes of analysis. 
71 Lawrence, S. and Wilson, P. (2019) An Independent Review of the Use and Effectiveness of Selective Licensing, (For MCHLG) Accessed 9/7/19).
72 Allen and McDowell, 1989, p. 5
73 T. Amodu (2018) Regulating the private rented sector: millennial themes, Journal of Property, Planning and Environmental Law, 10(2):154-168.
74 N. Cartwright and J. Hardie (2012) Evidence-Based Policy: A Practical Guide to Doing It Better, Oxford: OUP.
75 See, for example, D.P. Stroh (2015) Systems thinking for social change, Charles Green Publishing.
76 Tension with other priorities may exist in Northern Ireland but not with ensuring housing supply or managing homeless households because these functions are 
not within remit of local authorities there.
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When we consider the effectiveness of various policy instruments in encouraging compliance can we understand 
them in isolation? Or do we need to understand how they interact – intentionally or unintentionally - with other 
policy instruments being used and, crucially, whether there are feedback loops between these instruments? For 
example, does increased enforcement action reduce the effectiveness of attempts to educate and inform landlords 
through the mechanism of reducing trust and increasing antagonism between the regulator and the regulated 
population? This risk is widely recognised in the literature on responsive regulation, for example, but, while it is 
fundamentally a systems issue, it is not typically framed explicitly in systems terms.
Ultimately, the aim of systems thinking – in adopting more holistic approaches to analysis – is to build a better 
understanding of situations or problems and thereby work towards more effective solutions. Some of those possible 
solutions might be less immediately evident than established solutions because they recognise the power of 
interaction, interconnection and unintended consequences.
While systems concepts have informed our thinking during the analysis and writing of this report, we do not explore 
their potential in great depth here. Instead we build upon the analysis presented below in a companion report that 
focuses upon how systems concepts, coupled with an expansive understanding of the drivers of compliance, can 
enhance our appreciation of both the problems the regulatory systems is trying to address and the nature of effective 
responses.77
Summary
This chapter provides an overview of several areas of regulatory theory and existing regulatory practice in the private 
rented sector:
l	 Compliant behaviour on the part of a regulated population – in this case private landlords – is shaped by a range 
of factors, both those associated with “enforced” compliance, driven by deterrence-focused regulatory activities, 
and “spontaneous” compliance factors associated with broader socio-political context and prevailing social norms.
l	 While regulatory thinking starts with deterrence-focused regimes, a broad range of other approaches – including 
responsive, smart and decentred regulation – have been proposed. Regulatory practice has evolved alongside this 
evolution in regulatory thinking; for example, the widespread adoption of risk-based regulatory strategies.
l	 The key message of the regulatory literature is that much regulatory activity in practice is not focused on 
formal deterrence-focused enforcement action, and that more informal compliance-oriented activities can, in 
a range of circumstances, be more effective than formal enforcement. When developing regulatory strategies 
it is not necessarily a question of choosing either a formal or informal approach: blended approaches using 
complementary tools can be effective.
l	 Research on enforcement in the private rented sector has concentrated on formal deterrence-focused activities. 
The research shows that formal enforcement action is not widespread. While a minority of local authorities make 
extensive use of their formal powers, many engage in very limited or no formal action. Information on the extent 
and nature of informal and compliance-focused activities is lacking.
l	 The role and functioning of the private rented sector varies between local housing markets. Consequently, the 
various regulatory tools available are likely to impact upon the sector differently and regulatory strategies will 
need to be tailored in the light of local context.
l	 Ideas associated with systems thinking - which encourage us to think holistically and develop a stronger 
understanding of a system’s dynamics by thinking about interconnections, feedback, and complex causation - can 
enhance our appreciation of the nature of both regulatory problems and effective regulatory responses.
77 A, Marsh, J, Harris, and D, Cowan (2020) Private rented sector compliance: a systems approach, CaCHE Working Paper, Glasgow:  UK Collaborative Centre for Housing 
Research
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3. The UK picture: Law and policy 
If devolution provides the laboratory for social and legal change across the UK, housing law and the regulation 
of housing standards are the test tube. There have been significant shifts in the regulation of the PRS across the 
devolved governments in the last 15 years. In this chapter, first, we set out those differences, before providing an 
analysis of them. Our analysis draws on our key stakeholder interviews and draws attention to differences across the 
case studies.
While, at a broad level, it might be said that there is convergence over issues such as licensing of houses in multiple 
occupation, and local government being the sector regulator, there is divergence over issues such as licensing of 
landlords and properties, and registration of landlords.78 There are different approaches to the regulation of letting 
agents and, to an extent, energy efficiency.79
Nor can it be said that one government is “ahead” of another – different governments have selected different options 
from a relatively narrowly conceived range and have approached the issues in different ways. In any event, the 
housing systems between the jurisdictions, together with the individual nations’ laws,80 have different histories and 
trajectories.
Housing law and the regulation of standards
In this section, we set out the key differences which now exist between the devolved parts of the UK in the ways in 
which the PRS is regulated. The intention is not to provide a detailed statement of law, but to set out the different 
approaches taken by the different governments.81
England
Although England has maintained its system of largely deregulated tenancies across the PRS, based on an assured 
shorthold model under the Housing Act 1988, there have been some significant alterations. 
First, there has been considerable re-regulation between landlord and tenant, in that various documents and 
certificates (including an energy performance certificate, gas safety certificate, electricity safety certificate, tenancy 
deposit information, and an up-to-date copy of the Government’s How to Rent guidance) now must be supplied 
to the tenant before the tenancy takes effect. Failure to provide such documents means that the benefits of such 
a tenancy to the landlord (i.e. the mandatory eviction ground on two months’ notice) are not available. Smoke and 
carbon monoxide detectors must be provided and checked at the start of each tenancy. Since 6 April 2007, deposits 
for assured shorthold tenancies must be protected by one of the three government-approved schemes.82
Landlords must now also carry out right to rent immigration status checks on occupiers of their premises. These 
checks have been controversial and subject to legal challenge. 
As regards standards in the sector, between landlord and tenant, there is a new implied condition that the property is 
fit for human habitation (Homes (Fitness for Human Habitation) Act 2018). All these obligations are capable of being 
enforced between tenant and landlord only. 
78 T. Moore (2017), “The convergence, divergence and changing geography of regulation in the UK’s private rented sector”, International Journal of Housing Policy, 17(3): 
444-56.
79 Although energy efficiency of properties is regulated not by MHCLG but as a climate change initiative, by BEIS, which has implications for devolution. Housing is a 
devolved responsibility in Wales, but climate change is not.  
80 The laws in Scotland and Northern Ireland have long diverged from those in England and Wales. Wales has diverged from England since it acquired the power to 
do so in 2014.
81 As to which, see, for example, H. Cromarty (2019), Housing Conditions in the Private Rented Sector (England), Briefing Paper No 7238, London: House of Commons.
 82 MyDeposits, the Tenancy Deposit Scheme and the Deposit Protection Service
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Secondly, new regulations have been imposed on letting agents. They are now required to be members of a redress 
body.83 The Tenant Fees Act 2019 (which also applies to landlords) restricts the fees that can be levied on tenants 
as well as the amount of tenancy deposits.84 There are also provisions regarding the handling of clients’ money.85 
The enforcement duty for these obligations is on the local authority with trading standards responsibility (in two 
tier authorities, that will be the county council). However, local authorities which do not have the trading standards 
function may also enforce these rules.
Thirdly, there are public law provisions contained in the Housing Act 2004 which enable local authorities with 
environmental health responsibilities (in two tier authorities, the district or borough council) to regulate the PRS in the 
following ways: 
(a) the Housing Health and Safety Rating System is a system which enables local authorities to inspect 
properties to determine the category of hazard (“any risk of harm to the health or safety of an actual or 
potential occupier of a dwelling or HMO”: s. 2).  There are two categories of hazard, the most serious being 
Category 1, under which there is a general duty to take enforcement action. Category 2 hazards give local 
authorities a power to take enforcement action.
Enforcement action is by different forms of notice – mostly an improvement notice (which specifies 
required improvements to the property) or a prohibition order (which prohibits the use of the property). 
In certain cases, they may also take emergency action. Failure to comply with such notices constitutes an 
offence, for which the local authority can prosecute. If the local authority successfully prosecute, they must 
now consider whether to apply for a rent repayment order (RRO). Occupiers may also apply to the tribunal 
for an RRO.
In addition, under amendments in the Housing and Planning Act 2016, the local authority may charge the 
person (and/or their agent) with a civil penalty (except for breach of a prohibition order), as opposed to 
taking a prosecution, up to a maximum of £30,000.  Although entitled a “civil” penalty, the local authority 
must prove to the criminal standard, which means that there must be a reasonable prospect of conviction 
using the Crown Prosecution Service’s code. The MHCLG guidance suggests that local authorities should 
consider a series of factors in determining the level of the fine: severity of offence; culpability and track 
record of offender; punishment; deterrence (of the offender and others); and removing any financial 
benefit.86 The particular benefit of the civil penalty regime, and an incentive for local authorities to use 
these powers, is that the penalty is returned to the authority’s general housing fund.
(b) Provisions require the mandatory licensing of houses in multiple occupation (“HMOs”) by local 
authorities. Conditions, for example as to the maximum number of persons allowed to occupy the 
property, can be attached to the licence. The licence holder must be a “fit and proper person”. Only certain 
properties are classified as HMOs for the purposes of mandatory licensing, but these can be extended 
by the local authority which can designate additional types of properties (“additional licensing”). Local 
authorities can also designate a planning change of use where a property is to be converted into an HMO. 
The local authority can prosecute a person having control or managing of an HMO if they are unlicensed or 
breach a condition. In addition, the local authority or occupier can apply to a tribunal for a rent repayment 
order, which enables the tribunal to make an award of the amount of rent (including any housing benefit 
or universal credit) to be repaid to the occupier. If the local authority successfully prosecute they must now 
consider whether to apply for an RRO.
83 Either the Property Redress Scheme or the Property Ombudsman 
84 See MHCLG (2019), Tenant Fees Act 2019, Statutory Guidance for Enforcement Authorities, London: MHCLG.
85 Client Money Protection Schemes for Property Agents (Approval and Designation of Schemes) Regulations 2018 S.I. 2018/751.
86 MHCLG (2018), Civil Penalties under the Housing and Planning Act 2016, Guidance for Local Housing Authorities, London MHCLG.
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In addition, under amendments in the Housing and Planning Act 2016, the local authority may charge the 
person with a civil penalty (except for breach of a prohibition order), as opposed to taking a prosecution, 
up to a maximum of £30,000 for each separate breach.
(c) Provisions enable the local authority to designate certain areas for selective licensing of private rented 
accommodation for up to five years. There are consultation and information requirements which must be 
completed before designation. There were initially two conditions by which the authority was able to make 
that designation: first, that the area is, or likely to become, an area of low housing demand; or, secondly, 
the area is experiencing a significant and persistent problem caused by anti-social behaviour.  Further 
conditions were added in 2015, to include housing conditions, migration, deprivation, and crime. Originally, 
the Secretary of State’s approval was required for all such schemes, but, in 2010, that requirement was 
removed; the requirement was reinstated in 2015 in respect of schemes where more than 20% of the local 
authority’s geographical area or PRS stock is to be designated.  By 1st January 2019, 44 local authorities 
operated such a scheme, with four covering the entire area and nine covering more than 20%.87
Failure to comply with the requirement to obtain a licence or breach of a licence condition is a criminal 
offence, for which the local authority can prosecute. If the local authority successfully prosecute, they must 
now consider whether to apply for an RRO.  The civil penalty regime also now applies.
The further significant intervention is the introduction of banning orders and the creation of a database of rogue 
landlords and property agents. A banning order is an order made by a tribunal on an application by a local authority 
which bans a person from letting or managing property or letting agency work for at least 12 months. The database 
has been effective from 6 April 2018 and only local authorities can make entries. The database was initially only 
accessible to local authorities but in 2019 the Government announced plans to allow the public access. A further 
important provision enables a local authority to require a person to give information to enable them to decide 
whether to apply for a banning order against that person.
The final intervention has been in relation to energy performance certificates under the Energy Efficiency (Private 
Rented Property) (England and Wales) Regulations 2015, as amended. All residential tenancies must now have a rating 
of at least “E” (“the minimum energy efficiency standard” [“MEES”]). That requirement, which came into effect from 
1st April 2020; previously only applied to residential tenancies granted after 1 April 2018. The enforcement authority 
is the local authority, which may first serve a compliance notice. The authority may decide to impose a financial 
penalty, which ranges from £1000-£4000, depending on the offence. The requirement to have an EPC is enforced by 
the trading standards authority. In two tier authorities, the county council has trading standards responsibility, but 
enforcement for other aspects of housing management including enforcement of the MEES is the responsibility of the 
district council. 
Wales
Responsibility for legislation in respect of housing was devolved to Wales by the Government of Wales Act 2006 and 
which came into force following the referendum in 2011. Consequently, the provisions of the Housing Act 2004 apply 
equally to Wales. However, the enforcement regimes are different, as the civil penalty regime and the extension of 
RROs do not apply (as they were introduced by the Housing and Planning Act 2016). The extensions to the assured 
tenancy regime also do not apply as they postdate the devolution of housing. The MEES applies in Wales because it 
relates to matters not devolved to the Welsh Government.
87  Lawrence, S. and Wilson, P, (2019), An Independent Review of the Use and Effectiveness of Selective Licensing, London: MHCLG, para 1.15.
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The major intervention by the Welsh Government has been the requirement for all landlords in Wales to be registered, 
and landlords and lettings agents must be licensed for that purpose (Housing (Wales) Act 2014). A licence lasts for 
five years. Licensing is on the basis of the fit and proper person test and completion of an approved training course 
delivered by an authorised training provider (Regulation of Private Rented Housing (Training Requirements) Wales) 
Regulations 2015, SI 2015/1366), and the licence can be revoked. Failure to be registered or licensed is a criminal 
offence, but this can be discharged by payment of a fixed penalty notice of £150 (or £250 if the offence penalty is 
an unlimited fine). The licensing authority is Cardiff County Council for the whole of Wales. Additionally, the local 
authority or licensing authority may apply to the tribunal for a rent stopping order, which halts the liability for the 
payment of rent for a period; the same authorities and the tenant may apply for an RRO. As in England, since 6 April 
2007 all deposits relating to an AST (though not other tenancies or licences), must be protected by a Government-
authorised scheme.
The other major intervention has been the Renting Homes (Wales) Act 2016, which amends the security of tenure 
provisions in line with a more consumer-oriented ethos. However, that Act is not yet in force.
Scotland
The Private Housing (Tenancies)(Scotland) Act 2016 introduced the private residential tenancy, which is an open-
ended tenancy with a prescribed method of increasing rent. The tenancy contains mandatory and discretionary terms. 
One mandatory term is that the property must meet the “repairing standard”, which includes matters relating to repair, 
fire safety and carbon monoxide. Those matters are enforceable between landlord and tenant.
All landlords must be registered (Anti-Social Behaviour etc (Scotland) Act 2004, Part 8), which requires that they be a fit 
and proper person. The landlord register is a national scheme but maintained by local authorities. The fee for a single 
property is £66. Landlords may be refused registration, or their registration may be revoked. Where a landlord rents 
property without being registered, they may be prosecuted by the procurator fiscal (with a fine of up to £50,000) and 
the tenant may stop paying rent following service of a notice to that effect. By the Housing (Scotland) Act 2014, all 
letting agents must be registered, which includes a requirement that they be “fit and proper persons”. Letting agents 
must also follow a code of practice which came into force on 31st January 2018.88 Enforcement of the letting agent 
rules is by either landlord or tenant, who can apply to the tribunal after first serving a written notice on the agent. 
Scottish tenancy deposit protection is similar to the model adopted in England and Wales.89
In terms of standards, under the Housing (Scotland) Act 2006 as amended, all properties in Scotland must meet the 
“tolerable standard” (below which a property is regarded as unfit for human habitation) and private rented properties 
must also meet the repairing standard. The repairing standard has been altered by The Housing (Scotland) Act 2006 
(Modification of the Repairing Standard) Regulations 2019, which has staggered the changes. The changes which 
came into force in March 2019 are that the property must meet the tolerable standard and in determining whether a 
property meets the standards of repair, regard is to be had to guidance issued by the Scottish ministers. In tenement 
buildings, where there are multiple tenures and issues over the repairs of common parts, a property will not fail to 
meet the repairing standard if the majority of owners do not consent to relevant works. The tenant or local authority 
may apply to the First-tier Tribunal for Scotland (Housing and Property Camber) to enforce the repairing standard.
The tolerable standard derives from the Housing (Scotland) Act 1987, which remains in force, and provides the basis for 
the public regulation of private rented accommodation. The standard has been amended by the Housing (Scotland) 
Act 1987 (Tolerable Standard) (Extension of Criterion) Order 2019 and now includes two new elements covering smoke 
and heat alarms and CO alarms. However, the enforcement powers of local authorities are contained in the Housing 
(Scotland) Act 2006. These enable local authorities to issue work notices, demolition orders, and maintenance orders. 
Work notices are in respect of sub-standard houses, which do not meet the tolerable standard (among other criteria).
88 Scottish Government (2018), Letting Agent Code of Practice, Edinburgh: Scottish Government.
89 Scotland has three operational statutory tenancy deposit schemes: Letting Protection Service Scotland; Safe Deposits Scotland; and Mydeposits Scotland. 
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In terms of energy efficiency, after 1st April 2020, an EPC E+ rating was to be required on all newly rented properties. 
In light of the current COVID-19 pandemic, the decision has been made not to launch these regulations until the 
crisis has come to an end. The minimum EPC regulations introduced in England, Wales and Scotland will likely pose 
significant enforcement challenges for local authorities partly due to difficulties associated with identifying these 
properties.90
All HMOs must be licensed by the local authority and meet certain standards as provided by the Housing (Scotland) 
Act 2006, Part 5. The landlord or agent must be a fit and proper person, and the property must meet certain standards 
of suitability. The licence may include conditions and lasts for three years, but can be revoked earlier. The local 
authority must keep a register of HMOs. Where the HMO is not licensed or a condition is breached, the local authority 
can provide that no rent is to be paid, and the relevant person commits an offence which results in the payment of a 
fine on summary conviction and other consequential orders, such as disqualification from being a licence holder.
The Enhanced Enforcement Areas Scheme (Scotland) Regulations 2015, SI 2015/252, enables a local authority to 
apply to create such an area in cases of private rented housing which is either of a poor environmental standard or 
overcrowded, or there is a prevalence of anti-social behaviour.  The benefits of an EEA include powers to apply for 
a warrant of entry and additional discretionary powers and powers of information. The Private Housing (Tenancies)
(Scotland) Act 216, art 3, also contains powers for a local authority request approval from the Scottish Government 
for the creation of a rent pressure zone, which requires that rent increases cannot exceed a CPI+ measure for no more 
than five years.91
Northern Ireland
The Private Tenancies (Northern Ireland) Order 2006, SI 2006/459, provides the basis for the private obligations of 
landlords regarding the state and condition of property, and the public obligations of local authority district councils. 
As regards the former, the landlord has certain repairing obligations. As regards the latter, they may serve a notice of 
unfitness, where the property is unfit for human habitation; if not so unfit, a notice of disrepair if substantial repairs 
are necessary to bring the property up to a reasonable standard (having regard to age, character and locality).  The 
current housing fitness standard was last updated in 1992 – there was consideration of amending the standard prior 
to the dissolution of the Assembly.92 The council officer has power to enter a property on 24 hours’ notice to conduct 
a survey or examination. Failure to comply with the notice within a reasonable period is an offence. The council can 
require the person to pay the administrative costs of servicing the notice.
There are other provisions concerned with the certification of fitness of properties constructed before 6th November 
1956, which may affect the amount of rent that can be levied.
There is a mandatory registration scheme for landlords in Northern Ireland, the purpose of which is to be “light 
touch” to enable communication and better regulation of the sector.93 Accordingly, there is no fit and proper person 
requirement. Registration contains basic information about the landlord and the property let. There is a fee of £70 
payable for online registration and registration lasts for three years. Landlords must include their registration number 
in correspondence. Registration is through NI Direct.
A further publicly controlled scheme is the protection of tenancy deposits. Councils are responsible for enforcing this 
scheme, with fixed penalties up to £5,000
90  As part of our research programme for 2021 the research team will be carrying out a separate study exploring the range of issues the PRS faces in meeting energy 
efficiency standards and effective strategies in driving the change towards greater energy efficiency. 
91 Our study participants however emphasised that these regulations are virtually impossible to introduce in practice. 
92 Department for Communities (2017) Private Rented Sector in Northern Ireland – Proposals for Change, Consultation Document, Belfast: DFC.
93 Department for Social Development (2010), Building Solid Foundations, Belfast: DSD.
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HMOs are required to be licensed in accordance with the Houses in Multiple Occupation Act (Northern Ireland) 2016, 
an Act of the NI Assembly. Licences are issued by the District Council for up to five years, and may only be granted 
if it would not constitute a breach of planning control; the owner and any agent is a fit and proper person; the 
management arrangements are satisfactory; it will not result in the overprovision of HMOs in the locality; and the 
living accommodation is fit for human habitation.  An offence is committed if the HMO is unlicensed and there is no 
reasonable excuse for not having a licence, or if there is breach of a licence condition, with fixed penalties of up to 
£20,000.
Letting agents are not required to be members of accreditation schemes or subject to registration requirements. 
Disposal of Lands (NI) Order 1986 sets out that any stipulation that a tenant must pay the fees due to an agent for 
certain work commissioned by a landlord is void. The mechanism for reclaiming any such fees paid is through civil 
courts.
Before the Northern Ireland Assembly was dissolved, a range of further interventions in the PRS were being discussed, 
with comparisons being made between developments made by the other devolved governments and Northern 
Ireland. The re-establishment of the Assembly has reanimated the policy development process with respect to the 
PRS, but proposals for future change have yet to be made public.
Policy issues
Although there have been evaluations of individual policies such as landlord registration in Scotland and selective 
licensing in England,94 there has been no consideration of the range of policy issues which exists across the devolved 
governments. In this section we draw predominantly from our Stage 1 interviews with national organisations, 
amplified by our case studies, to consider the policy lessons which can be learned from the different approaches 
taken by the devolved governments.
By way of preface, one of the key points of our analysis is a recognition that each of the devolved governments is 
at a different stage in the development of their regulation of the PRS. So, for example, registration of landlords was 
introduced in Wales some nine years after Scotland, and a year after Northern Ireland (NI). Even if all other things were 
equal – which they are not – we would not be comparing like-with-like. What we can do is pull out key themes and 
consider how these play across the devolved governments.
Registration and licensing
Key policy choices are made in the selection of type of scheme. Two types have been used: registration and licensing. 
Registration is of the person – the landlord or their agent, and includes details about the property. It can be used as a 
device to monitor growth and decline in the sector and to provide information to landlords. An accurate view of the 
sector and how it is changing can, however, only be obtained if all qualifying landlords register and, where necessary, 
re-register.  
However, there are data gaps across the devolved governments with landlord registration, in part because of the 
challenges in building the database. Stakeholders drew attention to the issue of non-compliance and the significant 
proportion of landlords that continue to operate outside the legislation:
Now we have over 45,000 landlords registered with the scheme and close to 90,000 properties registered. The 
last house conditions survey that was done had estimated there would be about 135,000, 136,000 tenancies in 
Northern Ireland, so we still haven’t captured them all. (Registration, NI)
94 Lees, F. and Boyle, J. (2011), Evaluation of the Impact and Operation of Landlord Registration in Scotland, Edinburgh: Scottish Government Social Research; Lawrence 
and Wilson (2019).
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We’re 13 years in now and I guess if somebody had said to me back in 2006 when this went live that we’d still be 
where we are now which is still doing an awful lot of the administrative headaches that universal registration 
brings I’d be saying that was disappointing.  I don’t think anybody could claim that it’s been a roaring success at 
this stage. … there’s still a significant minority of landlords who are operating outside of the margins of the system. 
(NGO, Scotland)
Certainly from our point of view, finding not just the correct people, who are the landlords, but also correct 
correspondence details is something that is incredibly time consuming, something that’s very difficult, if you like, 
and probably is one of the things that takes up the majority, if you like, of our time, locating the people that we 
need to contact. (Rent Smart Wales)
Whilst national governments have provided local authorities with a range of new enforcement tools and schemes, 
there was a feeling that these schemes need to be combined with powers. For example, an issue arose over local 
authority officers’ rights of access to properties to inspect them. This was particularly an issue in Scotland but was 
mentioned more generally across the UK. An enforcement and inspection regime clearly implies that there should be 
rights of entry, particularly where there is reasonable suspicion that there is a health and safety hazard in a property:
The difficulty we have is - there’s two things. First of all, identifying where these properties are, because if the tenant 
doesn’t come forward through what’s called third party referral, then we won’t know about it unless social work 
or the police or fire and rescue identify a particular problem. The other big problem we have is we don’t have 
the legislative powers to enter these properties, so we can’t just chap the door and say, ‘We want to inspect this 
property.’ We don’t have that power. (Housing officer, Scotland)
An additional regulatory design failure highlighted by English local authorities was the ability for criminal landlords to 
operate “behind the schemes” via a letting agent if they received a banning order. Although from the point of view 
of the legislation someone else is formally in charge, these landlords can continue to “pull the strings” (Enforcement 
officer, England). 
Scottish authorities also reported a lack of clear guidelines to inform enforcement decisions, particularly in relation to 
the application of the “fit and proper person” test: 
Yes, you’ve got powers to register them or not register them but then if you de-register them you’ve got to be able 
to convince a court that that was appropriate, which is fair enough, but there’s not a lot of hard guidelines as to 
this person’s considered okay and this person wouldn’t be considered okay … we get to ask about convictions but 
there’s nothing to say, just because somebody’s got any particular convictions they’re not going to be considered 
fit and proper. So it still becomes very much a bit of a judgement on how to make that decision (Landlord 
Registration, Scotland). 
In Wales, a systems-based approach has been taken to deal with the issue of a lack of information on those who fail to 
register:
We also work with the National Fraud Initiative. We have coded our data to the National Fraud Initiative database. 
They cross-tabulate that with information from local authorities in regard to Council Tax and Housing Benefit, and 
then they provide us with a return, which is a mismatch of potential properties that are rented out that actually 
haven’t been registered with us. (Rent Smart Wales)
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This approach rests on the assumption that while a landlord might fail to comply with the licensing regime, either 
they or their tenants are complying appropriately with other administrative systems. But if non-compliance with such 
systems is correlated then that would constrain the scope for cross-referencing between systems to expose potential 
non-compliance with a licensing scheme.95
The amount and level of information distributed to landlords varies across schemes. Registration can be used as a 
self-certification device which also provides information to landlords about their obligations. The process requires 
applicants to confirm how they comply with their legal duties. In Scotland, there was a feeling that bringing these 
obligations to the fore within the registration process was improving awareness about landlord responsibilities:
There’s been a change to the information that landlords have to provide at the application stage96, so they’re now, 
instead of just ticking a box to say ”yes I comply with all of the legislation”, they’re guided through all of the key 
things to say ”have you done this?”, ”have you done that?”, ”have you done the other?“ and I was actually really 
shocked how much that is flagging up people not doing it. They’ve just been blindly ticking a box and saying 
historically ”yes I do it”, but they haven’t been doing it. So that’s made a really positive difference in terms of making 
people aware of their obligations and getting some of them to pull their socks up where they previously just hadn’t 
been doing really vital safety checks and things like that on their properties. (Landlord Group, Scotland)
Key stakeholders in Scotland however reported that not all local authorities are making use of the registration scheme 
to share information and communicate with the sector. 
Although registration schemes can be passive in the sense that they can simply require the landlord or agent to 
register on a database for a fee, some schemes also require the landlord or agent to fulfil certain criteria, usually of 
being a fit and proper person. This allows for landlords to be refused registration or to be deregistered subsequently. 
Previous evaluations show unevenness in the enforcement of such criteria, with some local authorities adopting a 
light-touch approach when assessing a landlord’s eligibility:97
I think this is partly a volume thing … it’s part a cultural thing, maybe we’ll come to this later on, but landlord 
registration culturally, it depends where it’s come from within a council service context. If it’s come from a kind 
of environmental health licencing regulation type of point of view that is not that close to a customer service 
approach to things, to put that diplomatically. (NGO, Scotland)
Whilst enforcement of the registration scheme can occur in response to tenant complaints, some local authorities in 
Scotland are undertaking random checks of properties to assess declarations of compliance. One of the key themes 
that emerged across all devolved governments was the different practices of enforcement among local authorities. 
This is explored in chapters 4 and 5 of this report.
Registration schemes with fit and proper person criteria and property inspections blend into licensing schemes, 
which are similarly concerned with the enforcement of standards. In this sense, the distinction between registration 
schemes (passive) and licensing schemes (active) tends to be blurred and the labels questionable. However, licensing 
schemes are often concerned not just with the person but also the property. This is a key feature of the licensing of 
HMOs, which pose particular risks to tenants in terms (for example) of fire hazards. It is notable that HMO licensing is a 
consistent theme across the devolved governments, and that the designation criteria used are similar. These schemes 
are afflicted with the same types of data gaps  as registration schemes, with a proportion of landlords failing to 
comply with the regulations:
95 One stakeholder suggested, on the basis of experience, that this is a relevant issue in trying to use tax records to identify landlords operating outside of a 
registration/licensing: landlords who seek to avoid licensing their property are also likely to be engaged in tax evasion. This did not emerge as an issue in our case 
studies but would justify further investigation.
96 These changes came into effect on 16 September 2019 under the Private Landlord Registration (Information) (Scotland) Regulations 2019
97 The 2011 Scottish evaluation demonstrated showed that several local authorities had adopted a ‘light touch’ approach, reviewing only those where: previous 
convictions are disclosed; complaints have been made; there is a history of involvement with the landlord; or the landlord is on a ‘review list’
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The good thing about licensing is it should create a level playing field, but it only works if there are not landlords – 
and I know that they exist – operating entirely under the radar. I know that there are a lot who just never registered, 
so then what do you do? The council has to track them down. You can do it partly with an intelligence-led model, 
but then you need some really good officers.  (NGO, England)
Equally, licensing can be used to educate those involved in managing a rented property – as in Wales, where there 
are mandatory training courses prior to a licence being granted. Licensing can also be used to target particular areas 
or types of properties, as in selective licensing in England. A particular issue with the latter type of scheme can be 
the low likelihood that a property will be inspected or that it is determined that certain documents (such as a gas 
safety certificate) are in place before a licence is granted. This means a licence could be granted to a property which is 
(say) unsafe and/or in breach of the HHSRS. This can lead to scepticism among some stakeholders directed not at the 
principle of licensing but at the way it has been implemented in some areas:
Licensing’s ...  a bit of a sham … Because it gives tenants a false sense of security. They’re moving into a property 
that’s been issued with a licence. That property, there’s a 90% chance, probably higher, actually, that it hasn’t been 
inspected. So it’s getting a certificate that on the tenant’s side tells them that it’s safe when actually there’s been no 
activity undertaken to demonstrate that it’s safe. (Landlord Group, England)
From our case studies it is evident that registration and licensing schemes were seen as offering benefits in terms of 
raising landlord awareness, increasing compliance, and providing an understanding of the private rented sector. Yet 
these benefits are not inevitable: there are important design and implementation issues that need to be dealt with 
before such schemes can deliver. Our interviews identified a number of areas in which existing schemes, as currently 
implemented, are not fully realising their potential.
National and local
The other vector of policy choice is whether to have a national or local scheme. England has the only local licensing 
scheme, but it is notable that Scotland has certain local schemes (EEAs and rent pressure zones98) which, whilst not 
being licensing schemes, have similar elements of control. Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland operate national 
schemes, with national bodies undertaking the management of the scheme in Wales and Northern Ireland, but local 
authorities responsible for the national scheme in Scotland. Here, we focus upon how the nation and local levels 
interact and make two key points about this interaction. 
First, national schemes are relevant at the local level where, for example, the local level has enforcement powers and 
requires information about the landlord. However, here, there can be communication issues around what data can 
be accessed and for what purpose. This was an important point made by our Northern Ireland case study, where 
data sharing restrictions significantly impacts on local authorities’ ability to use the data to understand the sector, 
communicate with landlords and target enforcement action. The local authority felt the sole purpose of the scheme 
was to check if the landlord was registered or not and that it carried little benefit at a local level:
Interviewer: Does the registration scheme, at all, help in giving you a bit of an understanding of where properties 
are and what the sector looks like … 
Respondent: To be honest, we wouldn’t be using the data off that for that purpose. … There are exclusions on 
what we can use it for. We, basically, just can access the Landlord Registration Scheme just to determine if, you 
know, the landlord of a property has registered. That’s it …  That is part of our duty, obviously, to check that the 
landlords are registered, but we’re not really allowed to use that data to contact them other than to check that 
they’re registered … There are so many restrictions in it, it’s only to check if they’re registered, it’s not to use their 
[details] or anything like that, or to do any profiling of where most of our rented properties are. It’s very restrictive as 
to what we can use it for. (Environmental health, NI)
98 Case study participants however reported that this is virtually impossible to put into practice.
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On the other hand, in Wales, the national registration scheme (Rent Smart Wales (RSW)) and local councils have 
a memorandum of understanding (MOU) and data sharing agreement in place. The MOU describes the role and 
processes both RSW and the councils need to follow and the payment arrangements. Anything councils do for RSW, 
they are reimbursed for. Local authorities were said to be the “eyes and ears on the ground” for RSW, and there was 
a system of what was described as “service requests” in place which operated both ways – the national scheme 
would request detail from the local authority in relation to a landlord or agent, and the local authority could provide 
information to the national scheme about a particular enforcement issue which the latter could then take. That 
service request scheme built on already existing relationships which had developed among environmental health 
directors, who met to agree an approach, share best practice, and participate in an expert panel on housing.
Secondly, there is a question about the relationship between individual governments and local authorities. There 
is, sometimes, an assumption that national governments set a framework and then operate passively. Such an 
assumption is challenged by the existence of good practice guidance, as well as ongoing scheme evaluations across 
the devolved governments.99
In Scotland, our case study authorities discussed the “direction of travel” of the Scottish Government – regarded as 
shifting from a “light-touch” approach to being more enforcement-oriented – as a determinant of their own approach 
and organisation. Some authorities hoped to move towards more tough enforcement action following this change in 
focus (see chapter 4 for discussion of the drivers of enforcement strategies and approaches). In contrast, in Northern 
Ireland, where the registration scheme retains its original “light-touch approach”, participants reported limited 
enforcement or monitoring activity. 
Civil wrongs 
One significant shift in policy and practice has been away from traditional forms of prosecution by the enforcement 
agency (be that local authority or other government body). In each jurisdiction, there has been a shift towards 
financial penalties, levied by way of a civil penalty (England), rent penalty notices (Scotland)100, or fixed penalty notice 
(Wales and Northern Ireland). One reason for this shift may have been a concern that traditional lower level criminal 
courts did not understand the seriousness of the issues, or perhaps prosecutions took too long. What is different, 
however, is the maximum amount of such a penalty, which ranges from £250 in Wales to £30,000 per offence in 
England. The level of penalties in England is calibrated such that they could ”break the business model” of a landlord, 
thereby in principle providing a strong incentive to comply.
This research identified diverse views regarding the role and effectiveness of the new civil powers. Some local 
authorities in Scotland and England regarded civil penalties as a useful financial deterrent that could encourage 
compliance because landlords do not want a criminal record: 
Again, dead simple, see, the ones that hurt them financially, they are the most effective tools. Threaten to fine them 
and charge them, it’s not always effective but the ones that contain real financial penalties tends to work. Usually 
before anybody loses anything, which is good. (Registration, Scotland)
I think if I look back it’s probably one of the best if used properly because it’s an instant financial impact and the 
landlord gets a shock, especially the ones who don’t understand the risk. When you hit them with that, next time 
they don’t do that. (Enforcement Officer, England)
99 Echoing findings from previous evaluations our findings suggest that, while recognising local regulatory practice needs to be tailored to local context, there is 
nonetheless a need for more best practice guidance and information, covering for example, the development of enforcement policies. 
100 Rent Penalty Notices are used as an alternative to a report to the Procurator Fiscal. Currently these can only be applied where the landlord has failed to register, 
although there has been some suggestion that they could be used more broadly, for example, in relation to property condition. 
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In England and in Northern Ireland there was, however, some scepticism that financial penalties were in general use. 
One key stakeholder noted that, in England, “information requests show the vast bulk of local authorities don’t have 
an enforcement policy in place which means they can’t use those powers”.
It is important not to regard the imposition of a civil penalty or fixed penalty notice as a snapshot; it is part of a 
process, which includes its collection by the authority. A penalty that is levied but not collected is an inadequate 
one, and does not do justice to the often considerable amount of work that has gone in to the decision to issue the 
penalty in the first place. In some cases, it will be necessary to go further in the event of non-payment, and, with 
larger fines, apply for further enforcement of the penalty (including, for example, applying for a charging order against 
the property itself). Reflecting findings from the review of the selective licensing regime, case study authorities in 
England reported difficulties in recovering the financial penalties levied, and the costs incurred in doing so.101 As a 
result, civil penalties were regarded by some participants as an unreliable source of income.102 One key stakeholder 
reported that local authorities in England are only collecting approximately 25% of the penalties they issue. 
Our research also identified a general reticence on the part of authorities in England to publicise these actions 
because of concerns that landlords will regard financial penalties as bureaucratic self-serving behaviour: that they are 
being levied by authorities simply to raise revenue. The MHCLG’s claim that the deterrent effect of civil penalties will 
be achieved informally103 is somewhat problematised by the large number of single landlords operating in the sector. 
Publicity of such activity may therefore still be desirable. Our online research identified one example where this type 
of publicity occurred on an anonymous basis.104
Our findings suggest that the effectiveness of rent penalty notices in Scotland may be undermined by the 
introduction of Universal Credit (UC). The 2011 national registration evaluation reported that in most cases where the 
penalty is applied tenants are on housing benefit; this shields them from the stress and vulnerability of withholding 
rent from their landlord. Prior to UC, the Housing Benefit department would work with the landlord registration 
scheme to suspend payment of the rent. However, under UC the tenant will be responsible for requesting benefit 
suspension; one local authority was concerned that:
…. if that reduces the effectiveness then we may spend more time in court and it may prove more difficult because 
the prerequisite of everything is someone needs to be able to identify the landlord … we had it working so 
brilliantly for housing benefits. It was so slick, it was so easy and so effective in dealing with the problem and now 
it’s like they’ve just taken away the best, or we feel as though we’ve lost the best, tool we had. But hey. We’ve not 
experienced it yet but we feel we know it’s coming. (Registration, Scotland)
Legislative development 
Participants in England and Scotland emphasised that legislative developments addressing the PRS tend to be 
piecemeal and disjointed. New legislation has generally focused on one specific problem or set of problems and can 
be overly complex or contradictory:105
The other one I find, I think there is a bigger issue around the legislation itself in that because of the explosion in 
the private rented sector, we have seen almost legislation thrown at it, and there has been no sort of strategic 
approach to that … [I] mean we struggle with the Housing Act itself because it’s quite an old piece of legislation. 
Does this bit apply or does that? There is some sort of consolidation of everything needed. But I mean that’s a 
massive piece of work nationally (Enforcement team, England).
101 Lawrence, S. and Wilson, P. (2019) An Independent Review of the Use and Effectiveness of Selective Licensing, (For MCHLG) Accessed 9/7/19).
102 The review of selective licensing in England also highlighted the potential problems associated with assuming a revenue from civil penalties to support a licensing 
designation if penalties could not be recovered or if compliance was higher than expected. Pg.51
103 MHCLG (2018) Civil penalties under the Housing and Planning Act 2016. Statutory guidance (Accessed: 10/6/20)
104 https://www.lettingagenttoday.co.uk/breaking-news/2020/1/huge-18-000-penalty-for-landlord-who-failed-to-improve-property
105 This echoes findings reported in J. Rugg,  and D. Rhodes, (2018) The Evolving Private Rented Sector: Its Contribution and Potential
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Reflecting longstanding concerns,106 participants criticised the law governing the PRS as fragmented, opaque and 
lacking strategic focus. Calls were made for consolidation and simplification of the law as a means of facilitating more 
effective enforcement practices: 
I think there’s six or seven different pieces of legislation – and one of the problems we have is reconciling all these 
bits of legislation. Instead of having one Act of Parliament that clearly sets out what the powers of enforcement are 
and what potential breaches there might be … I think there has to be a more realistic perspective and I also think 
that central government need to join up their thinking … to cut a long story short, I think the whole private sector 
housing legislation framework needs to be looked at again (Housing Strategy Officer, Scotland).
Trading Standards (England) 
The law as it currently stands makes it extremely difficult for trading standards in England to successfully use 
responsive approaches in their regulation of the PRS. Civil penalty charge notices can only be served against the 
legal entity which owns the business, which in most instances is a limited company without there being any liability 
on behalf of directors running the agency. If/when the local authority is successful in levying a civil penalty - which 
according to legislation is the standard course of action for a first offence107 - the agency can simply dissolve and 
restart under a different name, with the local authority then having to begin the whole process again: 
If you want the enforcement services to be more effective and robust about dealing with rogue letting agents, 
property management agents, then really you need to give us a set of tools that allows us, not only to go after the 
legal entity, i.e. the limited company, but it also allows us to charge at the same time a sole director of that limited 
company because it’s nobody else that’s operating that vehicle (Trading Standards Director, England).
Two-tier local authorities (England) 
There was a feeling among some case studies that insufficient attention is being given to the specific experience of 
two-tier authorities. Difficulties arise where enforcement responsibilities fall across both the district and the county 
council (e.g. in relation to having an EPC and enforcement of MEES): 
So the government have introduced a bit of legislation that said you have to have a bit of paper and that’s trading 
standards in a two tier authority and then a second bit of legislation that says oh and by the way that bit of paper 
has ... to reflect that the house is a certain standard of energy efficiency and that’s someone else who enforces 
that’s district councils. … this was all a bit of a mess because they weren’t even particularly clear who did what 
and where … it’s all well and good saying in a bit of legislation it’s got to be a minimum energy performance 
standard if no one’s got that bit of paper on which it should say it in the first place. (Trading Standards, England) 
Under these circumstances there is clearly scope for confusion and room for under-performance as a result of 
inadequate communication or coordination. One case study authority approached this issue creatively, with the 
county council establishing appropriate delegations so that the enforcement responsibilities would lie with the 
districts who are able to put in their own procedures.
As explored later in this report, one of the benefits of a housing strategy is the potential for thinking about PRS issues 
holistically and several participants highlighted the complex partnership working which is required to make a success 
of enforcing the legislation. This poses additional challenges for two-tier authorities: 
It has quite a wide partnership but the difficulty is, how do we impact on the private rented sector to act as trying 
to make a meaningful difference given the complexity of the system working across [many] different areas with 
[many] different sets of rules, linking back into a city … and then working with NHS and everybody else to try and 
deliver some of that. It gets really confusing and difficult to even get simple things done. (NHS Partner, England)
106 Marsh and Gibb, The Evolving Private Rented Sector 
107 Criminal prosecution is only available for the second offence at which point there is general liability for directors. 
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Our literature review confirmed that issues associated with multi-level governmental structures are generally absent 
from discussions on enforcement in the UK PRS:108
When you read lots of policy documents that come out, it almost feels that it’s been written for a Metropolitan 
Borough or a unitary or a city and doesn’t very often take in some of unique features – [of] the two tier system 
(NHS Partner, England).
Calls that have been made for a wider sharing of best practice109 are therefore all the more relevant in this context.
Short term funding 
In England, there has been some investment at a national level in tackling rogue landlords. This includes investment 
of £4million in the “tackling rogue landlord” fund. This type of approach to addressing the issue attracted criticism: the 
timescale for applying was extremely tight; the funding was generally short-term and for particular projects; and the 
limited money had to be spent within a certain very brief period. These characteristics mean that this funding cannot 
easily contribute to a robust strategic approach, which will no doubt be particularly troubling to policy makers: 
It funds some additional projects we’re looking at and some ideas we might have, so this year we’ve got 38,000 
and one of those is to improve our website. We’ll see an improvement and some additional money coming in, 
but I don’t think it helps you to think about things more strategically and how you might invest that and there’s 
some limitations on how that money can be invested as well, so you can’t use it, for instance, to fund your existing 
establishment so if you want to bring in additional enforcement officers, you’ve got to do it on an agency basis. 
(Head of service, England)
Summary  
In this chapter we have considered the different ways in which the constituent countries of the UK have developed 
their legislation towards the regulation of the PRS, as well as issues which have arisen in its practice. The central policy 
lessons are that:
l	 The approaches have been different, and sensitive to local contexts, although the menu of options is quite limited.
l	 Registration and licensing schemes create new areas for landlord non-compliance, and different approaches to 
inspection of properties across the devolved governments and between local authorities.
l	 There are significant issues around data sharing where there are national schemes, although these were resolved 
in Wales by a memorandum of understanding between Rent Smart Wales and local authorities.
l	 The new civil regimes of financial penalties have created new issues around the variability in the use of the 
penalty and around its collection. Particular issues have arisen in Scotland with Universal Credit because of the link 
between the financial penalty and the tenant withholding rent.
l	 The existence of two-tier authorities in England, and the awkward distribution of responsibilities between them, 
means that there is a need for a more streamlined approach in organising those responsibilities. This can be 
resolved locally, but national guidance would be welcomed.
l	 Short-term funding streams have proved problematic for local authorities and do not contribute to the kind of 
strategic approach which should be developed.
108 The following recent reports make no mention of two-tier local authorities: Lawrence, S. and Wilson, P, (2019), An Independent Review of the Use and Effectiveness 
of Selective Licensing, London: MHCLG, MHCLG, Rogue Landlord Enforcement: Guidance for Local Authorities (Accessed: 11/6/20), Housing, Communities and Local 
Government Committee (MHCLG) (2018) Private rented sector: Fourth Report of Session 2017-19
109 Lawrence, S. and Wilson, P, (2019), An Independent Review of the Use and Effectiveness of Selective Licensing, London: MHCLG
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4. Enforcement strategies and styles
Local authorities and enforcement officers decide how laws governing the UK private rented sector are implemented 
on a local level. Recent quantitative studies on the prevalence of formal enforcement activities110 are valuable but they 
tell us little about these local decisions or about their implications for levels of compliance. Little is currently known 
about the contextual factors that affect the development and operation of a local authority’s enforcement strategy. 
Drawing on findings from case studies with 13 UK local authorities, in this chapter we explore the variations in local 
authority enforcement strategies and their officers’ enforcement styles in their day-to-day interactions with landlords 
and letting agencies. We also identify and discuss the key drivers which underpin these decisions and activities.
Whilst each UK jurisdiction has its own national approach to regulating the sector (see chapter 3), the practicalities 
of enforcement involve certain key choices that are relevant to any kind of environmental regulation. On a strategic 
level this covers decisions about the frequency of inspections, groups to target for inspection, the regulatory tools 
that are prioritised, the amount of time and effort given to formal or informal enforcement activities, and the relative 
importance of this area of activity within their broader portfolio. This chapter considers these issues in relation to the 
UK as a whole but makes key distinctions between the four nations where appropriate.
Enforcement strategies 
From the analysis of our case studies we identify at least four types of strategies currently operating in the sector: i) 
light-touch approaches, ii) hard-line approaches, iii) compliance-focused approaches, and iv) creative approaches. We 
discuss the characteristics of each approach in turn and identify the key drivers shaping their adoption.
Light-touch approaches 
Identifying regulatory breaches is a key aspect of enforcement. This can either take place through reactive work, 
responding to complaints/communications from tenants, or through proactive inspections to identify issues. 
Although reactive work is part of the approach adopted by all local authorities, three local authorities engaged 
primarily in reactive activities and generally made little effort to initiate inspections to identify non-compliance. 
Officers told us any enforcement activity tended to be ‘a bit ad hoc’ rather than targeted or planned. Where 
inspections did occur, there was also evidence that regulatory breaches were not always followed up with 
enforcement. These practices occurred despite an awareness of undesirable behaviour existing in their area:
We’re aware that landlords who have a reputation for having substandard properties, that kind of thing, and yes, I 
would say that they do operate. To what extent? As I say, it’s down to what you hear, and that’s not necessarily that 
reliable. But they wouldn’t be difficult to identify and go and check up on, and we don’t have much of a strategy or 
policy for doing that. We just, sort of, turn a blind eye. (PRS Co-ordinator, Scotland)
To ensure compliance and address breaches of the law local authorities can take various types of formal or informal 
action. Informal enforcement activities include education, advice or guidance, persuasion and negotiation.111 Formal 
enforcement activity covers legal action, for example, serving statutory notices, civil penalties or prosecuting 
landlords.
110 Simcock, T.J. and Mykkanen, N. (2018) The Postcode Lottery of Local Authority Enforcement in the PRS, Manchester, UK, Residential Landlords Association, (Accessed: 
7/4/20), Generation Rent (2017) FOI local government enforcement 2017-18 (Accessed: 7/4/20).
111 Some literature suggests that enforcement approaches should be considered as positioned on a spectrum from retreatist, at the minimal end, to conciliatory, 
flexible, then perfunctory, and legalistic approaches at the more extensive end. For example, see Hutter, Variations in regulatory enforcement styles.
housingevidence.ac.uk
53
Local authorities adopting a light-touch approach were unlikely to make use of formal powers and were more likely 
to adopt a ‘retreatist’ and accommodating style when dealing with the sector.112 A retreatist mode of enforcement is 
defined as one in which “officials avoid hard choices … postponing decisions, or generating meaningless paperwork 
that creates only the appearance of regulatory enforcement”.113 An accommodative approach may be characterised by 
enforcement strategies that are highly unsystematic that may be awarded little overall priority relative to other local 
authority activities.114 In these areas formal action was exceptional and was generally reserved for the most extreme 
cases. Stakeholders and sector representatives consulted as part of this study reported that this approach would 
appear to be relatively commonplace in the UK PRS.
Officers in these authorities primarily seek to gain compliance through persuasion or providing landlords with 
information on their responsibilities. This type of approach has also been labelled as an “extreme advise and persuade 
strategy”.155  Whilst participants told us that a more informal and personal approach was often effective, it was not 
entirely clear if or when the response would be escalated if compliance was not forthcoming: 
It seems to be more of a soft approach here for sure, there’s no doubt about that, has been since I started. I think 
there’s even something in the guidance that talks about soft touch, so enforcement isn’t massive at all … it’s seen 
more of an education rather than, you know, a slap on the wrists. (Enforcement officer, Scotland)
These local authorities often reported being pro-enforcement and willing to apply sanctions where necessary. 
However, in practice, there was limited use of prosecutions, civil penalties (where relevant), legal notices or other 
formal remedies. In considering their written housing or enforcement strategies, at times a ‘strong-on-paper’ but 
‘weak-in-practice’ approach became apparent.116 One Scottish local authority in this category had carried out an in-
depth research study to understand the local housing market and, as in the other case studies, reported area-based 
differences in the PRS, with polarised markets. Like many of the housing strategies reviewed as part of this study, 
theirs had been developed to reflect changes identified in the sector and included important detail about improving 
standards in the sector. However, as one team leader of this council admitted, “we were maybe a bit passive after the 
document was produced”. This disparity between rhetoric and reality was also highlighted by a key stakeholder in 
England: 
Then there are the local authorities that want to pretend that they’re doing something and they pretend that 
they’ve got this big stick and they’re whacking the private rental sector, whereas in reality everyone knows on the 
ground that they’re not and it’s a charade. (Landlord Group, England) 
One local authority which adopted a light-touch approach admitted that they lacked a strategic approach to 
managing the sector. This was a criticism made of local authorities by key stakeholders across the four nations. These 
councils rarely have PRS enforcement policies and tend to rely on a central regulatory enforcement policy which may 
not be easily accessible to staff in a range of departments. In these authorities there will likely be little consideration 
given to aims, objectives or outcomes associated with managing the PRS:
Someday in the future, whether I’m there or not, it is probably something that should happen, a more planned 
approach and a more planned look at the whole private rented sector but, as I say, we’re just at the moment 
toddling along reactively. There definitely would be scope to change our approach but just at the moment and for 
the last few years, I just haven’t had the number of staff to do that. (Environmental health director, NI)
112 May and Winter, Regulatory enforcement styles and compliance. 
113 Kagan (1994) cited in L.K. Mcallister (2009) ‘Dimensions of Enforcement Style’, Legal Studies Research Paper Series.  
114 May and Burby, Making sense out of regulatory enforcement
115 Gunningham, N. (1987) ‘Negotiated Non-compliance: A Case Study of Regulatory Failure’, Law & Policy, 9: 69–95.
116 Braithwaite, J., Makkai, T. and Braithwaite, V. (2007) Regulating Aged Care, Ritualism and the New Pyramid, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
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The paucity of formal enforcement activities has previously been highlighted across the four nations.117 However, in 
this study local authorities adopting a light-tough approach also rarely carried out proactive compliance-focused 
activities such as advice, training, newsletters or landlord forums. Where these actions did take place, they were 
highly unsystematic and generally delivered in a sporadic manner. Informal activity typically took the form of ad hoc 
communications with individual landlords: for example, in response to a tenant complaint. 
The findings from the case studies illustrate the key reasons why authorities may fall into a light-touch or retreatist 
style of dealing with the sector. As discussed in the previous chapters, concerns have been raised about a lack of 
resources significantly impacting on the effectiveness of regulatory mechanisms across the UK PRS.118 Cuts to local 
authority budgets have resulted in a long-term gap between the availability of resources and demand for their 
services. The impact of this can be seen reflected within PRS enforcement strategies, where inadequate resources 
operate as a significant deterrent to carrying out proactive activity and formal enforcement: 
There are people out there who don’t know just their general rights … I suppose, personally, I would like to be able 
to help people more and signpost them more. More than, just, what our statutory duties are … there’s no money 
in the budget to do anything, really, outside of the ordinary, and there’s no time, and there’re no more staff coming. 
We’re just going to be dealing with reactive calls, firefighting. (Environmental health, NI)
As was repeatedly highlighted by participants across all the case studies, “resources” refers not simply to money, but 
also to the skills and capabilities of staff available. In short, in local authorities adopting a light-touch approach there 
are insufficient staff with the right training available to do the necessary work. 
Two participating Scottish local authorities in this category had only one officer who was responsible for carrying out 
enforcement under the national registration scheme and in relation to any proactive activity (if there were to be any). 
These councils also operated in areas with large rural communities, where carrying out inspections and face-to-face 
compliance-focused activities across a large dispersed and remote geographical area posed further challenges: 
Because of the geography where we are, we can’t usually go and visit but quite often the landlords aren’t local 
either, quite often they’ve moved for jobs and things like that … We have tried to do some workshops and things 
like that but again, the geography here, it’s difficult to get a reasonable number of people in one place to do 
presentations or give training (Registration team, Scotland). 
The predominant type of problem presented in these authorities was also a key factor in shaping the approach 
adopted. Intentional criminal behaviour was generally believed to be less common than in larger urban areas. Whilst, 
as noted above, in one case this assertion was based on research carried out to inform the strategy, in the other two 
authorities this belief was based solely on tenant complaints received. Yet, as vulnerable tenants are significantly less 
likely to approach their local authority (see chapter 5), it is highly likely that this approach is not fully capturing the 
extent of non-compliance. 
The local authorities in the light-touch category could also be distinguished by their internal organisation. A common 
challenge experienced by local authorities is service fragmentation. In two of the Scottish authorities, landlord 
registration sat outside of the housing team and alongside other licensing activities.119 There was evidence that 
this led to inefficiency, lack of communication and confusion regarding the delegation of roles and responsibilities. 
117 Simcock, and Mykkanen, The Postcode Lottery; Generation Rent (2017) FOI local government enforcement 2017-18. 
118 Marsh, and Gibb, The private rented sector in the UK
119 These observations do not apply to Northern Ireland where there is no “housing team”. Functions in relation to enforcement of PRS regulations/fitness standards 
are undertaken by and located within Environmental Health Departments.    
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The inefficiency arose, for example, because landlord registration was unable to take advantage of the skills and 
knowledge of the housing team. A key stakeholder also emphasised that a reason for the lack of enforcement in some 
local authorities may be the organisation of the service: 
In Scotland you’ve got 32 local authorities. They’re all structured a little bit differently in terms of which department 
deals with the private rented sector, they certainly will operate differently in terms of their level of engagement 
with the private rented sector, and I don’t know that there’s as much sharing of best practice as there could be and 
sharing of resources as well.  (Landlord group, Scotland)
Cultural factors also play a role in shaping the approach adopted. The findings indicate that certain UK local 
authorities do not consider themselves to have a significant role to play in educating or communicating with the 
sector. Scottish councils in this category did not make use of the registration scheme for this purpose: 
Actually I was quite surprised when we did some roadshow stuff just before the summer to find out that a lot of 
councils are not even doing the basic stuff like regular communication with landlords which quite surprised me. 
Some are citing things like GDPR as a problem, but it’s a cultural thing about not seeing that as a part of their core 
task. (NGO, Scotland) 
Across the case studies political will was one of the most important factors shaping the enforcement strategy 
adopted. In areas with a light-touch approach, local councillors showed little interest in formal enforcement and did 
not consider tackling poor housing standards or management practices in the PRS to be a priority area. It appears 
that in some areas elected members fail to recognise the scale and importance of the PRS in providing housing for a 
wide range of households. Councils in this category appeared vulnerable to political decision making and the anti-
interventionist agenda preferred by elected members shaped their (lack of) enforcement activity: 
It’s a political environment and they [local councillors] are conservative of administration. A landlord is wealth 
creating. It’s a business. Why would you want to have excessive regulation around a business? It’s a philosophical 
thing. (Manager, England)  
Another reason for not making use of the full extent of enforcement powers was caution about the effect of 
enforcement on landlord behaviour and on housing supply. This was particularly in areas affected by the impact of 
short-term lets where the council recognised their need for PRS accommodation, even if it is of poor quality:  
I think one of the key things that we keep mentioning is how Airbnb … is going to impact on the actual private 
rental sector. If you like that might drive a lot of these people out of the sector and if there’s more regulations and 
requirements on the landlords, I think a lot of these people would leave the sector because it’s not worth their while. 
(Officer, Housing services, Scotland)
Some stakeholders reported that the culture within some authorities has not kept pace with the changing nature 
of the UK PRS and that staff and councillors may not recognise their duty to private tenants because regulating the 
sector is a relatively new area of local authority activity. 
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Hard-line approaches 
Some participating local authorities prioritised strict enforcement action against those breaking the rules by rigorously 
applying legal sanctions. This type of strict regulatory approach has identified in other contexts as a ‘deterrence’ or 
penal style of enforcement which assigns prosecution an important role.120 In general, the official strategic approach 
of local authorities in this category did not embrace informal activities: 
Okay, so our stance is on the whole to take a tough line … I’ve been running this service for five years and when I 
took it over the enforcement officers were akin to social workers where they would get into lengthy conversations 
with landlords and tenants and act as mediator to try and get the properties repaired where the landlord would, 
excuse my French, take the piss and just string everyone along. I’ve stopped that. (Head of service, England)
This observation also suggests the scope for those in leadership roles to exercise significant influence over the 
organisation’s stance. This was a theme that emerged in other case studies – examples of individual public leadership 
substantially shaping service approaches. For leaders to exercise this type of influence over the organisation’s stance 
typically rests upon them being given the political support - or at least the latitude - to act.
These authorities reported a high number of prosecution or civil penalties. Effectiveness was generally conceptualised 
in terms of outputs, such as the number of civil penalties levied or the number of improvement notices issued. For 
this regulatory strategy the number of prosecutions is generally regarded as a sign of success and a job well done. 
Communicating these activities to the wider sector was a key part of the approach adopted:121
The council likes to be seen to be quite robust when it comes to dealing with rogue landlords and generally with 
our enforcement responsibilities. Again, I have to say ... we are quite good. We certainly do serve a lot more notices 
and take a lot more prosecutions than immediate neighbours. I think it is fair to say … you know, we are quite 
hard. We are certainly a lot harder than neighbouring authorities. (Enforcement lead, England
Whilst authorities in this category adopted somewhat different approaches towards inspections, all were to 
varying degrees proactive in identifying non-compliance. One local authority tended to be reactive to complaints 
but randomly inspected 10-20% of the properties in their selective licensing area.122 Another aimed to inspect all 
properties in their selective licensing area over the life of the scheme. A third was mainly reactive to complaints but 
also pursued landlords that historically had higher rates of violation or appeared to constitute a higher risk. 
Where a hard-line approach was prioritised generally less attention was given to compliance-focused initiatives such 
as training or advice. These activities were only briefly mentioned in the interviews and, crucially, did not appear to 
form part of the overall strategic approach. 
Our research identified the key drivers underpinning this approach. These included different types of problems to 
those experienced by light-touch local authorities, particularly in terms of high levels of criminality. There was also 
a belief that a significant proportion of non-compliance was the result of deliberate rule avoidance rather than 
inadvertence. They had a sense that a proportion of “ill-intentioned”123  landlords or letting agencies were operating in 
their area and this necessitated a high level of prosecution to deter future infractions. 
120 Hutter, Variations in regulatory enforcement styles
121 This is a stance that has been noted in other regulatory contexts. See Hutter, Variations in regulatory enforcement styles
122 Although in this case study the policy was that if enforcement action was taken against a landlord, all of his/her properties would then be investigated.  
123  Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, Understanding Regulation.
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These local authorities drew on different datasets to develop their approach to the PRS generally. Two carried out 
stock condition reports and consultation exercises whilst another commissioned an external survey of the sector. This 
survey illustrated certain issues relating to poor property condition, anti-social behaviour and problematic streets or 
areas, as well as adjunct issues around modern slavery, immigration and significant overcrowding. Strategies were 
developed to reflect these challenges and included key details about improving standards.  
The strategies operated according to a belief that higher rates of compliance would be achieved through a 
deterrence-focused approach (see chapter 5 for further discussion). In some cases a move away from an earlier 
light-touch approach had occurred:  it was considered to have been unsuccessful because high rates of criminality 
continued. The primary focus of these authorities was to identify and tackle criminal landlords by using their full range 
of powers:    
We say to good landlords at the beginning we’re not here to get you but we will take robust action against those 
that aren’t playing ball and they’re exploiting landlords as well as tenants because what we find is that a lot of 
those landlords with criminality are actually charging more for their rents than those that are responsible landlords. 
(Head of service, England)
Local authorities adopting a hard-line approach usually had large urban areas where the private rented sector 
comprised a significant proportion of the total housing stock; at 30%, 35% and 40% it was well above the national 
average. The private rented sector was a political priority area locally, and council members and local landlord and 
tenant groups actively advocated a tough enforcement regime. These third parties also viewed a high number of 
prosecutions as the primary measure of success of the enforcement regime: 
It’s political pressures particularly. We are a red authority in a sea of blue, and there is an expectation from 
members that we will take this hard-line enforcement approach, although perversely most of our senior 
councillors are landlords, which is always quite entertaining. (Licensing, England)
Views on the potential side effects of regulation on landlord behaviour among authorities taking a hard line approach 
contrasted strongly to those of agencies adopting a light touch approach. These local authorities saw themselves as 
having a role in policing the sector:  
People say you’ll see landlords exiting the market if you’re taking this more robust approach on licensing and that’s 
fine, let them exit the market. They don’t take the property with them. That house will still be there and whether 
that becomes unoccupied or a more professional landlord takes it over and manages it, it’s still there. Let’s get rid 
of the people that can’t manage their properties. (Head of service, England)
A key finding from the case studies is that some local authorities are moving – in the light of perceived weaknesses 
in relying on less formal approaches - towards hard-line strategies that place the use of criminal sanctions to the 
fore. Compared to those adopting a “light-touch” approach, local authorities in this category had a strong strategic 
approach and demonstrated high rates of formal enforcement activity. However, as explored in the next chapter, 
there are limitations and challenges associated with relying on a deterrence-focused style of enforcement as the 
primary means of regulating the sector. Hence, as we discuss in the next section, many local authorities adopt 
compliance-focused strategies. 
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Compliance-focused approach 
We see that as part of this, like our strategic role to provide a lot of those links, to provide a lot of the 
communication, to provide a lot of the support. (Rent Smart Wales124)
Some local authorities and Rent Smart Wales appeared explicitly to seek ‘a synergy between punishment and 
persuasion’125 whilst prioritising a compliance-focused approach. Compliance-focused activities can be understood 
as measures that fall short of prosecution or other formal action.126 Although these local authorities were open to 
using formal tools where necessary, the primary response was not to impose penalties but to help landlords comply. 
Participants emphasised assistance, support and co-operation:     
We’re very strong on compliance, but the first point is trying to encourage landlords to bring their properties up to 
the standards … so it’s a variety of things mainly to educate and help landlords, that’s our main role, rather than 
working against landlords, we try to work with landlords. (PRS Lead, Scotland)
These local authorities provided or facilitated access to a wide suite of community-based measures in order to 
educate and encourage landlords to comply with rules and regulations. This included accreditation schemes, 
individual action plans, landlord forums or events, advice provision, regular newsletters, online information (such as 
Facebook pages), free training sessions, and “landlord days”. Some of the Scottish authorities in this category had 
recently developed, or were hoping to establish, a dedicated advisory service which replicated the Private Landlord 
Support Officer project developed by Shelter Scotland.127 These positions would focus on providing advice and 
information to landlords in the local area, with the intention of freeing up resources for enforcement officers to take 
tough targeted enforcement action where required.
Multiple compliance-focused initiatives were generally provided as part of an overall strategic approach. In contrast to 
situations where compliance activities are provided on an ad hoc or moderately facilitative level (e.g., only addressed 
towards a particular landlord), these initiatives would be delivered systematically and regularly and target the sector at 
large. 
Authorities in this category approached inspections both reactively and proactively and some adopted a targeted 
approach with particular landlords or problematic areas (see chapter 5). 
Although compliance-focused activities were prioritised, these local authorities would use formal approaches where 
necessary and appeared to adopt an insistent rather than a persuasive strategy.128 As explored above, a light-touch 
approach could generally be characterised as highly accommodative and persuasive: it was not always clear if 
or when the response would be escalated. An insistent strategy, in contrast, is somewhat less flexible and, rather 
than “turning a blind eye”, there would be limits to what the local authority was willing to tolerate. Strategies that 
prioritise an insistent approach support their officers in escalating responses and increasing the pressure when 
compliance is not forthcoming within a certain period of time. However, the ultimate aim of insistent strategies is to 
achieve compliance. Local authorities in this category appeared to occupy a middle ground between the light-touch 
accommodative and hard-line deterrence enforcement approaches identified above: 
I think our approaches were one where we liked to work with landlords in the first instance and definitely 
encourage them to do so but I think there comes a point where you end up having to enforce things and I don’t 
think as a team we’re scared to do that. Yeah, I think we’d happily prosecute for financial penalty if we had to and if 
the evidence was there. (Senior licensing officer, England) 
124 In this chapter, Rent Smart Wales is considered alongside the local authorities
125 Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, Understanding Regulation.
126 Reiss in Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, Understanding Regulation.
127 Renting Scotland, Private Landlord Support Officer Project
128 The compliance literature makes this distinction between insistent and persuasive strategies see Hutter, Variations in regulatory enforcement styles
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The Rent Smart Wales enforcement officers who participated in our research emphasised that they still regarded 
compliance-focused activity as best practice. Yet they had also served 556 fixed penalties on landlords and 
prosecuted a small number for failure to pay the notice. Local authorities in this category also reported regularly 
issuing notices or civil penalties. Communicating this formal activity to the sector was a key part of the strategic 
approach; these authorities wanted to be seen as willing to apply tough enforcement action where necessary. 
However, unlike hard-line authorities, they did not regard prosecutions as a sign of success in and of themselves. 
Where few prosecutions were issued this was seen as evidence that less interventionist approaches were working: 
We’re always aware that courts and tribunals will immediately test how we performed there so we don’t want to 
appear to be too hard on people. We want to appear to be offering them opportunities and things. I think the fact 
that the formal enforcement around these things is pretty limited given that we’ve got 40,000 landlords. It shows 
that the less formal approach that we’re adopting is working. (Manager, Scotland)
These assumptions regarding how success should be defined and measured is one of the key factors underpinning 
the adoption of a compliance-focused approach. As explored in chapter 2, recent research on enforcement in the UK 
PRS focuses primarily on formal action taken. Local authorities prioritising compliance challenged this tendency to 
conceptualise success or activity in the private rented sector solely in terms of formal activity: 
Just because councils aren’t taking convictions doesn’t mean to say they’re not doing an awful lot of hard work 
and getting an awful lot of compliance. It’s just they’re doing that through what we used to call affectionately in 
the sector as the ‘Ways and Means Act’. You are ensuring that people get compliance by helping them through the 
process, by giving them time, support, etc., and that gets the compliance. (RSW, Wales) 
The recent evaluation of selective licensing schemes in England emphasised that the number of prosecutions, civil 
penalties, notices or inspections are not appropriate measures of success.129 Among compliance-focused authorities, 
the goal of regulation was not to secure prosecutions, but to improve standards by achieving compliance. They 
considered working in collaboration with landlords to be inherently more successful than formal activity in reaching 
this goal. A key theme emerging from the interviews in these authorities was the view that landlords generally 
respond positively to local authority intervention, which in turn negates the need for further enforcement action. This 
was said to provide evidence that informal approaches are effective: 
I do think it is difficult to tie the links in but the fact that when we engage informally it’s fairly uncommon to have 
to move to any formal enforcement action, it shows that the approach is working in supporting and guiding 
people through it. (Solicitor, Scotland)
Some Scottish local authorities in this category had restructured previously distributed housing services into one 
integrated and co-located housing team. Bringing multiple related services into a single point of delivery was 
reported to result in increased efficiency, a shared sense of purpose and better outcomes for tenants: 
I like to think now the officers have got a clearer focus on what we’re looking for, that this is all about improved 
standards. I would not expect, that you might have got in the past, an officer going out maybe to do the property 
repair, but you’re in somebody’s flat, you’re talking to him, “Oh, you’ve got to pay for common repairs there”, but in 
the meantime, this is a private rented flat and there’s no smoke detector, there’s no this, and they wouldn’t pick up 
on it. Now, when an officer’s in, and when you’re inside, you’re expected to pick up and say, ‘While I’m here, I’ll have 
a look, just to make sure this meets with [the regulations],’ so it’s a more joined-up thinking. (PRS lead, Scotland)
129 Lawrence, S. and Wilson, P. (2019) An Independent Review of the Use and Effectiveness of Selective Licensing, (For MCHLG)
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Like many other areas across the UK, most local authorities in this category had a large private rented sector which has 
grown substantially over the last 10-15 years. There was a feeling that the size of the sector and the lack of available 
resources to carry out formal enforcement made it necessary to focus on compliance-focused activities: 
You can imagine the volume if we are talking about 12,000 properties that need the standard improved over the 
next four years. That can never be done by enforcement it needs to be done through encouragement, advice, 
support. (PRS Manager, Scotland)
Authorities in this category viewed their role as that of an educator. There was a feeling that current understandings of 
PRS enforcement fail to capture the wide range activities adopted to ensure compliance: 
You’re an educator. And that’s why one of the reasons why we keep the HMO advisory service running is that we 
want to be able to still do that and that if you talk to people and say, “What’s your job?” Or “What does team 
do?”, “Private sector housing enforcement.” So it’s almost like that’s the wrong way of phrasing things in some 
circumstances. (EHO, Wales)
These findings indicate that some authorities that are active in the sector are adopting less coercive policies that focus 
on supporting the significant number of PRS landlords who may not be in full compliance. Tough enforcement action 
is reserved for the small minority of landlords who do not appear to be responding to informal actions or are wilfully 
breaking the law. 
Creative approaches
Our findings indicate that some local authorities are adopting new or creative regulatory strategies to facilitate 
improvements in the PRS. Three of our case study local authorities can be placed in this category. Their activities are 
not mutually exclusive of the strategic approaches outlined above. One favoured compliance-focused activities and 
less-interventionist approaches, whilst another would use more formal approaches when dealing with regulatory 
infractions. A third was pro-enforcement but was prevented from using the full range of formal powers (including civil 
penalties) due to local opposition from councillors who preferred a light-touch approach. These local authorities are 
however distinctive in their understanding of the problem and possible resolutions, and their adoption of alternative 
regulatory techniques.
In a survey by Shelter Scotland, 93% of all Scottish local authorities reported that their strategic approach to the 
PRS focused solely on property conditions and regulating landlords.130 Each of the creative authorities framed PRS 
compliance and their strategic priorities much more broadly. They situated the needs of private renters at the heart of 
a wider area-based strategy: 
It’s about trying to coordinate a neighbourhood management response, rather than just looking purely through, 
“This is a private rented property. What is this landlord doing or not doing?” It’s much wider than that. It’s also about 
that tenant, living in there, who may have multiple complex needs and has, potentially, just moved from another 
area and doesn’t know [the local authority], which happens as well. (EHO, England) 
One local authority addressed standards in the private rented sector by situating housing in the prevention element 
of an ‘integrated care’ NHS strategy. Another situated their enforcement strategy in a multi-agency, holistic approach 
that aimed to address not only housing, but also other issues that tenants would encounter. A third adopted a system-
based approach that focused on wider housing and wellbeing outcomes. In each case study, building effective 
partnerships with a range of potential partners was key to developing a more coherent and holistic approach. 
130 Shelter Scotland (2019) Where to Turn: A review of housing support and advice for private tenants in Scotland
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Several case studies drew on information regarding the characteristics of the physical stock for the purpose of 
developing their approach to the PRS generally, for example, by commissioning a survey of the sector. Creative 
authorities went further and drew on several additional data sets to target their community and tenant focused 
support. For example, one mapped NHS hospital admissions data and Indices of Multiple Deprivation data onto the 
housing conditions survey to gain a general idea of where the best and worst quality housing was located and the 
tenants most in need of support. This was used to help target enforcement activity and welfare support for tenants: 
for example, it facilitated getting the welfare rights team into those properties to ensure tenants were getting the 
maximum benefits to which they are entitled. An additional aim of this data initiative was to build support among 
local councillors by illustrating the incidence of poor standards in the sector:
I spend a lot of the time trying to influence the broader operating environment with colleagues and everybody else 
to try and develop an understanding of the levels of hazard for people living in our area … Members are more in 
favour of doing things for health and wellbeing and you creep your way round to starting to be able to use the 
tools that you need to influence. (Housing manager, England)
Another authority commissioned a data analyst to carry out stratified population analysis to explore neighbourhood 
deprivation which was subsequently ranked into 6 categories. This data was used to focus their community 
engagement and development work on “hard to reach” parts of the community. A third authority used housing 
benefit data and complaints data to target inspections and meetings on tenants most likely to be vulnerable and least 
likely to ask for help. All creative authorities were proactive in delivering tenant focused support:
We are very proactive so a big part of our project is going out and knocking on doors with other agencies with 
police and fire and job centre and looking at a person holistically and trying to figure out everything else for them 
as well not just housing issues … and we also take referrals from the other agencies who have gone out for a 
home visit and have seen things and have said look you really need to get involved … we tend to get involved 
in the cases where people haven’t approached us, don’t know how to or are scared to or are very vulnerable and 
have lots of other complex issues, substance misuse or criminal behaviour, lots of other things going on in their 
lives apart from their housing problems. (Housing manager, England) 
At these local authorities, the officers’ role in inspecting properties would extend far beyond applying relevant 
legislation. When visiting they would seek to identify interrelated issues and provide support by, for instance, 
signposting or referring tenants to other organisations. In one case where inspections were carried out under the 
selective licensing regime, staff would simultaneously have an in-depth meeting with the tenants. Their focus would 
be on identifying and addressing all underlying or overlapping issues, rather than only dealing with what might 
appear to be the primary issue. Because they received training from a wide array of support organisations, local 
authority officers were able to draw on external services where needed: 
We don’t just go into a property now and look at bricks and mortar. We are looking at everything. Why is that child 
in this property when he should be at school? Why are there complaints of antisocial behaviour and noise? Is there 
some domestic violence? Where are the bins? Why have we got reports of fly tipping and there is waste in the yard? 
Has the tenancy not been set up correctly? It’s kind of like that massive more holistic view we now take, rather than 
just looking at bricks and mortar. (EHO, England) 
In each area working in collaboration with different public services was key in identifying and responding to issues in 
the private rented sector; conversely, the PRS team would also receive referrals from other organisations. These local 
authorities had strong links with school liaison officers, health visitors, adult social care, police officers, community 
groups, doctors and housing options services. Through training sessions, team meetings and informal conversations 
the PRS teams aimed to raise the profile of support and increase awareness of how to detect and report issues such 
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as poor property conditions, unlicensed HMOs and tenants in need of support. This activity served to improve referral 
arrangements across different public networks thereby minimising the chance that vulnerable tenants and/or those 
who are at risk of homelessness would ‘fall through the cracks’ of different services:
Well what we’re trying to do is, in terms of how different professionals, - welfare rights being one - can we almost 
give them some questions that would help reveal any issues? … Between all the services we have, we have lots of 
contact with people and so some of it’s about trying to reduce the amount people go into people’s homes. So it’s 
trying to work with other services; but equally is then trying to say, well instead of the person continually ringing up, 
if we can between the local public sector organisations, gather that Intel, we can, with the person’s permission, do 
inter-departmental referral to improve the situation for the individual and to stop them having to tell their story ten, 
twenty different times over. (Housing director, England)
Each of these case studies adopted new models of integrated service delivery. At one local authority a multi-
disciplinary neighbourhood management team was created as part of the selective licensing scheme. This team 
consisted of an anti-social behaviour officer, an energy efficiency officer, two environmental health officers, a technical 
officer and administrative support. Another local authority operated an award-winning multi-agency team covering 
trading standards, the police, immigration officers131 and DWP officers who were all co-located within housing services. 
Bringing these disparate teams together helped to create innovative solutions to tackling issues relating to trafficking, 
modern slavery and overcrowding. 
These authorities operated with a different understanding of outcomes and what they were trying to achieve. Success 
also depended on the activity of other stakeholders and the strength of established relationships. Improving joint-
working was a key objective of their services:
We have to be open to that and not just try to say “Well, we’ve been and inspected 50 houses. We’ve found some 
problems and we’ve dealt with it”. It’s not just about the housing. It’s actually trying to, in my opinion, highlight 
how we can all fit and work together better in a micro-area. (EHO, England)
Their activity was also informed by a homelessness prevention agenda and a desire to use resources in a more 
efficient manner, with better outcomes for tenants:
It’s almost led to lots and lots of other partnership working across the council, because they’ve seen the benefits 
and the strength in investing in just a few officers, embedded in the team, and what a difference it can make. We’re 
all struggling with resources, but if you push together and have that targeted evidence approach, you really can be 
effective at making a difference. (EHO, England)
The Localism Act 2011 (England) gave local authorities the power to discharge their duty to households accepted 
as homeless under the Housing Act 1988 by providing an offer of accommodation in the PRS. Although not all 
participating councils had formalised relationships with PRS landlords or regularly discharged their duty through 
the sector, several councils were beginning to consider what role the PRS could play in meeting their homelessness 
challenges. Some authorities in Scotland and England were concerned that tough enforcement action could have a 
negative impact on their ability to procure property from the PRS to meet this need. This sometimes contributed to a 
reluctance to take formal action. In the creative authorities the PRS was recognised as both a cause and possible route 
out of homelessness, and homelessness prevention formed a key focus of their overarching housing strategy:  
131  Stakeholders consulted as part of this study raised concerns that multiagency enforcement operations involving the Home Office may further deter some 
claimants from reporting poor standards.
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This project is about preventing homelessness, as much as going in and making sure that property is safe under 
the Housing Act. From a PRS perspective … I believe, when you can try to combine all of the different elements, 
you’re much more successful than, “Well we’re going in to look at it under the Housing Act, then we’ll pass it 
onto a homelessness team who will look at their circumstances.” It’s about making sure that you have the right 
mechanisms in place, I believe, to signpost people, to help people, and to know what the real issues are. It’s not 
always what you think it is. (EHO, England)
Several authorities highlighted the importance of developing close working relationships with the housing options 
and homelessness teams as a means of dismantling departmental siloes that can pose barriers to effective working: 
Yes. We work jointly, together ... So our side is in homelessness, so we will offer certain landlords incentives. But we 
will liaise with Housing Renewal to ensure that we’re not on one side, providing a landlord with financial assistance, 
whereas the Housing Renewal Team are taking enforcement action, because that property is in a state of disrepair, 
or whatever. (Housing Options, England)
As noted in chapter one, an increasing number of vulnerable households now live in the private rented sector. We 
were given examples of how tenants’ reluctance to complain or pursue their complaint had a negative impact on the 
local authority’s enforcement activity. We explore this issue further in chapter 5. Creative authorities were distinctive 
in their attempts to address these issues in a systematic and structured way. Unlike most local authorities, whose 
strategic priorities are orientated towards property condition and landlord regulation,132 these authorities also focused 
more directly on the needs and demands of people living in the sector:  
That’s one part of licensing for us, and the monitoring, and making sure that landlords are doing all that, and 
supporting them. But then there is this huge element now of the people in the community, because they form one 
half of making this a successful intervention. (EHO, England) 
The practices and approaches adopted by these local authorities suggest that their strategies are underpinned by 
a philosophy which regards issues of disrepair, poor standards or landlord behaviour as part of a wider picture. Poor 
housing standards are seen as a component of a more complex reality, with issues related to poverty, deprivation and 
tenant vulnerability comprising further key parts: 
So it’s how we try and approach that as a whole system approach to try and tackle some of those issues, the 
drivers of which, from the NHS side, from my perspective, it’s more around general health, wellbeing, access to 
education etc. (NHS Partner, England).
Then it’s not just about the housing, it’s about the people and it’s more about the health wrapping around 
everything … so I call the staff that work in there “housing social workers”. What they do is they go in and go, 
“What’s fixed?  What’s broken? What needs fixing?” You’ve got a leaking roof, no hot water, heating’s broken, right, 
“By the way, have you got the right benefits? Do you need a dentist?” (PRS Housing Manager, England)
Assembling the funding for these sorts of holistic approaches was not necessarily straightforward. It is not possible 
to, for example, build a holistic service for a neighbourhood subject to selective licensing using the licence fee 
income alone. It requires overcoming siloed thinking and drawing on budgets from elsewhere. There was evidence of 
councils adopting an entrepreneurial approach to building political support and securing additional funding to cover 
these activities.133 
132  Shelter Scotland (2019) Where to Turn: A review of housing support and advice for private tenants in Scotland
133 The importance of a holistic approach to addressing housing problems and disputes has been addressed in the recent report by JUSTICE (2020) Solving Housing 
Disputes (Accessed: 23/7/20).
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Enforcement styles 
Enforcement styles represent the way in which inspectors and officers carry out their duties and relate to landlords 
and letting agents when enforcing the legislation “on the ground”.134 Strategic decisions and positions do not wholly 
determine officers’ day-to-day actions and decisions. Given the wide array and complex nature of the situations 
encountered, staff inevitably have substantial discretion over the nature of their response and the type and amount 
of sanction applied, if any. Indeed, the MHCLG calls on local authorities to be responsive to the nature of individual 
transgressions.135
If senior managers have confidence in the capabilities and judgement of their staff then they can be comfortable 
with explicitly delegating decision-making about how to respond to individual cases, particularly if robust reporting 
mechanisms are in place. This approach was emphasised in one of our creative authorities as a means of empowering 
staff. On the other hand, the inevitability of discretion means that a space opens up for individual officers to negotiate 
and challenge the strategic decisions and underlying enforcement philosophy adopted by their local authority. 
Decisions at the policy level to pursue hard or soft enforcement strategies do not always align with the opinions and 
activities of officers. 
Some officers appeared to adopt a highly informal and flexible style of enforcement and would primarily seek to gain 
compliance through persuasion and education. Interaction with landlords and letting agents was characterised by 
helpfulness and relationship-building, with officers explaining the law in a patient and open-ended way: 
I’m working with one landlord just now. He has 49 properties, none of them had smoke detectors, they’ve a couple 
of boilers that are a bit dodgy and a lot of people would be like “get it done, get it done, get it done”. I know that is 
technical and I know it’s a safety issue, but you need to get the work done. But I’ve been working with this landlord 
for six months now and gradually he’s doing it one by one and every time he gets another smoke detector, he 
sends me his certificate, but the best thing is he’s communicating and it’s now at the stage he phones me every 
week, just to say hello pretty much, but he’s staying in touch which is all we ask for. (Enforcement officer, Scotland)
This approach seemed to be commonplace where local authorities prioritise light-touch strategies. A rejection of 
prosecution and civil penalties at a strategic level seems to almost make informal activity the choice by default, even 
if individual offices’ own stance was pro-enforcement. However, hard-line or compliance-focused approaches at 
the strategic level offer more scope for divergence between the organisation’s declared stance and the approach 
in practice. This can be the result of failing to back a hard-line policy rhetoric with sufficient resources to deliver on 
it, rendering the policy largely symbolic, but it can also be the result of a divergence of views and the exercise of 
discretion at the frontline.
A more informal approach is at times adopted because decisions are affected by taking certain pressures and risks 
into account as well as by officers’ personal views on whether deterrence or compliance-based approaches are more 
effective. Some officers believed collaboration to be more successful in changing behaviours or attitudes in the long 
run, even though the official position of their local authority was to be hard-line:  
In practice, there is a lot of mixed approach but informal, nobody counts informal action … nobody cares for 
informal action, and yet it is informal action that has a lot more – you persuade people better. You have a lot 
better result if you persuade someone to think differently than if you force them and that is the case with landlords. 
(Enforcement officer, England) 
134 P.J. May and S.C. Winter (2011) ‘Regulatory enforcement styles and compliance’, in C. Parker and V.L. Nielsen, Explaining compliance: Business Responses to Regulation, 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Pub pp.222-244. Pp.224.
135 MHCLG, Rogue Landlord Enforcement: Guidance for Local Authorities (Accessed: 11/6/20) 
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The high levels of homelessness across the UK form essential context in which officers’ decisions are negotiated. 
In recent years homelessness across the UK has significantly increased. The eighth annual Homelessness Monitor 
(England) indicates rising levels of rough sleeping, statutory homelessness, temporary accommodation placements, 
and hidden homelessness.136 Officers cited risks to tenants - such as the threat of homelessness and illegal eviction - as 
key factors influencing their enforcement decisions:  
The homeless problems that we’ve got, you know, and it’s just getting worse. We are in that difficult situation 
where you have got massive homeless numbers, so is a roof over your head, or an unsafe roof over your head, 
better than no roof over your head? It’s that difficult one. (Licensing Team, England)
Summary 
Previous studies have demonstrated that regulators operate on a spectrum with deterrence- and compliance-focused 
activities at opposite ends.137 These are not binary options and it is likely that many local authorities will engage in a 
mix of actions located at intermediate points along the spectrum. Our findings suggest that there are at least four 
archetypes of regulatory strategies currently operating in the sector, although it is likely that in practice many local 
authorities fall somewhere between them. Some authorities preferred strict measures and a hard-line approach, 
whilst others favoured non-coercive activities and a light-touch approach. As explored further in the next chapter, 
there are certain challenges associated with each of these strategies. Compliance-focused authorities treat the two 
approaches as complementary and seek to achieve a balance between them. Our study also includes examples 
of authorities that are thinking more expansively and systemically and, as a consequence, have adopted creative 
regulatory strategies. Their focus is not only on enforcement but on broader regulatory technique, including issues 
related to the wider system, inter-agency working and the needs of tenants. 
By exploring the various factors which underpin the development of these strategic approaches, our study adds new 
insights on enforcement in the PRS. Regulatory approaches are not only based on pragmatic concerns about resource 
availability, but also on underlying assumptions regarding landlord motivations and effective ways of regulating the 
sector. The understanding of the nature of the problem and possible solutions, political support, geographical factors, 
how the teams are organised and configured, and how the local authority views itself in relation to the sector are 
additional key factor underpinning the approaches adopted.   
136 S. Fitzpatrick, H. Pawson, G. Bramley, J. Wood, B. Watts, M. Stephens, and J. Blenkinsopp. (2017) The Homelessness Monitor: England 2019 (Accessed: 22/7/20). 
137 P.J. May and J. Burby. (1998) Making Sense out of Regulatory Enforcement, Law & Policy, 20(2) 
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5. Obstacles to effective enforcement 
and new regulatory approaches
Assessing the effectiveness of different enforcement strategies is notoriously complex. As discussed in chapter 2, the 
impact of regulation will depend on how people respond to that regulation, and those responses in turn depend 
on factors that will often be external to the activities of the local authority. It is therefore important to avoid overly 
simplistic assumptions about cause and effect.
The first part of this chapter explores the nature of obstacles that local authorities are facing and certain key issues 
associated with the enforcement strategies identified in the previous chapter. We discuss the challenges and 
limitations associated with relying exclusively on either cooperation or deterrence as the primary means of regulating 
the PRS. The second half of the chapter explores the extent to which local authorities are using alternative regulatory 
approaches. 
The obstacles to effective enforcement
As noted in the previous chapter, some local authorities are moving towards a deterrence-focused strategy towards 
the PRS that places the use of formal sanctions at the forefront.
Participants had substantially different views regarding the effectiveness of formal action. Some of those favouring 
formal enforcement felt that sanctions could be effective in deterring future breaches of the law by the offending 
party. A more popular view was that widely publicised and visible enforcement action would have a ripple effect and 
prevent similar harm or behaviour from other landlords or letting agents: 
I’m not afraid to go to court. [The local authority area] is a close-knit community, so you tend to find if you take a 
court case, other landlords get to know about it. That does have an effect. (EHO, Wales)
Authorities in our study publicised successful prosecutions for this purpose via social media and in local newspapers. 
Some also targeted the intended audience via a mailshot to landlords and agents (e.g. in Scotland via landlord 
registration, in England via the selective licensing schemes): 
We publicise [prosecutions] hugely. It goes all over the place. You get a press release in the papers, we put it out in 
social media and effectively in a quarterly magazine that goes to every household in the borough so every house 
in the borough will see the name of that person and will see what they’ve done. It’s a deterrent. (Housing Manager, 
England)
It was however recognised that determining the causal impact of publicising prosecutions is difficult. Some 
participants did not consider formal activity to be an effective deterrent but nonetheless believed that punishing 
criminal behaviour was morally the right thing to do and key to building a positive relationship with the sector:  
I’m not sure that necessarily enforcement activities make non-compliant landlords start complying. I think with 
some of them it might, but I think it’s also about supporting those landlords who are investing, and ultimately 
complying … I think showing that there is a penalty for those landlords would show some level of support for the 
good landlord. (Team leader, Scotland)
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Whilst, as noted in chapter 4, views about the extent to which non-compliance was the result of conscious criminal 
activity differed across localities, most local authorities felt there were some landlords and letting agents that would 
only respond to tough enforcement measures. The literature emphasises that some level of legal enforcement – 
although it is not clear quite how much – is essential in achieving compliance.’138  Our findings, however, suggest that 
there are several factors which limit the effectiveness of a strategy that is exclusively deterrence focused. 
First, highly coercive instruments such as prosecutions require substantial administrative resources to be effective. 
A lack of resources, alongside other constraints, made it impossible for officers to adhere to a hard-line approach: 
several local authorities felt that they were only ‘scratching the surface’ of the problem (licensing officer, England).139  
Respondents spoke at length about the significant amount of time, money and effort involved in pursuing 
prosecutions, with some reporting that the necessary skill set was also lacking: 
When it comes to the level of investigation that I’m talking about, to get the right person, to feel the impact of 
the offence and to tie them to the crime, which they have committed through somebody else, it is very hard … 
those are the rogue landlords. Those are the ones that this law is meant to catch but it requires a lot of expert 
understanding of the law. It’s very complicated. It’s not as easy as we think ... so now we have officers who can do 
enforcement but only to a degree and it’s just not enough. (Enforcement officer, England)
With our legal system here too, it takes so long. Even the simplest case gets delayed and delayed and you could be 
talking easily a year with a few adjournments before it ever gets to the door of the court. (Director, NI)
Under-reporting of poor standards by tenants, and the barriers this poses to identifying non-compliance, was 
discussed by numerous participants across the four nations. When tenants who did approach the local authority were 
informed that their landlord would need to be contacted, they would often withdraw their complaints or deny the 
local authority access to the property. Gaining access to properties to inspect them was a difficulty faced by local 
authorities across the four nations. Finding tenants who were willing to testify in court was another key challenge: 
The problem is, the prosecution is only ever the tip of the iceberg. This is the thing, obviously, we don’t want the 
opposition to know. But it’s very difficult to actually get the evidence together for a criminal prosecution, because 
the first thing is you need a witness statement from a tenant, that’s your evidence of the malpractices. So you need 
a tenant who’s prepared to come forward, one, to give a witness statement, and, two, potentially to appear in 
court as a witness if challenged. (Trading Standards officer, England).
The likely reluctance of tenants to raise complaints due to a fear of retaliatory evictions or retaliatory rent rises is now 
generally acknowledged within the sector.140 A lack of knowledge or awareness of rights or entitlements is another 
key issue; this was viewed as particularly salient among migrant communities. New migrants to the UK are more likely 
to reside in the PRS than in other tenures and often experience poor and exploitative housing conditions.141 Analysis 
of Labour Force Survey data shows that 76% of recent migrants who arrived in the UK in the previous five years are 
housed in the PRS.142 The survey also showed that migrants are more likely to live in overcrowded housing, particularly 
in London. 
138 R.A. Kagan, N. Gunningham,and D. Thornton (2011) ‘Fear, duty, and regulatory compliance: lessons from three research projects’ 
139 Local authorities in England that operated a selective licensing scheme did report that the financial resources generated through fee-setting allowed for larger 
staff teams. However self-supporting schemes are rare and resources continue to limit their activity. For example, it is extremely unlikely that local authorities will 
carry out 100% property inspections. These issues are explored in depth in the recent review of selective licensing in England. See Lawrence, S. and Wilson, P. (2019) 
An Independent Review of the Use and Effectiveness of Selective Licensing, (For MCHLG).
140 This has continued to be an issue in England even after the 2015 Deregulation Act. This act provides protection against retaliatory eviction where the local 
authority has issued the landlord with a formal notice.  However, this protection only lasts for 6 months and action is only taken in certain cases of disrepair. In 
addition, other barriers may prevent the tenant from approaching the local authority such as lack of awareness of rights or fear of authority. See Citizen’s Advice, 
(2017) It’s broke, Let’s fix it. 
141 J. Perry (2012) UK migrants and the private rented sector. A policy and practice report from the Housing and Migration Network (Accessed: 23/7/20) 
142 This can be contrasted to the average percentage living in the private rented sector among all foreign born (39%), The Migration Observatory (2019) Migrants and 
Housing in the UK: Experiences and Impacts (Accessed: 23/7/20) 
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Language barriers, poverty, a lack of awareness of council services, low housing aspirations, dependence on an 
employer or agent for accommodation, and a fear of public services or authority figures are key factors that mean 
this group are highly unlikely to approach their local authority and are especially vulnerable to exploitation, including 
from gangmasters or criminal agents. Research suggests this may have been exacerbated by the recent Rent to Rent 
legislation with some migrants reluctant to complain about conditions due to fear of being deported:143   
The people who are the victims in these situations don’t go to councils. Quite often they’re from countries where, 
bizarrely, the state is not a good thing. (Landlord group, England) 
I think it is lack of understanding. It’s also some people think landlords are helping them, nobody else will give 
them [a place to live]. They think the condition they live in isn’t so bad. We think it’s bad. To them, they probably 
come from – I don’t know, they just don’t see it in the same way. (Enforcement officer, England) 
Tenants in London may experience difficulties in navigating the system due to variation in the adoption of selective 
licensing. People were reported to be often unaware of which council ward they lived in let alone whether a selective 
licensing scheme was in operation in that authority. 
Deterrence theory claims that people will be deterred from breaking the law when legal penalties resulting from 
the breach and the likelihood of swift detection and conviction are sufficient to outweigh the gain associated with 
non-compliance.144 The effectiveness of formal enforcement measures will therefore depend on court sanctions 
being sufficiently severe, which is, however, rarely the case in the PRS. Participants from across the four nations gave 
numerous examples of small financial penalties being imposed in spite of the serious adverse effects that a landlord’s 
behaviour had or could have had on individuals:  
He was singularly the worst landlord I’ve ever met. He was horrendous. We could probably find some of the press 
stuff about him actually … I think my staff attended court five times during that two years and at the time it 
was adjourned and they were messing about and all the rest of it and he was fined £110 against a maximum of 
£50,000 … You’re just hitting your head saying where is the deterrent there?  It’s not a value because we don’t get 
any money from that … If that becomes public, if people realise that’s the worst that can happen to me, why 
bother doing what the council ask? (Manager, Scotland)
Stakeholders reported that some councils lack support from their legal team to take enforcement action due 
to concerns of the level of risk associated with winning the case. In times of severe resource constraint formal 
enforcement activities can be subject to a stringent cost/benefit calculation that results in a decision not to pursue 
the case.
An additional risk of adopting a strategy based mostly on deterrence is that when indiscriminately or inappropriately 
applied it can breed resentment and hostility.145 One landlord representative from Northern Ireland criticised the 
heavy fines being issued for non-compliance with the HMO licensing scheme. This enforcement action was seen 
143  K. McKee, S. Leahy and T. Tokarczyk (2020) Redrawing the border through the ‘Right to Rent’: Exclusion, discrimination and hostility in the English housing market, Critical 
Social Policy, 1-20.
144 Parker and Neilsen, Explaining Compliance
145 Hodges, Delivering dispute resolution
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as unfair because it was applied regardless of whether the breach was due to inadvertence. Rather than initially 
providing advice, support or information and then escalating the response where necessary, the strategy appears to 
be based mostly on punishment:  
What’s happening is somebody’s getting smacked on because they haven’t renewed their licence for a couple of 
months. The other thing that happened was that the previous authority used to write out to everyone six months 
before saying, “Your registration is due to expire on the 31st October, please fill in the application if the house is still 
an HMO.” They stopped doing that, they didn’t write out. A lot of people weren’t aware … Tell people and then 
educate them and if they don’t do it, fine them. But don’t come and fine them first and don’t even educate them 
later. (Landlord group, NI) 
Enforcement officers working within hard-line authorities (see chapter 4) also reported that some local authorities in 
England are moving towards punishment as the strategy of first choice:  
It’s become very much an enforcement thing rather than looking at things holistically and it’s become very much 
punishing the landlord to improve the property. That is the approach that local authorities are adopting and 
obviously there are issues there. (Enforcement Officer, England)
There are important implications for compliance when punishment rather than dialogue and collaboration is in the 
foreground of regulating the sector. As noted in chapter 2, the degree of acceptance of the regulation and respect for 
the regulator are key factors that shape the likelihood that the regulated community will obey the law. To prioritise 
punishment whilst providing insufficient assistance or advice can undermine the goodwill of those that would – 
perhaps with some encouragement – be willing to comply. The literature suggests that this approach also risks 
fostering a subculture of resistance among the regulated community and makes it less likely that compliance will be 
achieved through cooperation.146 Adopting a predominantly deterrence-focused approach also means that certain 
types of non-compliance will go unaddressed (see below). 
Certain key themes regarding the successes and limitations of informal action are also evident within the data. 
First, the effectiveness of these mechanisms depends on the motivations and behaviours of those being regulated. 
Inadvertency among small landlords has long been recognised as the key regulatory challenge. Despite the growth 
and change in the sector it was still flagged by many local authorities as the paramount challenge they were 
facing. Several local authorities felt that the largest proportion of non-compliance was among landlords that were 
‘well-intentioned but ill-informed’; individuals generally willing to comply but lacking adequate knowledge, skills or 
resources. This was reported to be exacerbated by the growing number of regulations landlords had to comply with: 
One of the things that we’re finding more and more at the moment I think with looking at all the recent changes 
is quality and understanding of what landlords are required to do, more through ignorance than wilful bad 
landlords, I suppose. More and more of our accidental landlords not knowing what they should be doing, and 
because they don’t consider it to be a business, they don’t always consider themselves to be landlords in many 
cases, they don’t really know where to go to access the right information. (PRS Co-ordinator, Scotland) 
A second key theme is that landlords were typically perceived to respond well to informal activity. It was rarely 
necessary to escalate the enforcement response to formal action (see chapter 4). Although informal activities were 
rarely analysed, we were provided with evidence from Rent Smart Wales and some case study authorities that it could 
be highly effective among certain landlords: 
Recently, we’ve been managing this as a project to secure compliance, and we can tell you at every stage what the 
impact of a letter was or what the impact of an email was, and it’s massive. (Rent Smart Wales)
146 Ayres and Braithwaite, Responsive regulation
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I think sometimes you can get fixated on [formal] enforcement and about when you need to use that, but there 
are also a number of landlords in the area that a simple email will suffice or a phone call will suffice. (Improvement 
Officer, England).
The evaluation of Shelter Scotland’s private landlord support officer project also found advice provision to be 
particularly effective among accidental landlords who had small portfolios and other commitments.147 A key rationale 
behind dedicated landlord advisory services is that by focusing only on deterrence or formal enforcement a certain 
category of landlord behaviour is not being included in or targeted by the enforcement activity: 
The advisory service can take on some of that proactive handholding approach to landlords. Which frees you up 
to do the ordinary administration on one hand and the heavy enforcement on the other. (Tenant Group, Scotland)
It is important to note that unintentional violation of the rules can still cause significant harm in the lives of tenants. 
However, this and other research suggests that focusing on deterrence is not only inappropriate but, as noted above, 
quite possibly a counterproductive approach with those who are willing to comply.148 Where non-compliance is due 
to a lack of understanding or awareness, information and support, rather than the big stick, are required.
Participants were however aware of the limitations of informal activity that is targeted at a single landlord or letting 
agency.149 Some local authorities were criticised for their over-reliance on informal approaches and for failing to 
escalate the response within a certain time frame: 
Nobody is going to dispute that informal processes do work.  But it’s a case of saying to people, “Have you got your 
annual safety certificate, it’s a legal requirement, can you send the copies to me?” That is fine. To send a letter then 
saying, “Oh, can you send me it?” then another letter, then another letter, that is giving the person the option to not 
bother with the law at all. (Landlord Group, England) 
For some local authorities there also appeared to be a lack of consistency regarding when the response would 
be escalated. A risk of informal approaches is that once landlords establish that the approach is “all talk and no 
action” they subsequently disregard the local authority. In light-touch areas without a real threat of formal action the 
landlords’ response to regulation was seen to be characterised by dismissiveness or game playing. Evidence provided 
by light-touch authorities shows that relying heavily on an informal approach without possible escalation is likely to 
be exploited by a small minority of landlords:
For a system of regulation to be effective, those that are been regulated need to know that action’s coming … I 
would say that they have twigged that this is not the case and ... so they just carry on regardless knowing that 
possibly nothing’s gonna happen. Yes I think they do. They do know. (Housing officer, Scotland) 
Informal activities were also reported to take more time than formal enforcement and, in some cases, could 
undermine the ability to ensure that all necessary repairs are completed. This appeared to be particularly the case 
where an informal approach was applied without clear time limits: 
It’s hugely labour intensive. Loads of time on an individual case trying to cajole a landlord along, and ultimately, 
maybe, backing off if he does 80% of the work and just leaves the rest, because it’s too little now to serve a notice 
on. (EHO, England)
147 Renting Scotland, Private Landlord Support Officer Project 
148 Hodges, Delivering dispute resolution 
149 In contrast to compliance-focused activity that is pitched at the entire sector, for example, in the form of training or advice (see chapters two and four). 
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Finally, the current financial environment negatively affects the provision of compliance-focused activities for some 
local authorities. Following a reduction in available resources a local authority in Northern Ireland had to stop several 
informal activities such as Facebook campaigns, advice provision to landlords, literature drops and call-ins with estate 
agents. A key stakeholder in Scotland also reported that some councils used to have ‘really good interactions with 
the private rented sector’ where they would offer free training courses, a free magazine and in-depth articles. During 
times of severe resource constraints these activities are not always seen as a priority and therefore scaled back.150
The lack of outcomes or impacts data 
Whilst no mechanism for regulating the sector can function effectively without an effective enforcement regime, this 
is one of the most difficult regulatory areas to analyse.151 We also face the more fundamental prior question of how 
effectiveness can and should be defined in this context.
A sense emerged in this study that many PRS teams struggle to evidence how their activities contribute to improved 
standards. The impact of different enforcement strategies and approaches is rarely monitored or assessed, so 
exploring the causal impact of informal or deterrence-focused activities is challenging at best. This is a common 
challenge associated with local authority regulation across sectors; a recent review found that they are generally poor 
at demonstrating the impact of these services.152 In this process they face various challenges including lack of data, 
lack of evaluation and analysis capacity, and difficulties in attributing impacts to specific activities. 
As noted in chapter 4, one key stakeholder reported that some local authorities perceive success primarily in terms of 
outputs (such as the number of prosecutions) rather than outcomes:  
Outcomes don’t get you any publicity or headlines because they’re not inputs or outputs, and inputs and outputs 
are much easier to measure and therefore get you headlines in newspapers. (Landlord group, England) 
The wider sector similarly tends to confuse the output of local authority activity with its outcome or impact. For 
example, a lack of formal enforcement activities has been interpreted by landlord groups as demonstrating the 
ineffectiveness of selective licensing schemes in England.153 However, the number of prosecutions, civil penalties, 
notices or inspections are not appropriate measures of success since the goal of regulation is not to secure 
prosecutions, but to improve standards by achieving compliance.154
Although informal activity is often recorded in the form of case notes, this data was only analysed by a few 
participating enforcement agencies. This could represent a significant knowledge gap because, besides 
demonstrating its effectiveness in achieving compliance, there are several reasons why local authorities might wish 
to analyse this data. It could for example be used to determine the most effective point for escalating responses or for 
assessing the most efficient mode of communication. Among hard-line local authorities there was a tension between 
staff activity on the ground, organisational expectations, and recognition of activities that could - at least in principle - 
be measured or analysed:
We have it [record of informal activity] because we have a database that when we complete a case we say it is 
closed, the case is closed now, having done formal action, having improved the property, removed category one or 
category two … it’s just not monitored. It’s interesting because I think if you look at that list and you’ll find there’s a 
lot of informal action. (Enforcement Officer, England)
150 Some of these were relaunched when the Private Housing (Tenancies) (Scotland) Act 2016 came into effect. 
151 J. Tiessen, C. Celia, L. Villaba-van-Dijk, A. Reding, C. Van Stolk and T. Ling (2016) Impacts and Outcomes of Local Authority Regulatory Services
152 J. Tiessen, C. Celia, L. Villaba-van-Dijk, A. Reding, C. Van Stolk and T. Ling (2016) Impacts and Outcomes of Local Authority Regulatory Services
153 Simcock, and Mykkanen, The Postcode Lottery
154 S. Lawrence and P. Wilson (2019) An Independent Review of the Use and Effectiveness of Selective Licensing, (For MCHLG) 
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Some local authorities were able to evidence the number of serious hazards and defects that were identified and 
addressed. One local authority in Scotland could demonstrate reductions in the number of properties that failed the 
Repairing Standard. Success was, however, largely discussed in terms of outputs. In addition, it seemed that only some 
local authorities regularly communicate their successes and activities to the wider sector: 
I think it [national registration scheme] is enforced better than landlords think it is, because local authorities aren’t 
very good at publishing their success stories when it comes to landlord registration, so I think landlords genuinely 
think there is no enforcement happening, but actually there’s a fair bit. (Landlord group, Scotland) 
Insufficient communication has potentially important consequences. Keeping landlords up to date on the outcomes 
of regulatory interventions such as selective licensing schemes is an important aspect of building effective landlord 
engagement.155 Positive working relationships with landlord groups are key in achieving compliance and improving 
professionalisation of the sector.156
New regulatory approaches 
The first part of this chapter identifies several limitations associated with relying entirely on either deterrence or 
informal activity as the primary means of regulating the PRS. These findings echo a wider body of empirical and 
theoretical academic research demonstrating problems associated with a deterrence-focused or hard-line approach, 
including its inability to respond to the varied motivations and behaviours of different types of landlords (see Chapter 
2). Even where deterrence is adopted at a strategic level, enforcement officers will often adopt a more informal 
approach based on communication and persuasion. This well-established finding from the academic literature was 
reaffirmed by our research for the case of PRS regulation. However, an over-reliance on persuasion or informal activity 
will leave vulnerable tenants unprotected and is likely to be exploited by a minority of landlords. These observations 
raise questions regarding local authorities’ adoption of alternative regulatory approaches towards the PRS. In Chapter 
4 we outlined compliance-focused and creative approaches, but this does not exhaust the possibilities. We now 
consider further dimensions of these more comprehensive regulatory approaches. 
Self-monitoring and co-regulation 
Landlord groups have argued that selective licensing in England should be abandoned in favour of voluntary self-
monitoring or co-regulation.157 A recent report by Shelter also states that co-regulation could be an effective approach 
for gaining landlord support and regulating the sector.158 
Feedback from our interviewees suggests episodic compliance to be common in the UK PRS. Episodic compliance 
is where a regulatee will obey the rules in the runup to an inspection or following the identification of a breach but 
does not display continuous adherence to the rules in the absence of oversight.159 Numerous respondents felt that 
many landlords only comply with regulations following an inspection, formal notice, informal telephone call or other 
local authority intervention. The findings suggest that rather than a ‘compliance culture’ in the PRS, where the value 
of delivering to the relevant standards is internalised by landlords, obedience to the rules depends on local authorities 
being active in monitoring adherence: 
I think there’s a kind of almost unwritten culture around it’s almost like this and there’s always this problem with 
enforcement and regulation. I think a lot of our landlords want to be told what to do. (EHO, England)
155 Lawrence and Wilson, An independent review
156 Lawrence and Wilson, An independent review
157 Simcock, and Mykkanen, The Postcode Lottery 
158 Newton, D. and Brown, P. (2019) A good landlord scheme for Greater Manchester. What does the evidence say? (Accessed: 10/6/20).  
159 This is discussed further in our forthcoming companion report: Marsh, A, Harris, J. and Cowan, D. (2020) Private rented sector compliance: a systems approach, CaCHE 
Working Paper, Glasgow:  UK Collaborative Centre for Housing Research.
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One English local authority that had recently reintroduced a selective licensing scheme thought that practices would 
deteriorate without external scrutiny: 
You can just tell from the way in which the dealings you’ve had with them throughout that there was a very high 
likelihood they would just revert back to former management practices without the ongoing intervention from the 
council. (EHO, England)
Indeed, one case study reported that they dealt with landlords whose properties within the selective licensing area 
were managed and maintained in a manner that satisfied the requirements of their licence, while, simultaneously, 
properties owned by the same landlord outside the selective licensing area were being identified as requiring 
enforcement action.
The limitations of self-regulation in this context could be partly associated with those accidental or small-scale 
landlords who may fail to recognise themselves as part of an industry that requires regulation: 
There are still a lot of landlords have that belief, “It’s my property. If I want to lend it to three people in a room or 
keep a box room and they’re happy with it and that’s my right.” … its slowly changing but I think it has got a long 
way to go. (Licensing Team Leader, England)
Some may also fail to recognise their behaviour as criminal:
We have got a lot of landlords as well who don’t see their mismanagement or their bad practices as being criminal, 
at all. “I’m not breaking the law here”. (EHO, England)
These observations raise a question: to what extent is the PRS currently capable of self-policing? Two participating 
local authorities in England had tried to operate co-regulatory schemes run in collaboration with a landlord 
organisation. The idea behind these schemes is that the partner organisation would take on some responsibility for 
ensuring compliance. In essence, members of the landlord organisation were given discounts on the licence fee. In 
one organisation, this membership was linked also to an accreditation scheme; and, in another, landlord members 
were required to undergo a bespoke training course. Both authorities were rethinking their approach, in part because 
of a perceived lack of success.  
The benefits of partnership working with a landlord organisation are that, in principle, local authorities should be 
able to take a more informal approach with members because they are more likely to be compliant with regulatory 
standards, especially if the training provided succeeds in upskilling the landlord or agent. However, in one of these 
schemes, no training, assessment, or development was provided to landlords before accreditation to help them 
meet standards. There also appeared to be disagreement and a lack of clarity regarding the administration of the 
scheme and the exact role the landlord organisation would play. The local authorities recognised that the landlord 
organisations were more light touch than they would have wished. The scheme essentially became a self-certification 
exercise: 
I can’t dispute the fact that (city council)’s criticism of the co-regulation scheme is such that the standards of 
landlord within the co-regulation or co-regulated members was probably not as good as it should’ve been. But 
there was nothing to prevent bad landlords from becoming members of that scheme unless there was evidence or 
knowledge about that landlord’s behaviour previously. (Landlord group, England)
Ideally, from the perspective of self-regulation, the landlord organisation itself might have the ability to discipline 
its members for infractions of a code of practice or other infringement. This can then allow the local authority to 
concentrate resources on dealing with the most problematic cases. However, at present, it does not appear that 
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landlord organisations have this capacity. In the interviews the landlord organisations in this case study area tended 
to express concerns about the overarching regulatory approach of which the co-regulatory scheme was a part and, 
more broadly, about over-regulation of the PRS. It is difficult to see how a co-regulatory scheme can be effective 
when the partner fundamentally disagrees with the tool by which the sector is being regulated.
In several case studies accreditation schemes formed part of the package of compliance-focused activities offered 
to landlords. For example, one Scottish council referred landlords to the accreditation scheme under the “action 
plan” they draw up with non-compliant landlords. There was however a feeling among key stakeholders and local 
authority respondents that accreditation schemes generally only capture landlords who were already willing and able 
to comply. Whilst accreditation schemes were seen as part of the suite of tools used to regulate the sector, their role in 
increasing compliance appeared to be relatively limited. 
Responsive regulation 
Enforcement officers in our study reported that their actions would be varied in line with the behaviour and attitude 
of those being regulated. The key variable was whether regulatory breaches were perceived to be the result of 
ignorance – in which case education would usually be the first resort – or whether landlord behaviour was regarded 
as criminal:  
We might take a little bit more time with landlords where we feel as though, despite their best efforts, they haven’t 
managed to get the property up to standard, or they have never come across us before. Whilst they should be 
aware of their legal obligations, fair enough we’ll give them a chance. (EHO, England) 
However, there was little consensus as to what kind of behaviour was “criminal”, or, indeed, what proportion of 
landlords fitted that description. These varied assumptions informed the different practices of enforcement of 
regulatory standards discussed in chapter 4. 
Rent Smart Wales and some compliance-focused authorities appear to be consciously adopting responsive regulation 
as a means of combining both informal and deterrence approaches to regulation. This is also known as a pyramidic 
approach or graded response (see chapter 2). Here persuasion, advice, support and assistance are applied as strategies 
of first choice: this is where the bulk of regulatory action occurs. When a landlord engages with a local authority, they 
will first be supported informally. Then if the landlords exploits this position or does not respond to informal measures 
by complying, the authority will begin a graded response and move towards progressively tougher enforcement 
measures (Figure 5.1). 
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The importance of a responsive or escalated approach for those that fail to cooperate has been highlighted by the 
MHCLG.160 However, only occasionally had case studies explicitly adopted responsive regulation as part of their 
overarching strategic approach. This has important implications for consistency in the response, particularly in relation 
to escalation and de-escalation. 
Some authorities used civil penalties, fixed penalties, or rent penalty notices (as appropriate) as a part of a responsive 
approach underpinned by a robust enforcement policy. Rent Smart Wales and some authorities in Scotland and 
England would apply penalties when softer, informal enforcement activities had been unsuccessful. Their response 
would then progress to the next higher tier on the regulatory pyramid; landlords would be made aware that 
additional escalation would be necessary if compliance was not forthcoming: 
I think that from an important point of view, the more tools that you have, the more useful that really is, to be 
perfectly honest with you, because it’s not going to be one size fits all. Some people will choose to ignore it until 
they get a fixed penalty and suddenly realise that they are getting fined. (Rent Smart Wales)
It’s interesting at the moment explaining to a landlord that because of their relatively good track record, and 
because there hasn’t been serious harm outcome for the tenant, we are letting them off with a financial penalty. 
That’s a conversation to have. (EHO, England)
Figure 5.1: Example Enforcement Pyramid
160  MHCLG, Tackling rogue landlords.
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For Scottish local authorities that used formal powers161 rent penalty notices were always the first step. Further 
escalation to criminal prosecutions was reported to be relatively rare, which indicates the effectiveness of the notices 
in achieving compliance: 
But for landlord registration there has probably been about ten cases or something over ten years that we’ve 
referred because we’ve got either no proper evidence to refer them to the courts or the civil remedies have worked 
so that puts that in some sort of perspective for you (Enforcement Manager, Scotland).
One local authority in England provided evidence that financial penalties were an effective deterrent: 
The civil penalties are having a desired effect to get people at least into the [selective licensing] scheme … at the 
moment we have got one large licensing area that is divided into three. In phase one of the scheme there were 
about 20-odd civil penalties. Phase two there has been two. (Enforcement Manager, England)
The application of the law regarding civil penalties in England is not arbitrary but driven by robust policy, with penalty 
bands applied according to harm, severity of offence and landlord culpability. Among case study authorities, civil 
penalties were unlikely to be used where a light-touch enforcement strategy was adopted. Because civil penalties are 
part of an escalated response, where regulatory activity only takes place around the base of the pyramid, or if a high 
level of compliance is anticipated, it is unlikely that civil penalties will be employed: 
Because again the civil penalty is only a result from not complying with improvement notices because we’ve not 
served improvement notices therefore, and generally even when we do they comply with them. (Head of Housing 
Services, England)
Escalation and de-escalation 
The escalated strategy adopted by Rent Smart Wales provides an example of the use of an explicit enforcement 
pyramid. Here a range of sanctions are available ranging from informal activities at the base, extending to formal 
approaches including prosecution and rent penalties. Responsive regulation depends on having a range of sanctions 
to respond the diverse motivations and behaviours of those being regulated: 
The fixed penalty notices work and of course then we can take to prosecution, either if they don’t discharge their 
liability for the initial offence by not paying their fixed penalty notice - we then take them to court for that actual 
offence … or for if they do pay but continue to not comply … we can carry on then to take that case to court to try 
and ensure compliance through that route. Like I said, we still take prosecutions and sometimes people still choose 
to not comply. Then that is when we move onto rent stopping and, potentially, rent repayment orders.  
(Rent Smart Wales)
One criticism of the pyramidic approach is that sometimes a step-by-step escalation may not be appropriate,162 for 
example, where the tenant is at significant risk. The approach adopted by Rent Smart Wales illustrates that in these 
instances, it is possible to immediately move to the higher levels of the pyramid: 
Of course, if we found that there was a case that was significant or of a serious nature, then we could skip a step 
because it’s not that we have to go through those steps. We may take a case straight to court. Certainly if we 
were having, for instance, noncompliance after someone has already been prosecuted once, we can of course 
take them to court again if we establish an offence again. It would be inappropriate or it probably wouldn’t be 
worthwhile to go back to doing a fixed penalty notice. (Rent Smart Wales)
161 Chapter four explores how authorities adopting a light-touch approach are unlikely to use formal powers.
162 Ayres and Braithwaite, Responsive regulation
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Among local authorities in Scotland and England civil penalties are also seen as less effective for the most serious 
criminal offences and officers would sometimes bypass the civil penalty stage and immediately escalate the response 
to a higher tier on the regulatory pyramid (i.e. criminal prosecution). Officers in one case study felt that recent practice 
locally had come to lean too heavily on civil penalties rather than criminal prosecution and that this didn’t send the 
right signals in relation to the most serious cases: there was an ongoing discussion about rebalancing the approach.
Criminal penalties therefore remain an important tool at the local authority’s disposal. Prosecutions were generally 
reserved for particularly serious or high-risk offences such as fire safety and persistent patterns of behaviour such as 
failure to comply despite repeated local authority intervention:  
[Rent Penalty Notices] can be effective I think because as I say, if you’ve got someone who is quite law abiding in 
the first place that’s just maybe fallen down a bit it’s easier for them to comply. They’re not perhaps effective with 
the more crooked end of the market but when I say that I’m not actually saying that the entire system is a failure 
because it happens in every sector … the criminal courts are very busy for a lot of reasons. (Solicitor, Scotland)
In addition to authorities adopting light-touch approaches, which fundamentally lacked clarity regarding the 
circumstances in which the regulatory response would be escalated, variation in practice regarding escalation was a 
common theme among participating authorities. Often this was down to the discretion of the individual officer. Rent 
Smart Wales however provides an example of step-by-step escalation being informed by clear organisational policies 
and procedures: 
We have internal procedures, that stipulates … the timescale people get. So normally, in the first instance, they 
would get a 14 day deadline and then after that, they might get a second seven day deadline and then after that, 
that’s when you would look to do a fixed penalty notice … actually what we’re doing now is we’re escalating 
… because it’s unrealistic and unreasonable for us to have to write five letters before you comply. That’s not cost 
effective, not time effective and not reasonable. (Rent Smart Wales)
A further criticism of pyramidic approaches is that sometimes it may be appropriate to move the response down the 
pyramid where, for example, the regulatee has demonstrated an increased willingness to comply, but de-escalation is 
not necessarily straightforward.163 There was also significant variation in practices regarding processes of de-escalation. 
For example, in England it is down to the local authority’s discretion whether to pursue the penalty if the landlord has 
responded to the notice of intent. Some authorities in England take the view that they would never de-escalate the 
response once a notice of intent for a civil penalty had been issued or a prosecution commenced, either because they 
hadn’t been given a good reason or because they believed it was morally wrong: 
So first thing to say is same as you decide to drive a car, the police stop you, you didn’t have a licence. That’s an 
offence already, so we prosecute for [failure to license]. You can go and get a licence tomorrow, that’s not going 
to change anything … I think the landlords believe when they get stopped, when something happens, they can 
go and do what needs to be done and they think they will be okay – a lot of councils still do that. (Licensing Team 
Leader, England) 
Other local authorities informed us that they would usually de-escalate the approach whenever the landlord 
demonstrated willingness to comply. 
An additional criticism of responsive regulation is that for certain types of problems the optimum regulatory response 
will not be at the base at the pyramid but will demand a higher level of intervention.164 In these instances a targeted 
regulatory approach may be more appropriate. Some compliance-focused local authorities were adopting an 
163 Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, Understanding Regulation.
164 Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, Understanding Regulation.
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informal approach for the wider sector but a stricter approach for certain problematic areas. However, even in these 
areas the principle of responsive regulation can still apply: 
Where we’ve got activity and we’re doing work in an area, it’s a formal approach, but we’ll still engage with 
landlords and say, ‘This is what your property needs to bring it up to standard. If not, I’m afraid we’ll see what we 
can do to close you down’. So we’ll take action and we’ll tell them we will take action against them, but generally, 
for the sector, it would be the more informal approach. (PRS Lead, Scotland)
Further key aspects of responsive regulation include identifying the regulatory logics behind the different tools 
employed and considering how they can interact effectively in practice.165 Deterrence-focused or formal instruments 
are underpinned by very different understandings to those that animate informal tools. Two local authorities in 
Scotland that had just introduced an advisory service sought to respond to this challenge by differentiating their 
enforcement and supportive functions, where those responsible for providing advice did not have enforcement 
responsibilities: 
So we try and keep the two things quite distinctive. In an area where we’ve had to be quite clear over the years 
because we look at the engagement and the access, it’s quite difficult to be all things to all people. If you’re 
trying to engage with landlords on the one hand, but enforce with the other, it becomes quite difficult. Landlords 
don’t really want to see you if you’re there in an enforcement capacity, so it’s a difficult one in terms of building 
relationships. We try and keep the two functions quite separate. (PRS Co-ordinator, Scotland)
The findings indicate that responsive regulation has some traction among UK authorities. However, these approaches 
often lack strategic oversight and there appeared to be an absence of formalised structures and processes. Other than 
Rent Smart Wales, we identified only one example of a graded response to enforcement being outlined in a written 
local authority enforcement strategy. 
The role of third parties 
A narrow understanding of regulation concentrates on the enforcement of laws by public bodies as the lever to 
influence behaviour and increase compliance. Regulatory models such as smart, decentred or networked regulation 
recognise other possible sources of regulation besides the State and argue that other social actors can participate in 
the process of regulation using regulatory mechanisms other than law. This project sought to explore the extent to 
which local authorities draw on third parties in regulating the PRS.
In chapter 4 we noted that in some case study areas, particularly those adopting creative approaches, inter-agency 
activities were instrumental in identifying and responding to poor standards in the PRS. However, besides these 
activities there was limited evidence that other organisations or third parties were being enlisted in the process of 
regulation. 
One local authority had tried to build a network of over 500 voluntary sector organisations as community partners 
who could help identify and report poor standards, deliver education and awareness-raising activities, and signpost 
landlords and tenants to appropriate services. The ethos underscoring this initiative was that everyone could play a 
role in helping to improve standards. This is an intriguing approach, but the local authority had struggled to engage 
organisations and at the time of data collection the initiative had not yet been successful. These efforts do however 
165 Black and Baldwin, (2010) Really responsive risk regulation
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give an example of an attempt to redraw the regulatory map more radically to include a wider range of actors, 
including the local community: 
The idea behind that is rather than us just doing all our comms and whatever, is to engage with as many 
community groups as possible where they would act as advocates for us to spread the word … I don’t mean 
housing specialists, community groups like advice for renters, or Citizens Advice Bureau that already know about it, 
but scouting groups, Girl Guides, groups that are engaging with just general people that they could then go away 
and if they have a meeting every now and again say we’re part of this group where if you’ve got problems with 
your landlord or if you’re privately renting then come and see us because we know where to refer you to.  
(Service Lead, England) 
Social lettings agencies and PRS access projects are examples of third parties that could play a role in improving 
standards and management practices within the sector. Social letting agencies are social purpose commercial 
agencies that operate to support both landlords and tenants on lower incomes or who might be vulnerable to 
ensure the tenancy can be sustained over the long-term. They can act as a conduit for disseminating good practice in 
housing management into the private rented sector, both directly and indirectly.
However, most case studies were not exploring opportunities for strategic co-ordination with third parties. This might 
mean, for example, establishing structures for regular information flows in both directions between the local authority 
and advice agencies, tenant groups, or local colleges and universities about issues arising in the sector. Or seeking 
to embed landlord organisations in structures for disseminating information to landlords. Engagement primarily 
occurred at the level of consultation, and even then, it was not always clear how the concerns of landlord or tenant 
groups were taken on board in a meaningful way. Whilst there are isolated pockets of good practice, social models of 
letting agencies are generally not given much consideration in local housing strategies.166 In most areas, state-centred 
regulation was used as the single instrument to address standards within the sector. The potential of using a range of 
different approaches implemented by a range of different parties has yet to be realised in the PRS context. 
Summary 
Our findings indicate some key practical issues associated with relying on fines, prosecution or other formal remedies 
as the primary way to affect landlord behaviour in the private rented sector. These issues include inadequate 
resources, the way in which breaches are identified, the level of and way in which legal penalties are applied, and the 
risk that unintentional non-compliance goes unaddressed. In the regulatory literature it is generally acknowledged 
that when used in isolation, deterrence-focused approaches are unlikely to be effective.167 At the other end of the 
spectrum, an over-reliance on informal activity will be exploited by some landlords whilst leaving vulnerable tenants 
unprotected.
Lessons from the case studies indicate regulation in the sector is more likely to be effective when local authorities 
aim to find a balance between the two approaches. This is evident in those case studies applying compliance-focused 
strategies (see chapter 4) and responsive regulation. Whilst some authorities appear to be consciously applying the 
principles of responsive regulation, only occasionally is it adopted at a strategic level. Clear organisational policies and 
procedures can lead to more procedural fairness and consistency in the application of the law.
166 Shelter Scotland (2016) Social Models of Letting Agencies 
167 Hodges, C. (2019) Delivering dispute resolution: a holistic review of models in England and Wales. Oxford: Hart. 
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6. Discussion and recommendations 
This Chapter draws together findings on the enforcement of standards in the private rented sector and key policy 
recommendations derived from this study. The chapter is structured around five key themes: i) the importance of 
a strategic approach; ii) improving the availability of data; iii) maximising the effectiveness of compliance-focused 
activity; iv) the use of responsive regulatory strategies; and, v) exploring a tenant-focused approach. The chapter 
concludes with a series of recommendations for policy and practice.  
The importance of a strategic approach: England, Scotland, Wales168 
In their most recent review of the PRS in England, Rugg and Rhodes highlight the need for a fundamental change 
in the regulation of the sector at a national level.169 They call for an overall strategy for the sector developed through 
an extended period of consultation with diverse stakeholders, focusing on dismantling government departmental 
silos and moving away from the current trend of tweaking different aspects of the system in isolation. Stakeholders 
in Scotland also reported the Scottish Government strategy is out of date and suggested that the overarching 
strategic aims for the PRS should be revisited. We support these recommendations and believe that consolidation 
and simplification of the law is a precondition to more effective enforcement practices. In this section we consider the 
strategic changes that local authorities can adopt to improve the regulation of the sector at a local level. 
For some time, local authorities in England and Wales have been responsible for developing general housing 
strategies on a range of issues across their local housing stock. These general strategies should encompass the PRS, 
alongside home ownership and social renting: they can be supplemented by more detailed tenure-specific strategies, 
where necessary. In Scotland, the development of local housing strategies also allows councils to think strategically 
about the role and operation of the PRS. However, this does not imply that local authorities are generally active in 
their regulation of the sector. In the initial online research informing the sampling for this project, relatively few local 
authorities appeared to have strategies that covered the PRS - or, at least, if relevant strategies towards the PRS exist 
they were not publicly available or easily discoverable - or seemed to be actively engaged with the sector.  
We made a deliberate effort to sample local authorities which available documentation indicated were making 
noteworthy efforts in this area. However, it turned out that even among the selected authorities some were in reality 
doing very little to address poor standards or management practices in the PRS. Stakeholder interviews also indicated 
that only few local authorities take an active role in regulating the sector. The findings suggest a culture change is 
needed - local authorities need to accept the PRS as a significant player in their local housing markets that demands 
strategic thought and organisation. A key policy lesson, therefore, is that local authorities should seek to demonstrate 
an explicit strategic approach to the sector in reformulating their housing strategies.
These strategies are however only as meaningful as their practical application. Our findings suggest that in certain 
areas well-intended regulatory activity has grown starkly out of alignment with its original objectives. As highlighted 
by recent reports in England, adequate resource investment, strong political support, clear leadership, and robust 
enforcement policies are key in developing successful strategic approaches in managing the sector.170
Findings from our case studies add to this discussion by suggesting that a positive way forward involves not 
only considering the application of formal penalties, but also appreciating the value of broader regulatory 
techniques. As explored below, these regulatory techniques would cover issues of aims and purpose (does the 
adopted understanding of the problem capture all relevant dimensions?), holistic thinking (what is the role of 
other organisations within this process?), internal design (e.g., how are PRS teams are configured? Do they work 
collaboratively?), and how outcomes are defined and measured. 
168  In Northern Ireland, the housing functions with local authorities is limited. The development of housing strategy rests with the Department for Communities and 
statutory responsibility for homelessness with Northern Ireland Housing Executive
169 Rugg, J. and Rhodes, (2018) The Evolving Private Rented Sector: Its Contribution and Potential (Accessed: 23/7/20)
170 Lawrence, and Wilson, P, An Independent Review; MHCLG, Tackling rogue landlords. 
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Aims and purpose 
A consideration of the goal or wider social impact that the PRS team is striving to achieve is key to regulating the 
sector in a more strategic and responsive way. This opens a space for creative thinking in how the problem is defined. 
Ashby’s principle of requisite variety suggests that addressing a complex problem or system requires a range of 
responses of equivalent complexity.171 The MHCLG Rogue Landlord Guidance in England covers examples of local 
authority enforcement activities where housing conditions are not the only focus. Findings from our authorities 
adopting creative approaches add new knowledge by illustrating the key factors driving these approaches, including 
clear aims and objectives framed in terms of outcomes; the innovative use of data and evidence; an entrepreneurial 
approach to building political support and securing additional funding; and a system-based and tenant-focused 
approach.
Our findings suggest that an overarching goal, related organisational aims, and a clear understanding of the problems, 
as manifested in local housing markets, are critical in the development and orientation of local authority strategic 
approach. This will help local authorities decide on the interventions or activities needed. The creative authorities in 
this study understood the PRS in different ways: as having pockets of deprivation each with a distinct range of issues; 
as representing a health concern; and as a part of a system that requires thinking about inter-linked problems and 
how to identify them. Consequently, those authorities prioritised complex long-term responses which at their core 
involved establishing new relationships among various actors. 
A holistic approach 
One of the benefits of a housing strategy is that PRS issues can be approached in a holistic manner. The PRS now 
provides accommodation for a population that earlier might have been able to access social housing. One widely 
recorded phenomenon is that housing problems often occur alongside other issues. Research shows that problems 
relating to housing, benefits, debt and relationship breakdowns often go hand in hand, and that society’s most 
vulnerable people will be more likely to have interlinked problems.172 Tenants approaching a local authority with 
housing disrepair issues may well also be experiencing other problems or issues.173
The development of a holistic strategy takes account of vulnerable populations and tenant needs in the PRS. It 
provides an opportunity to think creatively and draw in organisations that can help with issues ranging from welfare 
benefits advice to veterinary assistance for pets. Engaging with other services could also provide a means for housing 
staff to receive the necessary training to identify and respond more effectively to problems tenants are facing. The 
creative and compliance-focused local authorities in this study show the benefits that can result from restructuring 
provision and developing new models of integrated services. Facilitating more effective collaboration between 
various housing teams and external partners could be key to achieving lasting change and more efficient use of 
resources.174 
Multi-agency working
The MHCLG rogue landlord guidance in England has highlighted the need for multi-agency work to ensure effective 
enforcement. Our research illustrates the importance of partnership-work; this is not only to identify non-compliant 
landlords or letting agents but also to identify and provide support for vulnerable claimants within a tenant-focused 
approach (see below). This could include, for example, signposting tenants to the appropriate services. The creative 
authorities demonstrate that building effective partnerships with a range of potential partners is key to developing a 
more coherent and holistic approach. We support the recent recommendation in England175 that local authorities be 
171 Gibb, K. (2019) – System-thinking and housing – Online blog.
172 Moorhead, R. and Robinson, M. (2006). A trouble shared: legal problems clusters in solicitors’ and advice agencies (Accessed: 25/11/19).
173 JUSTICE, Solving housing disputes;  S. Nason, A Sherlock, H. Taylor, H. Pritchard. (2020) Public Administration and a Just Wales: Education (Accessed: 20/7/20)
174 These observations do not apply to Northern Ireland where there is no “housing team”. Functions in relation to enforcement of PRS regulations/fitness standards 
are undertaken by and located within Environmental Health Departments.     
175 Lawrence, and Wilson, An independent review
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given additional guidance on the issue of multi-agency working and suggest that similar guidance is developed by 
all devolved Governments. It is also important to acknowledge that building and maintaining effective multi-agency 
arrangements requires a sophisticated set of leadership and organisational skills.
This report demonstrates the challenges that two-tier local authorities in England may face in building needed 
relationships. However, issues relating to multi-level governmental structures are generally absent in discussions on 
enforcement in the UK PRS. As such we would recommend that in the development of policy and practice guidance, 
the MHCLG should consider the issues faced by two-tier local authorities.
Internal organisation 
Giving strategic thought to the sector will also require local authorities to consider the role of enforcement officers 
and the way in which the PRS teams are configured. Licensing or registering landlord activities requires different 
skills from licensing a taxicab and driver. The nature of the PRS, the object of regulation itself, and the powers of the 
licensing authority in respect of non-compliance are more complex and require considerable expertise. It makes 
little sense to organise PRS licensing or landlord registration alongside other licensing activities. There was evidence 
in our study that this led to inefficiency, lack of communication and confusion regarding the delegation of roles and 
responsibilities.
The MHCLG select committee in England has called for better joint working between departments or a transfer of all 
duties to a single department.176 Findings from this study indicate that Scottish local authorities would also benefit 
from the integration and co-location of landlord registration with other housing services. This could lead not only to 
more efficient use of resources, but also to opportunities for information exchange and a shared commitment to a key 
goal or vision for the sector.  
An effective strategic approach entails providing adequate consideration to how different departments that address 
PRS related issues are aligned and work collaboratively. This may include housing enforcement, environmental health 
teams, trading standards, building control and planning, the police and other public services. Where relevant, local 
authorities should also develop approaches to working with neighbouring authorities. Outside of the larger cities, 
local authorities may wish to explore the potential to come together and establish regional teams skilled in working 
within the PRS and pursuing enforcement. Management arrangements for these multi-partner teams might offer 
the potential to enable PRS tenants and landlords to be engaged in the process of designing and implementing 
regulation.
Our research emphasises that these recommendations need to be sensitive to the specific issues faced by two-tier 
English local authorities and areas in the UK where co-location may be difficult (for example, across large rural areas). 
However, some of our English case studies approached the issues creatively, for instance by making appropriate 
delegations which allowed the legislative split between having an EPC and enforcing the MEES to reside with the 
same authority. In areas where co-location is not possible, integration or collaboration can take place by developing 
shared strategies or joint processes or projects, for example, in relation to research. Further advice and guidance are 
needed to support processes of service integration or co-ordination of operations where co-location or the creation 
of new organisational forms is not a realistic objective. 
Demonstrating outcomes and impacts 
Local authorities have extensive experience in measuring their activities in terms of outputs. However, there is some 
indication that processes of assessment and evaluation could be improved and that within the wider sector there may 
be a need for an increased awareness of the distinction between outputs and outcomes. Whilst auditing activities 
can be important in helping improve services, they do not fully capture the changes brought about by a specific 
activity or suite of activities. 
176 Housing, Communities and Local Government Committee (MHCLG) (2018) Private rented sector: Fourth Report of Session 2017-19
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Situating outcomes at the centre of the strategy can help local authorities move away from the more traditional 
output-focused approach. Once the ultimate aim or goal has been agreed, local authorities will need to make an 
evidence-informed decision on the desired outcomes: the broader changes or benefits that they anticipate will 
result from their enforcement activity. Whilst these outcomes can form part of the key performance indicators 
that authorities are required to report on – for example, where selective licensing is in place in England - our study 
indicates they are rarely communicated to the wider sector. As explored in chapter 2, respect for the regulator and an 
acceptance of regulation are key in promoting compliance. We therefore recommend that local authorities regularly 
report on the outcomes achieved (e.g. via regular newsletters or on their website), considering this to be an essential 
part of building a positive relationship with the sector. 
A lesson for the wider sector is that the number of prosecutions or other forms of formal activities are not appropriate 
measures of the effectiveness of a regulatory approach. However, a principal issue to be considered is that certain 
actions cannot be measured easily. A strategy of working with a landlord over an extended period to obtain 
compliance or partial compliance, but excluding formal action, does not generate a straightforward measurement. 
Yet, if the goal of enforcement is to ensure that tenants live in accommodation which meets certain standards, then 
such activity is successfully contributing to meeting that goal. We would recommend therefore that local authorities 
should seek to capture informal activity more systematically and report on cases that are resolved by informal and by 
formal action. They should also explore further ways to evaluate the impact of the compliance-focused activities. 
Improving the availability of data 
One particularly notable theme within our case studies was that they drew on different datasets to develop their 
general approach to the PRS. However, certainly in England (but also in other jurisdictions), there was a lack of 
knowledge about the sector at local level. Some case studies sought to improve the availability of data by appointing 
an external organisation to conduct a survey of the sector in the area or used other sources of administrative data, 
such as an interrogation of housing benefit and council tax data. One authority conducted a drone survey of the 
condition of roofs in an area with concerns about damp penetration. 
Whilst the case studies provide interesting examples of practice in this area, these information sources have 
considerable limitations. Following the migration to Universal Credit (held by the DWP), housing benefit data (held by 
the authority) is proving difficult to obtain. Use of other proxies (such as HM Land Registry data) was said to yield very 
limited results. Reports by external organisations were said to be of variable quality. In addition, using council tax or 
housing benefit to identify landlords presupposes they are paying tax which won’t always be the case.177
Administrative data collected by the tenancy deposit schemes offers a potential source of information that could be 
drawn upon to inform local strategies towards both the PRS as a whole and enforcement more specifically. Non-
compliance with the deposit protection requirements may be indicative of a parties’ general approach to compliance. 
However, feedback from our participants suggests that local authorities do not see tenancy deposit scheme data 
as particularly accessible or useful in its current form. Identifying non-compliant landlords only works if the data 
from all three schemes can be easily accessed by local authorities. If all tenancy deposit schemes are willing to share 
relevant data with local authorities, then the question arises regarding how the data can be brought together into 
one database to make it useful for councils to interrogate. If this data were to be routinely used as a resource for local 
authorities, a means of providing the data that is not hugely resource intensive for local authorities or the tenancy 
deposit schemes would need to be developed. 
177  Whilst it was not mentioned in the interviews some commentators have highlighted the problem of tax evasion in the UK PRS. For example, https://www.
lettingagenttoday.co.uk/breaking-news/2017/8/academic-alleges-massive-tax-evasion-throughout-private-rental-sector  and https://www.generationrent.org/
landlord_tax_evasion_what_do_we_know
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Disaggregated data and granular geographical information are key if local authorities are to develop strategies that 
exert effective leverage on the various types of landlords and local housing market conditions. Across the UK there is 
a need for an effective and responsive database that evolves in real time and consequently allows local authorities to 
understand the sector and the way in which it is changing. 
In England, one option for developing this information would be through a system of enforced self/co-regulation that 
introduces a legal requirement for all landlords and letting agents to join a professional association. A data-sharing 
agreement could then be drawn up between the professional association and local authorities.
Co-regulation or enforced self-regulation
Co-regulatory schemes can be somewhat beneficial on a local level, for example, by providing possibilities for mixed 
funding for training schemes to develop landlord knowledge on their obligations. Our research does however 
suggest that a move from the current situation based upon locally-developed practice to a national system of 
enforced co-regulation may not be practical unless there were substantial contextual changes. 
For such a system to work, professional organisations would need to be able and willing to robustly discipline their 
members for infractions of the regulations. Professional landlord organisations currently have a limited membership 
and a defined purpose; those that participated in the interviews emphasised this did not include enforcing against 
their members. Consequently, a national co-regulatory scheme would require a significant reorientation of thinking or 
the emergence of new types of organisation. 
A national co-regulatory scheme would also require a regulatory body - a so-called ‘metaregulator’ - to provide 
independent oversight. The existence of such a body is necessary to ensure that co-regulatory mechanisms were 
being operated robustly and were therefore viewed as legitimate and credible. This would represent a significant 
change to the current regulatory architecture. 
National registration schemes
Unless the changes to the regulatory architecture and the nature of landlord organisations are introduced – so that 
membership of such a body effectively becomes a licence to operate – we are a long way from co-regulation as 
an effective solution for increasing overall compliance. We therefore believe that appropriately designed national 
systems of registration or licensing will be the only means to regulate the sector effectively, including providing local 
authorities with the data they need. National systems of registration and licensing are potentially powerful tools in the 
development and sharing of knowledge about the sector, as well as the upskilling of landlords and letting agents.  
Several academics, industry groups and the MHCLG select committee have called for a national system of registration 
in England. Evidence from elsewhere in the UK suggests registration and licensing schemes can be effective, when 
appropriately designed. Our research adds to this discussion by highlighting further key factors that will need to be 
taken into consideration in introducing and improving national registration schemes: 
Identifying non-compliance 
In principle systems of registration and licensing should provide more complete datasets, which would at least need 
to cover the identity of landlords and properties. The sector is however characterised by fluidity and a lack of landlord 
knowledge about relevant requirements, resulting in the numbers actually registered/licenced falling short of the 
numbers that should be registered/licenced. Proactive enforcement, data sharing protocols and joint working are key 
in identifying non-compliant landlords. A principal example of the former is Rent Smart Wales, where the enforcement 
of the obligations is shared with local authorities as part of their ongoing role in enforcing standards. As explored 
below, effective enforcement practices also play an essential role in ensuring that these schemes are fit for purpose. 
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Scheme objectives 
A further point relates to the objectives of national schemes. In Scotland and Northern Ireland case study participants 
described a deficit in purpose. Several participants in Scotland highlighted – with landlord registration having been 
hastily assembled halfway through a bill change in 2004 as part of the Antisocial Behaviour etc. (Scotland) Act - an 
ongoing debate about what the scheme is aiming to achieve and how effectiveness can be measured. On a local 
level, local authorities in Scotland are also reported to continue focusing on the administration of the scheme rather 
than making it more policy purposeful. In Northern Ireland these issues warrant consideration on a national level 
(see below). This then leads to a key policy recommendation that national systems of registration or licensing require 
greater clarity of purpose, both on a national level and in their enforcement by local authorities.
Information sharing agreements 
If one of the purposes of registration and/or licensing is to expand available information about the sector – a 
legitimate interest of government – the next question is what to do with that information. If the information is used in 
a passive manner or cannot be accessed by local authorities, there may be little point in collecting it. 
The Northern Ireland Assembly should consider whether the national registration scheme as currently configured 
is fit for purpose. The findings suggest that current data sharing restrictions significantly limit its usefulness as a 
means of targeting enforcement and communicating with the sector at local level. The scheme’s potential to 
reduce inadvertent non-compliance by improving the landlords’ understanding of their responsibilities is therefore 
greatly diminished. These restrictions mean that local authorities also lack incentives to enforce it, with our findings 
suggesting that at present little is done to identify those operating outside the scheme. 
Maximising the effectiveness of compliance-focused activity 
Our findings illustrate that an exclusive focus on formal enforcement overlooks some of the most important aspects 
of the work of local authorities. Several of our case studies and Rent Smart Wales prioritised compliance-focused 
models of regulation; whilst they were open to using formal tools where necessary, the primary activities were 
seeking to helping landlords comply. The data illustrates, in some cases, an increased emphasis on providing advice 
and information through dedicated advisors, helplines, training sessions, and other support mechanisms.
Certain characteristics of the UK PRS indicate that these less interventionist measures will often be preferable. For 
example, compared to other regulatory contexts the PRS has a higher level of amateurism. Case studies and key 
stakeholders all reported that most landlords will only own one or two properties and are often accidental landlords. 
Whilst we noted in chapter 2 that a broad range of factors shape compliance, knowledge of the rules and capacity to 
comply appears to be particularly salient within this context. Much non-compliance in the UK PRS does not appear 
to stem from rational calculation but rather from a great many landlords being confused about the rules or failing to 
identify themselves as a business that requires regulatory oversight. Some also lack the necessary economic resources 
and technical knowhow – the capacity – to deliver compliance. 
Inadvertent behaviour among small landlords has long been recognised as the key regulatory challenge. Despite 
growth and change in the sector, local authorities still flagged this as a crucial issue and a main focal point of their 
regulatory activities. Our study provides new insight into why and how local authorities across the UK choose an 
enforcement approach to respond to this challenge. Although informal activity is rarely analysed, we did obtain 
evidence suggesting that with many landlords these activities can be effective in ensuring compliance. The 
effectiveness of compliance-focused activities is also supported by research in many other regulatory contexts. The 
promotion of good practice and the provision of information should be the main strategic and operational priority for 
non-compliant landlords who unintentionally violate the rules. 
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Other reports indicate that local authorities will often apply informal approaches in their regulation of property 
standards. However, at present little is known about the role and impact of compliance-focused enforcement 
activities. In the context of increasing resource constrains that significantly impact on local authorities’ ability to 
deploy formal enforcement mechanisms, it has also become increasingly important to explore the potential and limits 
of these activities. As explored below, our research adds new insights into certain principles and approaches that may 
facilitate the effective use of compliance-focused activities. 
A balanced approach 
Whilst compliance-focused and deterrence-focused activities exist at opposite ends of the spectrum, they are not 
binary options. Although authorities which prioritised either formal or informal activity engaged in actions along the 
spectrum, four distinctive orientations could be identified within the data. 
Some case studies preferred strict measures and a “hard-line approach,” while others favoured non-coercive activities 
and a “light-touch” approach. The findings indicate that a strategy totally based on persuasion, ad hoc advice and 
informal action is likely to be exploited by a minority of landlords. If the local authority is seen as unwilling to apply 
tough enforcement action where appropriate, this may also impact on trust and respect among the wider landlord 
community. On the other hand, to adopt a deterrence-focused approach as a first choice in all circumstances appears 
to be both unaffordable and unworkable. The landlords’ reaction to the licensing of HMOs in Northern Ireland 
provides a stark example of the risk of a hard-line approach breeding hostility and resentment among those willing to 
comply but lacking the necessary knowledge or skills. 
These findings suggest that in isolation neither compliance nor deterrence-focused strategies are likely to be effective 
in a PRS context and that local authorities should aim to combine both approaches. The smart regulation literature 
suggests that the use of multiple rather than single policy instruments usually produces more effective regulation. 
Our findings suggest that there is scope for this principle to be more broadly applied to the PRS. Local authorities 
adopting “compliance-focused” or “creative approaches” clearly demonstrate the benefits of a blended range of tools 
or approaches. 
Adopted strategically 
Most case studies engaged in some level of informal action - regardless of whether this approach had been adopted 
at a strategic level - since the role of an enforcement officer on the ground involves considerable discretion. Our 
findings suggest, however, that less interventionist measures are likely to be most effective when designed and 
delivered at a strategic level as part of a proactive approach. Ad hoc communication with individual landlords will only 
reach a small proportion of the landlord population and consequently can only have a limited impact. In Scotland it 
is imperative that local authorities properly use the national registration scheme to communicate with and upskill the 
sector. In Northern Ireland, these issues warrant consideration at a national level (see above). 
The activities of compliance-focused and creative authorities tended to be multi-channel by using a mixture of online, 
telephone and face-to-face communications. These activities were not restricted to an occasional landlord forum or 
the promotion of accreditation schemes: some interviewees recognised that these activities might be of limited use 
in reaching the non-compliant landlords they meant to target. Rather, compliance-focused approaches appear to be 
most effective when a range of activities are provided systematically and regularly and targeting the sector at large. 
Scottish and Welsh local authorities also reported that the integration of a dedicated landlord advisory function into 
the PRS team increased rates of compliance. Quite apart from the regular changes in the policy and legal framework, 
regular inflows of new landlords into the landlord population implies that engaging with the sector to communicate 
responsibilities and clarify legal obligations needs to be a recurrent – if not continuous – and open-ended activity. 
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Our findings indicate that rural communities may have difficulty provided compliance-focused activities at scale. The 
rural PRS comprises many sub-markets that tend to be geographically dispersed over large areas. If a large part of 
non-compliance in these areas is due to inadvertence, as our case studies suggest, then these activities would be 
all the more important. One of the challenges highlighted by the ongoing COVID-19 crisis is to find ways to provide 
advice and support at a distance. This has challenged the advice sector to adjust the framing and application of 
their practices and to creatively use technology to meet the needs of those using their services. We would invite the 
research community and local authorities to be aware of the various options and learning gained regarding the use of 
digital technologies in providing advice, not simply during this time of social distancing but as a future mechanism for 
overcoming some of these challenges of physical distance. 
Evidence-informed
Effective regulation involves decisions on the appropriate blend of enforcement strategies for the particular context 
that is being regulated. The emphasis given to either compliance or deterrence-focused activities will depend on 
the context. If research identifies a high level of intentional criminal activity, a local authority may choose to focus 
primarily on tough enforcement action. Equally, if non-compliance in an area is predominantly due to inadvertence or 
a lack of knowledge, then education-based strategies may be prioritised. Regardless of the tools that are prioritised, it 
is essential that these decisions are evidence-informed. 
In areas with a high level of intentional criminality it may be necessary to focus on the highest risk. However, this 
approach may lead to a significant amount of non-compliance remaining unaddressed. Inadvertent non-compliance 
may still cause significant harm in the lives of tenants, and in these areas compliance-focused activity must still form 
part of the overarching regulatory approach. 
Greater nuance in the language of non-compliance
Policy discussions on the PRS can suggest a binary distinction between the majority of responsible landlords and the 
minority which are deviant in some way; the “criminals” or “rogues”. Such a distinction is unhelpful in the context of 
enforcement and the reasons for non-compliance in the UK PRS. One of our participants emphasised that the positive 
connotations of the term “rogue” do no justice to the seriousness of the offences that are committed. More generally, 
the term is unhelpful and unlikely to resonate with the many landlords who may not wilfully neglect the law. Nor 
does it resonate with those local authorities that expend significant effort in responding to serious criminal behaviour. 
On the other hand, by focusing attention on a subsector of criminal landlords the distinction risks downplaying the 
incidence and potential impact of regulatory breaches elsewhere in the sector.178 It is an unhelpful reference point for 
the design and promotion of effective enforcement practices. 
The availability of resources 
A blend of different enforcement strategies is costly. Local authorities already struggle with operating in the 
challenging context of meeting increased demand with increasingly constrained resources. Resources are a key factor 
affecting implementation of strategies; not just funds for services but also personnel with the necessary skills and 
experience to deliver successful enforcement actions. The evidence suggests that a lack of resources has become a 
significant deterrent to carrying out prosecution activity. Services require adequate funding to develop appropriate 
178  Such breaches can, as we have noted, be the result of ignorance or inadvertence. This was certainly a view we heard from interviewees across our case studies. 
However, that does not exhaust the possibilities. For example, in the specific context of harassment and unlawful eviction Marsh et al (2000) noted that ’good’ 
landlords can sometimes knowingly engage in bad practices (eg unlawful eviction) while rationalising them as being justified by ’good’ reasons (eg. to deal with 
troublesome tenant behaviour quicker than is possible through formal channels, out of consideration for other local residents). Hence neatly distinguishing ’good’ 
from ’bad’ landlords with respect to the legality of their management practice is more complex than simple binaries imply. See A. Marsh, R. Forrest, P. Kennett, P. 
Niner, and D. Cowan (2000) Harassment and unlawful eviction of private rented sector tenants and park home residents, London: Department of Environment, Transport 
and the Regions.
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and effective responses to the changing nature and context of the PRS. In England, the Housing, Communities and 
Local Government Committee also recommends that ‘while councils need to be better at enforcing standards, the 
Government needs to provide  more resources for councils to ensure they have the capacity to enforce the law’.179
Although some additional funding has become available in England, this is usually made available through a bidding 
process operated on extremely tight timescales and is generally only available for short-term projects. Our research 
suggests that such staccato projects are not the most effective way to assist the development of the longer-term 
strategies that are needed.
Prevention 
These observations indicate a further need to consider prevention and the role of local authorities in encouraging 
adherence to standards. Most case studies adopted a traditional and relatively reactive approach to regulation. 
Enforcement action takes place either in response to an activity that produces a dangerous situation or in response 
to the realisation of harm. The development of new compliance-focused approaches – such as the dedicated 
advisory function of some Scottish councils; the introduction of a landlord helpline in Northern Ireland funded by 
the Department for Communities;180 or the adoption of “Call before you serve” Service in England181 – suggests a 
growing concern for the prevention of harm in the first place. These initiatives could potentially reduce the level of 
non-compliance from inadvertence and thereby prevent more costly enforcement action. It is important to note, 
however, that less interventionist measures must operate within the shadow of the law, where formal enforcement is 
understood by landlords to be a viable and credible option (see below). 
Responsive regulatory approaches 
The recommendation that compliance-focused measures are adopted at a strategic level, raises questions about how 
they can be provided alongside formal enforcement activities. The findings illustrate how the prioritisation of the use 
of different tools in the PRS is underpinned by different assumptions and enforcement philosophies. For example, 
when non-compliance is assumed to result mainly from deliberate rule avoidance and formal action is seen as an 
effective deterrent, then a hard-line approach may be adopted. If it is believed that persuasion is more effective in 
ensuring landlord compliance, then a light-touch approach may be prioritised. This report, by highlighting the diversity 
of models in operation, makes a new contribution to current understandings of enforcement in the UK PRS.
The findings indicate that some case studies adopt responsive regulation in order to effectively combine different 
approaches in practice. This is also known as a pyramidic approach or graded response. Here persuasion, advice, 
support and assistance are applied as strategies of first choice and it is in this area that the bulk of regulatory action is 
taken. The principle is that the regulatory agency escalates to more punitive responses where prior efforts have failed 
to secure compliance. 
The importance of a responsive and proportionate approach has been highlighted elsewhere. For example, in 
England the Rogue Landlord Guidance reports that effective authorities adopt an escalated approach for both 
repeat offenders and for those who do not engage with initial interventions. Our research indicates, however, that 
consciously pyramidic approaches are only occasionally adopted at a strategic level and are rarely communicated to 
the sector (e.g., online or in regular newsletters). Whilst many officers told us that they would adapt their approach 
to the behaviour and attitude of the regulatee, we identified only one example among our case studies of a graded 
response to enforcement being outlined in a written enforcement strategy and made publicly available. 
179 Housing, Communities and Local Government Committee (2020) Building more social housing: Third Report of Session 2019-21 (Accessed: 27/7/20).
180 Department for Communities in NI has funded operation of a Landlord Helpline since 2016: this is provided, on their behalf, by Housing Rights, is free at point 
of delivery and deals with over 1500 calls per year. Its aim is to encourage statutory compliance and promote good practice amongst landlords and letting agents 
operating in the private rented sector
181 https://www.dashservices.org.uk/Shared-Services/CallBeforeYouServe
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As discussed in chapter 2, trust and respect for the regulator are important factors in achieving compliance. 
Compliance is most likely when an agency displays an explicit enforcement pyramid that clearly illustrates a local 
authority’s desire to work with landlords in the first instance and illustrates the ability and willingness to apply 
sanctions that are less drastic – and therefore more realistic – than prosecution.182 At the same time, it can give 
clarity regarding the circumstances in which the local authority will choose immediate escalation to more formal 
action. A clearly articulated enforcement pyramid can lead to less inconsistency and greater procedural fairness in 
the approaches adopted by officers. Rather than escalation, or de-escalation, being applied at the discretion of the 
individual enforcement officers, this should be part of the enforcement strategy. 
Pyramidic approaches depend on the availability of a range of enforcement tools. In each jurisdiction in our study the 
enforcement toolbox had grown considerably over the past 10 to 15 years. Rent repayment orders, civil penalties, rent 
stopping orders, fixed penalty notices, along with the ability to charge for traditional enforcement notices, have been 
designed as alternatives to prosecution. Each jurisdiction now follows a different path regarding the availability and 
use of these measures and has a different approach on deterrence from traditional criminal law. 
A number of authorities and Rent Smart Wales successfully apply civil penalties and rent penalty notices respectively 
as part of a responsive approach underpinned by a robust enforcement policy. Civil penalties are applied when softer, 
more informal enforcement activities have not been successful and the situation progresses to the next tier of the 
regulatory pyramid. A further escalation to criminal prosecution is relatively rare, which indicates its effectiveness of 
civil penalties in achieving compliance. 
Enforcement strategies generally require political “buy-in”. For example, in one of our case studies in England, the 
authority decided not to use civil penalties because of concerns among local councillors that this would affect a 
landlord’s business. This was, of course, the point of making substantial financial penalties available. Hence, local 
policymakers in this case study are rejecting the premise upon which the policy is based. This kind of rationale at 
local level reflects a belief that the local authority should have a limited or residual role, as was the case among 
those adopting a light-touch approach. Our findings however indicate that elsewhere civil penalties can be effective 
when used as part of a responsive regulatory approach and underpinned by a robust enforcement strategy: the size 
of the potential penalties – precisely because they were big enough to affect the landlord’s business - was seen as 
contributing to their effectiveness in bringing landlords to compliance.
The biggest stick: criminal prosecution 
Our findings suggest that the threat of further action helps to make civil penalties an effective tool, with landlords 
being made aware that they should expect further escalation to prosecution if they do not co-operate. Case studies 
reported that in such cases landlords would usually work with the local authority to avoid a criminal record. 
The compliance literature also suggests that the effectiveness of pyramidic approaches will be affected by the level 
of punitiveness to which an agency can escalate their response.183 Even if rarely used, the severity of the sanction 
at the tip of the pyramid figures as an effective deterrent and signals meaningful escalation is possible. Our case 
studies reported that, although it was very rare, sometimes the response needed to be escalated further to criminal 
prosecution. Reinforcing the findings from the 2018 MHCLG select committee report, our participants felt that civil 
penalties were not severe enough to deter the worst of offenders. Criminal prosecution remains an important tool for 
local authorities.184
182 Ayres and Braithwaite, Responsive regulation
183 Ayres and Braithwaite, Responsive regulation
184 Housing, Communities and Local Government Committee (MHCLG) (2018) Private rented sector: Fourth Report of Session 2017-19
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Our research however suggests that both the regulatory efforts of local authorities and the effective responsive 
regulation in the PRS are seriously undermined by the low fines and other sentences issued by the courts and 
tribunals. Even for cases where prosecutions were successful, stories were shared by numerous participants about low 
levels of fines for apparently egregious offences and successful defences which, on the face of it, appeared “creative”. 
If governments are to promote effective responsive approaches, then the “biggest stick” needs to be significantly 
bigger than is currently the case. 
The law as it currently stands makes it extremely difficult for trading standards in England successfully to use 
responsive approaches in their regulation of the PRS. Penalty charge notices can only be served against the legal 
entity which owns the business, which in most instances is a limited company. If/when the local authority is successful 
in levying the civil penalty, which the legislation indicates is the standard course of action for a first offence, the 
agency will simply dissolve and restart under a different name. The local authority must then begin the whole process 
again. Consequently, it is extremely difficult for trading standards to apply an escalated response. 
A range of enforcement tools 
For responsive regulation to be effective, the local authority needs to have access to a range of informal and 
formal sanctions. A smarter approach to enforcement is one where the local authority’s toolkit contains a range of 
approaches to drive improvements in the sector.
Legal transplants between devolved governments are generally hazardous since they do not account for local culture 
and differentiation. In addition, in Northern Ireland and Scotland the law has developed from a different base than is 
the case for Westminster, and we should be wary of simplistic transfers of laws. However, both the use of fixed penalty 
notices for lower level offences in Wales and the implementation of the civil penalty regime in England suggest fresh 
thinking that allows adaptation across jurisdictions.  
Publicising civil penalties 
A new theme identified in our research is a general reluctance on the part of authorities in England to publicise the 
use of civil penalties because of concerns that landlords will see these types of financial penalties as bureaucratic 
self-serving behaviour and as levied by authorities simply to raise revenue. Publicity of such activities can, however, 
be approached in a number of ways, such as for instance by demonstrating its effect on landlord behaviour (e.g., a 
bad landlord exiting the sector). As explored above, demonstrating the outcomes and impacts of the enforcement 
regime is key in building effective relationships with the sector, and publicity about such activities may therefore still 
be desirable. Our online research identified one example of this taking place on an anonymous basis.185
A tenant-focused approach
The goal of local authorities in regulating standards in the sector is to ensure that tenants have a healthy and safe 
home; a goal recognised even in areas with the most light-touch enforcement strategies. However, there is a sense 
in which tenant behaviour is also seen as problematic, such as when considering motivations for complaining to the 
authority and decisions on whether to proceed with complaints.
185 https://www.lettingagenttoday.co.uk/breaking-news/2020/1/huge-18-000-penalty-for-landlord-who-failed-to-improve-property
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We were told that, on the one hand, tenants often complain about standards because they are looking for something 
better (usually social housing). It is reasonable to assume that this behaviour is associated with feelings of precarity 
and insecurity, which research has shown to be associated with renting privately, particularly among lower-income 
households.186 On the other hand, we were told that tenants would often not pursue a complaint because of concerns 
about retaliatory eviction by their landlords or would simply move property to escape the problem if they had that 
choice. Enforcement action will usually rely on a complainant who is willing to give evidence so a decision not to 
pursue a complaint will have a significant impact upon a local authority’s enforcement activity. 
Local authorities were also aware that many tenants do not make complaints for a number of reasons: they might 
not be aware of the local authority’s role in enforcement; they might have vulnerabilities or otherwise be exploited 
by a landlord - in, for example, cases of modern slavery; or they could be afraid of the authority, which is particularly 
prevalent among certain migrant communities. 
There is (rightly) much discussion about the ways in which local authorities can engage with landlords and letting 
agents. There is less discussion about ways of engaging with tenants, with very few local authorities seeking to 
address the above issues in any kind of systematic or structured way. In contrast, among those which adopted creative 
approaches to enforcement, supporting tenants was the key focus of their activities. Their strategies illustrate options 
to focus on tenant vulnerabilities, with their approach extending far beyond a focus on property standards.  
Across the UK, the advice and support needs of tenants may be addressed via policy areas such as health and social 
care, anti-poverty strategies, or debt reduction. Additionally, a wide array of voluntary sector organisations provide 
advice and support for tenants. However, as emphasised in a recent report by Shelter, strategic partnerships in respect 
of the private rented sector are usually underdeveloped and, in the UK, there is no single policy framework in place 
that addresses the advice and support needs of private renters.187 Creative authorities demonstrate the benefits 
of building strategic collaborations with a wide array of services in order to meet the advice and support needs of 
renters by, for example, effective signposting or referral processes. Where they do exist, specialist housing advice 
services can provide advice and support for private renters who are vulnerable or have more complex issues and 
needs. Local authorities have a key role to play in improving pathways to access these services, which may in turn 
help prevent homelessness among private renters. 
Recommendations for local authorities 
All local authorities in the UK should develop more detailed PRS strategies. 
l	 When formulating their strategy, local authorities should adopt an overarching goal, clear aims and objectives, and 
an explicit definition of the problem they are aiming to address.
l	 Local authorities should integrate and, wherever possible, co-locate landlord registration alongside other housing 
services.  
l	 Local strategies need to reflect the needs of private renters and consider the specific issues experienced by 
vulnerable tenants. 
l	 Local authority enforcement teams should aim to build strategic collaborations with a range of internal and 
external partners to assist in the identification of poor property conditions and in signposting tenants to the 
needed support. 
186 K. McKee, A.M. Soaita and J. Hoolachan (2019) ‘‘Generation rent’ and the emotions of private renting: self-worth, status and insecurity amongst low-income renters’, 
Housing Studies
187 Shelter Scotland, Where to Turn
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Local authorities should aim to improve the ways in which positive outcomes are defined, recorded and communicated to the 
wider sector. 
l	 Local authorities should move away from an output-focused approach and communicate success in terms of 
outcomes achieved.  
l	 Local authorities should report on cases resolved both by informal and by formal action.
l	 Wherever possible, the impact of compliance-focused activities should be evaluated. 
l	 Outcomes of enforcement activity should be regularly communicated to landlords and letting agents as part of 
building a positive relationship with the sector. 
Strategies that are entirely based on either compliance or deterrence-focused activities are unlikely to be effective in a PRS 
context. UK local authorities should aim to combine both approaches.
l	 Local authorities should provide a range of compliance-focused activities as part of their overarching strategic 
approach. This could include, for example, training sessions, a dedicated advice service, landlord forums, online 
information and regular newsletters. 
l	 In Scotland local authorities should use the national registration scheme to communicate with and upskill the 
sector. 
l	 Rural local authorities should learn from the experience of COVID-19 to explore how digital technologies can be 
used to share advice and information with the sector. 
l	 Compliance-focused activities must operate in the shadow of the law, with formal enforcement offered as a viable 
alternative.
l	 Pyramidic or responsive approaches to enforcement (where adopted) should be part of the enforcement strategy 
and clearly communicated to the sector. 
Recommendation for Governments 
UK and devolved governments should improve the advice and guidance available to UK local authorities on regulating the 
PRS. This should include advice on:
l	 Multi-agency working and building effective partnerships with public services and external partners. The focus 
of these activities should be to identify poor conditions, target enforcement activity, and provide tenants with 
needed support. 
l	 Processes to integrate services or coordinate operations where co-location or the creation of new organisational 
forms is not a realistic objective.
l	 In England, consideration should be given to the issues faced by two-tier local authorities with responsibilities 
across those authorities. 
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UK and devolved governments should improve the data available to local authorities on the PRS.
l	 In England, a national registration system of all landlords as well as letting agents should be introduced.
l	 National schemes of registration or licensing should have clear aims and purpose.
l	 The Northern Ireland Assembly should consider whether the national registration scheme as currently configured 
is fit for purpose. Current data sharing restrictions are significantly limiting its usefulness as a means of targeting 
enforcement and communicating with the sector at a local level.
Given the significance of the regulatory role played, and of the private rented sector itself, UK and devolved governments 
should re-consider their approaches to resource allocation to local authorities. 
l	 Local authorities should receive, and allocate, adequate funding to develop appropriate and effective responses to 
the changing nature and context of the PRS.
l	 Funding programmes need to build in sustainable longer-term goals, as opposed to short-term sticking plasters. 
UK and devolved governments should consider technical amendments to the existing suite of legislation, as well as 
codification of the diverse legislative provisions which currently exist.
l	 The various provisions regarding the regulation of the PRS are found in diverse locations of primary and secondary 
legislation, with statutory guidance.  Codification is good practice, particularly bearing in mind the needs of the 
landlord community.
l	 Clearer sentencing guidelines need to be provided to criminal courts to ensure that punishment is proportionate 
to the nature of the offence.
l	 Trading standards should be entitled to serve civil penalties against the company directors who are the controlling 
figures behind the company form.
l	 Data sharing between local authorities and other agencies such as Universal Credit, that hold data that would 
facilitate more effective enforcement should be enabled.
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